The Lesson [i]
The great military lesson of the present war is the lesson of munitions. The failure of treaty and fort, the increasing effectiveness of great gun and machine gun, the menace of battle cruiser, submarine, and aeroplane, the value of trenches and command of the seas—these, too, are lessons of far-reaching importance, hut the greatest is that of munitions.
There has come about a change in the relative importance of the various factors concerned in the prosecution of war, a change not yet wholly realized by those most intimately and vitally concerned. Formerly, it was largely a question of generalship, or numbers and morale of troops, that determined the victory. Now, surely it is no disparagement to the skill of the strategist, to the vigilance of the tactician, or to the valor of the soldier in the ranks, to say that victory will rest with that side which can maintain the combat most vigorously and for the longest time.
The successful conduct of war demands organization to the last detail of all the resources of the nation in men and material. It is not only proper but necessary to divert the ordinary channels of trade to make them subserve the needs of the nation. Business should not proceed as usual, and the industrial organization should be made to conform to the dire national necessity.
Modern warfare has developed into a national industrial undertaking, as much as a specialized military one. In fact, there is as much for the industrial organizer to do as there is for the soldier. Fleets and armies are powerful only when constant mobility is assured and when the material necessary for their efficient operation can be supplied when and where needed, maintaining at the same time a reserve for a superhuman effort when the progress of the fight requires it.
The great fact is that the effectiveness of military forces is largely dependent upon the efficiency of the industries supplying those forces. In something more than a figurative sense, therefore, we may say that the army and navy can go nowhere unless they are carried there upon the backs of mechanics and factory hands— and who can say which is the more important in warfare, the factory or the trench?
But best the relative importance of our machine shops, for instance, be not yet appreciated, consider for an instant the Allies’ great offensive of September 25, 1915. There were fired in this single engagement over 1,000,000 shells from the French “ seventy- fives ” alone, some of the guns firing twenty a minute. These shells weigh 18 pounds apiece, so that 10,000 tons of material were expended. As it takes five hours to make each shell, 1,000,000 shells will take 5,000,000 hours, or the work of 625,000 men for an 8-hour day. Four large shops employing 500 men each will require a year to make this number of shells, to be fired in a single day’s action. Assuming that 600,000 men are engaged in such an action and that it lasts eight hours, it will take 25,000 more men to make the shell than it does to fight the battle.
The army has organized and coordinated to a high degree the activities of the trench, and its allied accessories, the field gun, machine gun, rifle, bayonet, mine, grenade, pick, and electric wire; as has the navy in the case of propulsive machinery, guns, torpedoes, mines, etc.; but what we have yet to learn, and what European nations learned only as the result of nearly a year of conflict, is to organize the industrial activities for war and to coordinate them with the military activities. The fact that should constantly he borne in mind is that the men in the field and in the fleet will suffer and die in vain if the supply of shot and shell, guns and gear, ships and engines, armor and armament, is not maintained in the fullest measure, and these must be supplied by the industrial. Perfect industrial organization will, of course, never compensate for deficient military skill; its importance, however, due do the large number of forces engaged and to the almost unbelievable wastage of ammunition, guns, transport vehicles, and war supplies in general, has heretofore been greatly underestimated.
Logistics
The details for moving and supplying armies and fleets, including all the operations, except purely strategical ones, conducted outside the field of battle and leading up to it constitute that branch of the military art known as logistics.
In its relation to strategy, logistics[ii] assumes the character of a dynamic force. . . . .
The strategic conception may he that of a genius, but if it he not based on a solid foundation of logistic facts, it can have no force and will he of no effect, unless, indeed, it lead directly to disaster.
There can be no more striking example of this than the disasters that overtook the Russian armies in the spring of 1915. Their machine shops and powder factories were simply inadequate to supply ammunition in sufficient quantities. The same thing indirectly held true in England and France until the fall of 1915, though to a less degree. In spite of earnest warnings before and even after the declaration of war the Allies were a unit in their belief in the old doctrine that,' given a national determination to fight and win, the material energies would sooner or later find their way into the right channels. Early in the war Lord Kitchener announced to workmen engaged in the manufacture of war munitions, “that they, in carrying out the great work of supplying munitions, are doing their duty for their king and country equally with those who have joined the army for active service in the field.” At the time this was considered rather as a diplomatic utterance designed to conciliate the labor interests, and its full significance as a statement of fact was not appreciated by either the workman or the nation until many months later.
The doctrine of a “nation in arms” had not yet become generally accepted, but gradually the vastness of the effort entailed in organized preparation for definite military tasks was realized. Frequent defeats and the abandonment of repeated offensives due to lack of munitions finally overthrew the established peace-time governments. Coalition governments were, set up in their stead, and these evolved the machinery to assure the organization of the national resources, Some delay ensued until all the delicate governmental mechanism could be adjusted to the needs of the occasion, which by then were very pressing, but from this time on material improvement could be noticed in the logistic plans of the Allies.
The Question
Without further elaboration, then, of those facts with which virtually all military and lay minds agree, let us ask what should be done to organize our industrial resources so as to overcome the delays that have been so disastrous to the cause of the Allies.
The answer, to be complete, cannot be brief. What follows, therefore, must be considered as an outline of what the answer should embrace rather than the answer itself.
The Answer
The actual quantity and the precise quality of munitions needed should first be determined. This estimate should be furnished by the General Staffs of the army and navy, and the importance of accurately predetermining it can hardly be better illustrated than to quote an excerpt from Lloyd (George's speech introducing the Munitions of War Bill before the House of Commons the latter part of June, 1915:
In order to understand the whole depth of meaning of. the problem wo are confronted with, I would almost say that ultimate victory or defeat in tiffs war depends upon the supply of munitions which the rival countries can produce and with which they can equip their armies in the field. That is the cardinal fact of the military situation. When the Germans establish a superiority on any front it is due to a preponderance in the material of war. When they are driving the forces of the Allies before them in any quarter of the field it is due to the same cause. When the Allies are making progress in any part of the line it is due to the fact that in that section of the battlefield the Allies have predominance of the munitions of war. . . . .
Expense of Advance Preparation
Having determined the amount of munitions necessary we must see clearly bow impracticable and undesirable it would be to maintain such a stock always on hand. In time of peace no Congress could ever be persuaded to appropriate the money for its manufacture, no sane person would recommend tying up indefinitely so large a fund as would he needed to pay for it, the losses from deterioration would be serious, and vast quantities of stores might becomes obsolete over night on account of new inventions and more advanced practice in the art of making war. This “preparedness against war,” upon which so much thought is now being expended, is, after all, purely a relative condition. In a concrete sense there is really no such thing. No sooner have the best of rifles been supplied an army than some one invents a light; reliable machine gun, necessitating the creation of a new set of experts for its operation; by this time an improved type of field gun appears, and we must have that too. Aeroplanes, airships, motorcycles, search-lights, and every other device and invention must he provided and men trained to use them. To attempt to realize such a notion is to pursue a will o’ the wisp that will lead far astray its most painstaking and vigilant followers. It is not, then, so much a great reserve in advance as the capacity for manufacturing rapidly and accurately when the necessity arises.
Government Arsenals of Necessity Inadequate
There has already been a clash between those who feel that this capacity should be provided in government shops and those who would Obtain it through private plants; Taking into account the rate at which ammunition is now expended, the former plan would Wean the erection of huge plants that would lie idle for long periods. Some idea of the capacity of the arsenals required may be obtained by considering the proposition with which the British War Office was confronted in the fall of 1914:
The total army estimates had been £28,000,000 in a year of peace. They suddenly became £700,000,000. All that represents not merely 25 times as much money, hut it means 20 or 25 times as much work. It means more than that. It had to he done under pressure. The sort of work which) in a business, takes years to build up, develop, strengthen and improve, had suddenly to be done, in five or six months. The War Office Staff arc a devoted, hard-working, capable lot of men, but they were not enough. And there is another consideration which cannot he left out of account—that men who are quite equal to running without a hitch a long-established business on long-established lines, may not always be adequate to the task of organizing and administering a business 30 times the size on novel and original lines.[iii]
Not only would our government arsenals be inadequate, but even such great plants as the Winchester, Remington, Bethlehem Steel, and Baldwin Locomotive, would be unable to supply the huge demands. Moreover, we would always have to take account of the geographical locations of these establishments and the grave possibility of their falling into the hands of an invader. Furthermore, even though we were to consider these and similar large firms as parent plants, it would still be highly desirable to utilize the services of smaller plants for the manufacture of the parts of the various completed articles. The task before us now is not to set up new plants, but to put into effect a practical, efficient system for mobilizing existing plants. In the first instance this resolves itself into a question of organization of industrial plants and of training them to produce certain definite products in the event of war.
Department of Munitions
At the present time no governmental machinery exists, to enable such a plan to be put into operation. It will be necessary for Congress to provide by law for a Department of Munitions. It must be a department, not a bureau, because, among other functions, it will be required to coordinate the needs of a number of bureaus under both the War and Navy Departments, and because nothing less than a department could be vested with the power it would be necessary to give it to perform its function. Its head should be co-equal with the other secretaries and should not be an officer of the army or navy, The primary duties of such a department will be to deal with the commercial or business interests of the country, and a civilian in close touch with labor conditions and with rapid and economical production on a large scale would seem to be the man best qualified for the position. His staff should consist of specialists in the army and navy, leading civilian engineers and specialists selected from manufacturing concerns. Provision should be made by law so that, in time of war, any powers or duties of a government department may be transferred to, and exercised by the Secretary of Munitions.
In time of war it should lie lawful for the Department of Munitions:
- To require that there be placed at its disposal the whole or any part of the output of any factory or workshop of whatever sort;
- To take possession of and use for the purpose of the government’s naval or military service any such factory or the plant thereof;
- To require any work in any factory or workshop to be done in accordance with the directions of the Army or Navy General Staff in order to make the factory or workshop or the plant thereof or labor therein as useful as possible for the production of war material;
- To regulate or restrict the carrying on of any work in the factory or workshop, or other premises, or the engagement or employment of any workman on all or any classes of work therein, or to transfer the plant therefrom with a view to maintaining or increasing the production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or premises;
- To regulate and control the supply of metals and materials that may be required for any article for use in war;
- To take possession of any unoccupied premises for the purpose of housing workmen employed in the production, storage, or transport of war material.
Compensation for Plant if Commandeered
Should it become necessary to thus virtually commandeer a plant, some measure of compensation should be allowed, which while “not the same complete measure of compensation which you would enforce in time of peace when you take a man's property,” should nevertheless substantially recompense the firm for such losses as they might thus be forced to suffer. Certain difficulties arc sure to come up that can best be contended with by express act of Congress. The law should consequently provide that where fulfilment of any prior contract is interfered with by the necessity of complying with any requirements or restrictions of the Department of Munitions, such necessity will constitute a good defence to any action or proceedings against the firm for the non-fulfilment of the contract, so far as it may he due to that interference.
Establish a Register of Plants
It should be lawful for the Department of Munitions to require the owner of any establishment in which persons are employed to give information periodically to the Department of Munitions, in such form as the department may require, as to
- The numbers and classes of persons employed in the establishment;
- The numbers and classes of machines at any such establishments;
- The nature of the work on which any such persons are employed, or any such machines, are engaged;
- Any other data which the secretary may desire for the purpose of his powers and duties.
The Department of Munitions should also have access to such information in the hands of other government departments as may have been collected under the National Defence Secrets Act.[iv]
The department should then record these industrial resources by preparing a file, containing the names of firms and the contemplated articles of parts which each is best equipped to manufacture. When the data thus obtained have been carefully analyzed, it will be found that the business of munition-making will be absolutely new to a great many concerns well equipped for it; the next step is then to inform all firms as to precisely what they may be required to do. For this it would be necessary to call upon the technical Bureaus of the War and Navy Departments for a suitable number of detailed plans and specifications, and even samples, for distribution. It would be advisable to organize certain factories to produce jigs, gages, etc., so that when new and untried factories are called upon, standard jigs and tools could accompany the order so that the work could proceed without delay. It would also be advisable each year to place a small order with as many different firms as possible for maintaining the stock of those items they might be called upon to produce, and to establish an “ Acceptable List ” of those firms whose product was found to be uniformly satisfactory. In his splendid campaign of mobilization of England’s manufacturing resources, Lloyd George was everywhere met with this query:
Tell us what you want to do. We are all right; we are all willing; we are all eager. It is not a question of there being any sort of delay, as far as we are concerned. It is not a question of our having any disinclination to place our shops at your disposal, hut we want to know exactly what it is you arc asking us to do.
Decentralization
In the practical application of this plan it will soon be appreciated that the geographical size of the country will involve endless delays in communication; and in time of war it will be impracticable from one central authority to give decisions on the great number of details that will require immediate settlement. It is suggested, therefore, that we resort to decentralization to the extent of establishing a suitable number of “munition areas,” not less than 10, each to be served by a responsible representative of the department, who should preferably be an expert civilian engineer in close touch with local business men and labor conditions. He should have an “organizing secretary,” and representatives of the General Staffs of the army and navy should be associated with this office in such a way that it would act as a “clearing house for work, for labor, or for information.”
Register Skilled Mechanics
In each munition area an accurate register should be kept of all skilled mechanics and miners (with special reference to supervising artisans and draftsmen), who could be employed on the production of war supplies. Arrangements should be made with recruiting officers of the army and navy through their respective departments, to exclude from enlistment those men who would he of greater value in industrial than in military service.
Badges and Diligent Service Medals
The Secretary of Munitions should be authorized by law to establish rules in time of war, relative to the issuance and wearing of badges or other distinctive marks by persons employed on munition work, and to prescribe penalties for the misuse of such badges. A nation-wide campaign should be undertaken by the department to educate employers and workmen as to their national obligations when working on munitions. The importance of keeping full time should be brought home to men of all classes. In the manufacture of war supplies many different trades are involved, and broken time or absenteeism of employees in one trade holds up the work of many other trades with consequent delay in the completion of the ship, gun, or projectile. As an incentive toward good time keeping it would be advisable to authorize the issuance of “diligent service ” medals and premiums for steady attendance and efficient performance during a war.[v]
Issue Shop Regulations
The secretary should have full power in time of war to issue regulations relating to order, discipline, timekeeping and efficiency in shops and mines producing war materials. Penalties should be prescribed for their infraction, involving fines or imprisonment. The following rules used during the war in British factories indicate the nature of the above regulations:
Regularity and Diligence.—Every person employed in the establishment, whether on time, piece, or otherwise, shall attend regularly and work diligently during the ordinary working hours of the establishment, and a reasonable amount of overtime (including week-end work), if required, unless he has previous leave of absence for holidays or otherwise, or is prevented by sickness or some other unavoidable cause, which shall he immediately reported.
Suspension of Restrictions.—No person employed shall insist, or attempt to insist, on the observance, either by himself or by any other person employed, of any rule, practice, or custom tending to restrict the rate of production of any class of work, or to limit the employment of any class or person, or otherwise tending to restrict production or employment.
Sobriety and Good Order.—No person employed shall (a) be the worse for liquor in the establishment or bring intoxicating liquors into the establishment, (b) Refuse or neglect to obey the lawful orders of any person having authority over him. (c) Create or take part in any disturbance in the establishment, or use abusive language or otherwise interfere with or annoy any other person employed in the establishment, (d) Tear down or deface any regulations, rules, or other notices posted in the establishment in pursuance of the Munitions of War Act.
Provision Against Lock-outs and Strikes
The law should provide that an employer shall not declare a lock-out, nor shall any employees take part in a strike, in connection with any difference as to wages, or working conditions, unless such differences have been reported to the department and at least one month has elapsed without settlement. Heavy penalties of fines or imprisonment should he set covering such strikes and lockouts.
Employers, unions, and individual workmen should all he made to realize how necessary is this regulation of their function. After all, in every phase of communal life voluntary action is exceedingly limited. All law is compulsory, and trade unions themselves are the very essence of compulsion. It is manifestly unfair to require men to undergo the rigors and risks of life in the trenches without at the same time requiring their comrades in the shops to exert themselves to the utmost under rigorous rules. These latter should not he free to work only when it pleases them. Clearly, in time of national stress, the liberty of the individual must be restricted according to the needs of the nation. Here as elsewhere compulsion, in itself, is an evil thing, but with the nation at war there is more at stake than the health of the individual, more than the cherished and often justifiable principles of trade- unionism.
Limitation of Output
There is a further very important phase of the trade-union problem to which reference must be made—that of restriction of output. Trade-unionism in its attempt to pull down the individual output to the class level has prescribed certain rules, perhaps essential in peace time, for the protection of the workman from undue pressure and strain. There is little doubt that if these rules were suspended for a long course of years, the men in certain establishments would be unduly exhausted. These rules are unquestionably founded on the necessity in normal times for the protection of labor against undue claims upon its strength. They take a variety of forms, such as limiting the daily unit output per man, prohibiting unskilled labor from performing certain classes of work customarily performed by skilled mechanics, or prohibiting one man from tending more than one machine.
There arc those who believe that this important matter can best he solved in a democratic form of government like ours by certain working agreements during war time between the department and labor leaders. They forget that in many cases the men become quite intractible. Moreover, the tenure of office of labor leaders— their very source of sustenance—depends entirely on the good Will of the men, and any voluntary agreements ” can only proceed a certain way along the line of forcible action before the leaders must ultimately yield to influences sure to be exerted by competitors for their posts.
With the nation at war it would be a grave and wholly unjustifiable concession to recalcitrancy, if the law did not forbid under penalty of fine or imprisonment, or both, any rule, practice, or custom tending to restrict production or employment in munition plants and mines.
There are, of course, two sides to this question, and before such a law can be passed it will be necessary to dispel the fear of the men that the employers will make exorbitant profits, and to assure them that labor conditions prior to the war will he resumed upon the advent of peace. Until we can satisfy these two conditions, we cannot consistently demand the maximum efforts of the workmen.
Control of Profits
The problem of limiting the excessive profits that are possible in the business of munition-making is perhaps the most difficult of all to solve; it begins in time of peace during “the preparation for defence” stage. We all know the vast strength and influence of the great armament firms, and many of us know, too, that there have been grave scandals in other countries, even including the inciting of conflict, to further the sale of arms and munitions. After war has been actually begun, the possibilities for individual profits become almost limitless, and under such conditions it is hypocritical and wholly inconsistent to call workmen unpatriotic for demanding shorter hours or increased wages proportional to the increased profit secured by their employers. It is a hard statement, but it is nevertheless true, that there are always a few who arc ready to take advantage of the necessities of their country even in time of war. Excessive profits paid on munitions add materially to the inevitable burden of taxation that later must be shared by (he laboring class, the soldiers and sailors who return from the front, and the dependents of those who have lost their lives in defence of their country. It becomes, therefore, imperative for the law to provide that if the Secretary of Munitions considers it expedient for the purpose of successful prosecution of the war that any munition establishment, in whole or in part, whether original contractor, or sub-contractor, should he subject to special limitation of employers’ profits, he may declare that
- The companies engaged on such munitions can earn a return on their capital only one-half more than in the three complete financial years preceding the outbreak of the war, determined in accordance with certain rules to be made by the secretary with regard to value of plant, depreciation, etc.[vi]
- Any excess of the net profits so determined should revert to the treasury.
It is realized that this legislation and departmental regulation of employers’ profits and trade-union principles, even though impartially imposed on employer and worker, borders very closely upon a violation of certain fundamental principles of our government; but war is itself the quintessence of fundamental principles and accounts it a grievous waste of time and effort to deal with less.
There are extremists who advocate the absolute control of such plants by central governmental authority, fixing the salaries and wages of all those actually assisting in production, allowing for depreciation, but limiting the profit to a low rate of interest on the capital invested, if not eliminating it altogether. They argue that when the life of the nation is at stake, which means the business life of the manufacturers as well, there should he no question of individual profit. The question, however, is essentially a practical one, and the foregoing appears to present the most reasonable compromise.
Labor Conditions to be Resumed After the War
To insure that labor conditions existing prior to the war will he resumed afterwards, the law should specifically provide that
- Any departure, during the war, from the practice prevailing in shops, shipyards, and other industries prior to the war shall he only for the period of the war.
- Any change in practice made during the war should not prejudice the position of the workman with an employer or with a trade-union in regard to the resumption and maintenance after the war of any rules or customs existing prior thereto.
- After the war preference as to retention of employment should he given to those who were in the establishment prior thereto.
Employers Enjoined Against Competition for Labor
It should be especially noted that nothing thus far suggested militates against the maintenance of a free market for labor, and the workman can still sell the only commodity he has, namely, his labor, in the open market. In time of war the demand for skilled labor will he greatly in excess of the supply, and to prevent a ruinous competition between employers for each other's workmen, and to maintain a high sense of discipline, so that a workman who has refused to obey a reasonable order in one plant may not walk over to a neighboring plant and he employed without being questioned, the law should provide that no person should give employment to a workman whose last previous employment has been in connection with munitions, unless lie holds a certificate from his last employer that he left with the employer’s consent, or for reasons satisfactory to the local representative of the Munitions Department.
Control of Material
In addition to these regulations regarding the shops themselves, and the machines and labor for production, it will he necessary for the department to include in its control the raw material fabricated in these shops, even to the extent of declaring- an embargo against exportation. These will embrace such war staples as coal, cotton, copper, iron and steel, food-stuffs, certain chemicals, etc. The department should be regularly and accurately informed as to the stocks of raw material or metals on hand and in prospect. With this object in view it should require monthly returns from all large users and producers. From the data thus obtained it should he possible to follow accurately the past, present, and future output of munitions. Such control will ensure that available material is not wasted on non-essential work, and that material is not stored merely for the purpose of securing a higher price later on.
Establishment of Tribunals
As soon as a start is made toward putting into operation the provisions of the foregoing plan, it will be found that a number of extensive changes are necessary in the ordinary business world. Numerous disputes and differences must consequently be expected to arise, and in order that they may be settled with a minimum of lost time, it is proposed that there be established by law in each “munition areamunition area by law in each “ . . . . ” a District Munition Board, appointed by the Secretary of Munitions, and consisting of a chairman, three members representing employers, and three members representing the workmen. At each large plant and in such other locations as the district representatives of the department in each munition area may direct, there should be constituted a Local Munitions Board to which should be referred all minor matters. This local board should have power to impose fines but no sentence of imprisonment. All matters that cannot be settled to the satisfaction of all concerned by the Local Board should he referred to the District Board, which should have power to impose both fines and imprisonment, and when the decisions of the District Board have been approved by the department, they should he considered as final. To ensure uniformity of practice by all these boards, and to aid in arriving at quick decisions, which will be imperative, the law should provide a schedule of fines and punishments for the most probable offences.
Conclusion
We of the army and navy have little to do with shaping the military policy of our government, but we will unquestionably be held responsible for safeguarding the country in time of war, regardless of what the policy of our government has been. This can no longer be assured by the mere skillful handling of armed forces, or the performance of valorous deeds by men well versed in the military art. The industrial must always be subordinated to the military; and logistics must ever be less important than efficiency of higher command; nevertheless, skill and valor will not suffice, but must be supported with every industrial resource of machinery and organization. We have all the essential resources; we possess more than one-half the tools of industry of the entire world, and we produce every mineral that is needed in industry. Let us then develop the needed organization with the least delay possible. Even if our navy is not strong enough to keep sea lanes clear, we need depend on no imports whatever; we occupy a stronger financial position than any other nation; we possess a genius second to none for invention and the mechanical arts. We need but to organize industrially. The development and administration of this organization is essentially a problem for the business men of the nation. The role of the government is that of a great directive force, supplementing in every possible way the experience and ability of our business men and engineers.
The lines along which this organization should proceed have been indicated. Its existence will materially increase the effectiveness of our military forces and induce a greater respect for them in foreign Chancelleries. If we adopt it we menace the well-being of no other country, we but add to that visible expression of efficient military force that alone can guarantee peace, and we proclaim to the world that we too have learned that the great military lesson of the present war is the lesson o
[i] Written October-November, 1915, since which time much has already been done along the lines herein recommended but no laws have been passed The writer considers it essential to enact into law much of the legislation herein proposed. The writer desires to acknowledge, with thanks, the frank criticism and valuable suggestions given during the preparation of this paper by Naval Constr. E. Snow and Asst. Naval Constr. C. L. Brand.
[ii]Logistics—Its Bearing Upon the Art of War, by Comdr. C. T. Vogelgesang, U. S. N., Proceedings U. S. N. I., March, 1913.
[iii]Lloyd George in speech before House of Commons, June, 1915
[iv]Act March 3, 1911, 36 Statutes, 1084.
[v] London Engineering for January 22, 1915, states that ‘‘Out of detailed returns received by us, embracing 10,505 workmen, exclusively engaged in manufacturing war munitions of almost every kind; in a recent week the normal working time aggregated 63,027 days and the firms arranged for a total of 4524 days of overtime—of course at increased rates of pay. Thus the aggregate possible time became 67,551 days, but the time actually worked was 56,252 days, there being an aggregate in this one week of 11,299 days of idle time, equal to 16½% of the possible total. Needless to say all the overtime was worked, as for it extra pay was got. For every day of overtime worked the men remained idle for nearly three days of ordinary time.
[vi]England allows only one-fifth more than in two previous years, but this seems less than justified by the wear and tear on the plant equipment working shifts at high pressure, the increased gross business, and the desirability of retaining a material incentive toward maximum of production