Motto: Bricks Without Straw.
"Fenced by your careful fathers, ringed by your leaden seas,
Long did ye wake in quiet and long lie down at ease;
Till ye said of Strife, 'What is it?' of the Sword, 'It is far from our ken';
Till ye made a sport of your shrunken hosts and a toy of your armed men."
As bricks cannot be made without straw, neither can ships be fought without men. Two elements are required for this naval success—ships and men; and the goal should be that we have the best of each. A great navy is the demand of many; an adequate navy is the demand of practically all the people. But ask the man in the legislative hall, the man in the club, the man in the street, what he means by a great navy, and he will answer— battleships. Observe the newspapers, the conversation of intelligent men after the adjournment of Congress, and so far as interest in the navy is concerned, all are happy or depressed in proportion to the number of battleships Congress has added to the navy. The navy is battleships in the popular mind. Now there is an obligation on the part of the legislators and the professional men of the navy towards the people that is analogous to that of the family physician to his patrons. And the people will hold them to the same severe accounting that the physician should be held to, who, having observed disease in the body of a member of 3 family, failed to give notice of its existence and offer a remedy.
All that pertains to the material branch of the navy is well understood, because it is exploited daily. The public understands that with larger ships must come docks large enough to dock them, the necessity for reserve power, guns, great reserve coaling bases, and large sums are being expended for these purposes.
But towards the personnel, the attitude has been the dangerous one of "laissez faire." In the gradual increase of the navy, the personnel has never been considered as an indispensable part of each new unit added to the material of the navy. Along with the battleships, with her armament, equipments, etc., has never been added a clause in the appropriation bill providing for 50 officers and 850 men. A certain number of years elapses; a certain number of new units are added to the navy, and then by a strong request from the Navy Department, more men are added to the navy. This very method of procedure shows some sort of a lack of appreciation of the true relations of the materiel and the personnel in the up-building of the navy. To avoid platitudes, yet to attempt to place the personnel and the materiel in the correct position of their relative importance, let us cite Napoleon who is quoted as saying:
that in every military campaign the personnel element counts three-fourths; all other elements one-fourth.
Or Farragut, who said:
In conclusion on this point permit me to say that I think the world is sadly mistaken when it supposes that battles are won by this or that kind of gun or vessel. In my humble opinion the Kearsarge would have captured or sunk the Alabama as often as they might have met under the same organization and officers. The best gun and the best vessel should certainly be chosen, but the victory three times out of four depends upon those who fight them. (Flagship Hartford, Mobile Bay, November 8, 1864.)
As a part of the duty of its military advisors to the people, is that of dispelling such illusions as are harmful. Of such is the Fourth-of-July oration that we can "lick the world." Even a cursory reading of history will show that we have never licked any one except where we were better trained for the specific purpose than our enemies. Other phrases, equally dangerous, are to the effect that "the Civil War was won by the private soldier," or the sense of security that seems to possess the people at the mention of the phrase—" the man behind the gun." Now, the man behind the gun is a part of the great naval establishment —he is not all. It is harmful to suppose he is. Between him and success lies the dragon he must master—training. For, by the man behind the gun is here meant the great number of young and very intelligent men in whom the people place the safety of the country. It is our imperative duty to show the country that a trained personnel is as important as are battleships; that a trained reserve personnel is as important as the battleships in reserve. It is necessary that it be understood that it was recruits that fought the first battle of Bull Run, and trained men who marched through Georgia to the sea. The same source supplied the men who fought with Villeneuve at Trafalgar, and with Suffren in the Indian Seas. It is the personnel that counts; it is the leader that counts, because the trained man is what the leader makes him.
A Trained Naval Reserve
The problem of a trained naval reserve is one that we must solve for ourselves. A study of the methods employed abroad will assist us but little. In fact, the path followed by the other powers is more likely to be to us what the frontiersman calls a "blind trail." For, in the first place, all great powers, except Great Britain, have compulsory military service. This alone places us in a class apart. In the second place, the powers that concern us most—England, Germany, Japan, France—have a large, and in some cases, rapidly growing merchant marine. They also have certain shipping subsidies, and a governmental control over both ships and personnel that will probably never be realized here. There are still other conditions that differentiate us from them. But in brief, the causes that force upon us the solution of our problem are:
- The form of our government.
- The character of our people.
- Geographical conditions.
Causes (a) and (b) are closely bound together, the one being a reflex of the other. We are confronted with the two facts; first, toe indisposition of our people to in time of peace, prepare for war"; and second, that all military service, either in time of peace or war is voluntary. An effort will be made throughout this paper to emphasize the importance of ever keeping in mind the human element.
Cause (c) will be taken up in connection with the subject of organized and unorganized reserves.
Definite Requirements
But to get from general to specific conditions, it is believed that the situation will be this:
A. That in the near future the navy will have in active commission twenty-one battleships, with cruisers, destroyers, submarines and miscellaneous vessels.
B. That there will be in "Commission in Reserve," with partial crews, twenty battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
C. That it will be imperative to complete to its full strength the first or battleship line.
D. That for this purpose there must be available, subject to the call of the President, 1000 officers and 15,000 men.
E. This reserve force must be organized, equipped and trained; must be mustered into the service without examination, or delays; must be able to reach the distant sea coasts in thirty-six hours.
How and where is such a force to be found?
By developing the present naval militia.
It is, of course, very clear that the personnel of the all-big-gun battleship of 1910 differs radically from that of the battleship of fifty years ago. But to make clearer this difference, there are given below the complements of the U. S. S. Delaware (1910), and the U. S. S. Minnesota (1863):
| U.S.S. Delaware | U.S.S. Minnesota |
Petty Officers (Line) | 81 | 52 |
Seamen | 129 | 138 |
Ordinary Seamen | 190 | 145 |
Landsmen | … | 171 |
Boys | … | 44 |
Subtotal | 400 | 550 |
Artificer Branch | 52 | … |
Artificer Branch (Engineers): |
|
|
Petty Officers | 66 | … |
Firemen | 100 | 25 |
Coal Passers | 112 | 33 |
Subtotal | 278 | 58 |
Miscellaneous: |
|
|
Yeomen, Hospital Stewards, etc. | 37 | 2 |
Messmen | 46 | … |
Subtotal | 83 | 2 |
Total | 813 | 610 |
In the old Minnesota the engineer's force was 9 percent of the total complement; in the Delaware, it is 40 per cent.
These mere figures, however, do not begin to tell the story. Id the class marked "Artificer Branch" on the Delaware, apart from the painters, plumbers, etc., are twenty-eight electricians and four wireless operators. On the twenty-eight electricians devolves the care of all the machinery that operates every turret, ammunition hoist, fire-control apparatus and miscellaneous machinery. On the four wireless operators devolves the system of communications that alone makes possible the scouting, the dispersing and combining of squadrons, and all else that constitutes the strategy of the campaign before the fleets meet and the tactics after the battle begins. Nor is this all. Of the eighty-one so-called line petty officers, thirty-two are gunner's mates and turret captains, whose efficiency is rated far more by their mechanical than their seamanship qualifications.
It is impossible to imagine a similar number of men on the old Minnesota whose existence was as vital to the ship as are these men to the Delaware.
The conclusion is evident. The modern man-of-war is a marvelous machine, and for her operation requires mechanics of the highest skill.
It will be demonstrated later on that that absolutely necessary quality for naval efficiency—hitting the target—is being now accomplished in the fleet by young men enlisted from the interior of our country, serving on their first enlistment, and whose "sailor knowledge" is confined to that acquired in the few months in the navy.
With these facts (and they are facts and not theories) before us, it seems to be the part of wisdom, in formulating any scheme of a "reserve," that we recognize the requirements as they are, and endeavor to meet them. Traditions die hard. There is no tradition that is more reluctantly given up than that the "Naval Reserve" shall be recruited from "the sea-faring population," yachtsmen, etc. Such men are not required for the navy; they form a minute proportion either of the annual recruits or of any of our ships. Still, of such must be the naval reserve. We might as well bury the tradition. We are not dependent on that class, which is fortunate, because it does not exist.
It is clear, then, that the requirements are:
- Skilled mechanics to fill all the mechanical ratings.
- Intelligent, strong, young men, to be trained into the ratings of the seaman branch.
It seems inexplicable that in a country where the mechanical trades have reached the highest efficiency, and where technical schools are abundant, there should be any question of finding the necessary men to fill all the requirements of class (a). Nor, equally, that there should be any question of the necessary number of young men to fill class (b). The authorized enlisted strength of the navy is about 48,000 men. And the Navy Department is able, spite of the rigid mental and physical requirements, to keep its quota full. This, however, is difficult in the higher ratings in the skilled mechanical branches. The reason is simple. The skilled mechanic is, on shore, a well-paid man. The attractions of family, etc., are stronger than the desire to go to sea. In time of war, however, this is changed. Such men will go then. But that they may go quickly, that they may be made to feel they will step at once into billets in which they can serve their country by means of the skill they know they possess, they must be interested and educated in the nature of this emergency service they propose to render. Let us give one concrete example. A— B— is the chief boilermaker of the establishment of X— Y— in the city of Providence, Rhode Island. He is also a member of the naval militia of Rhode Island. As a member of the Rhode Island Naval Militia his interest in the navy is aroused, and kept alive. He cruises in summer on the small vessel assigned the State, or he takes his turn on the battleships for the summer exercises. The Navy Department prepares examinations for boilermakers, which he successfully passes. His name is so registered in the office of naval militia, and in the division of enlisted personnel in the Bureau of Navigation. War threatens. The naval militia of Rhode Island is ordered to report at the Boston Navy Yard. There are vacancies to be filled on the Connecticut, the Vermont, the destroyer Flusser, the ammunition ships and many others. Each man before he left Rhode Island had in his pocket the station billet of the ship to which he was assigned. He stows his bag and hammock; knows his station—perhaps had made his last summer cruise on that self-same battleship. There is the whole story. Multiply this instance by thousands and you see the invaluable function the naval militia can perform.
But What is the Naval Militia?—The naval militia is an organization consisting of 540 commissioned and warrant officers, and 5961 petty officers and men. There are local branches in twenty-one States. The members join that they may be trained m rime of peace to serve in the navy in time of war.
The dates the organizations were created in the several States are given below:
| Date |
1. Massachusetts | Mar. 29, 1890 |
2. New York | June 23, 1891 |
3. California | Sept. 3, 1891 |
4. North Carolina | —, —, 1891 |
5. Rhode Island | —, —, 1891 |
6. South Carolina | Nov. —, 1892 |
7. Pennsylvania | Jan. 6, 1893 |
8. Illinois | Sept. 30, 1893 |
9. Connecticut | Nov. 27, 1893 |
10. Michigan | Mar. 1, 1894 |
11. New Jersey | May 20, 1895 |
12. Louisiana | Sept. 11, 1895 |
13. Ohio | July 26, 1895 |
14. Georgia | Oct. 26, 1894 |
15. Maryland | —, —, 1896 |
16. District of Columbia | May 11, 1898 |
17. Maine | Apr. 2, 1903 |
18. Minnesota | Dec. 15, 1903 |
19. Missouri | Dec. 18, 1905 |
20. Wisconsin | June 29, 1909 |
21. Indiana | Aug. 24, 1909 |
In addition to the above there were organizations created in the States of Washington, Oregon and Florida during the present year, which organizations are awaiting the action of their several legislatures during the coming winter. In general, the naval militia is a part of the militia of the State, the phraseology being something to the effect that "such part of the State militia as the governor may elect shall constitute a naval militia." Up to the year 1903 the land and naval militias were upon practically equal terms. But by the passage of the Act popularly known as the "Dick Bill" (after its advocate and promoter, Senator Dick, of Ohio), the land militia became an organized national guard, subject to the direct call of the President of the United States, a status desired for the naval militia, and for which there is now a bill before Congress, introduced by Representative Foss, and favorably recommended by the House Naval Committee.
It will be seen from the dates of creation of the several organizations that they were not the result of any emergency, or threatened disaster, nor are they the result of any hysterical and ephemeral patriotic wave. They are the calmly thought-out desire of a body of patriotic citizens. Space does not permit an adequate description of the earnest work, the personal sacrifices of time and money, the hours devoted to study and drill, the discouragements, the rebuffs encountered by the officers and men of the naval militia in their determined effort to make organizations for the benefit of the navy, and thereby for the general government. Attention is invited to the register of the commissioned and warrant officers of the naval militia of the United States, 1910, for in that publication will be found the refuting of so many mistakes that exist in the mind of the ignorant. It will there be seen, for instance, that of the seven captains, three entered the service in 1891, one in 1892, two in 1894, and one in 1901—an average service of nearly seventeen (17) years.
It will be seen that there is in the naval militia one captain for every 824 enlisted men; one commander for every 289 men; whereas, in the navy there is one captain for every 555 men, and one commander for every 375 men. The bulk of the officers is in the junior grades—enthusiastic, intelligent young men, capable of being developed into excellent officers.
Let is be stated here clearly and distinctly that the naval militia is what it is through its own efforts. The Navy Department has been reasonably generous in the granting of requests; it has advanced—offered—until recently, nothing. Let it be just as clearly stated here that the naval militia craves the sympathy and assistance of the navy. It is ready to follow wherever the navy will lead it, be it in the matter of training in time of peace, or into the thick of the fight in time of war. The naval militia is the ideal field from which to recruit and train just the men to fill the requirements outlined earlier in this article. It needs only to be directed, to be told what to do, and it will immediately set about fulfilling the directions given it. Let is be understood that up to the time of the war of 1898 the naval militia had been trained in nothing larger than a ship's cutter; that the naval militia is now manning completely, with its own force, vessels from the Chicago down. To illustrate the statement that the naval militia need but to be directed, let these instances be cited: The naval militia of the State of California, having passed from strictly shore and armory work to the U. S. S. Alert, consisted of eight divisions, of which seven were deck or seaman divisions, and one engineer division. When the Alert was replaced by the U. S. S. Marblehead, the necessity at once appeared for more engineers, for electricians and mechanics, and without even waiting for suggestions from the Navy Department, there were four more engineer divisions created. In Massachusetts, the naval militia (19 officers and 369 men) took the U. S. S Chicago for a ten days cruise. The ship's company was, in general, very complete, but strange to say was short on electricians. It happens that die officer in charge of the electrical division is in the employ of the General Electrical Company, of Boston, as well as having been four years at the Naval Academy. He was asked if he could not recruit an electrical force, to which he replied: "Certainly, from our own electrical works." It is unnecessary to multiply instances.
The officers are many of them graduates of the highest universities and technical schools. From such an education they have become men of great affairs. They are accustomed to issuing orders and having them obeyed. They have been given opportunity to take the course at the compass office at the Naval Observatory in Washington, and are availing themselves of it as the chance offers. They are given the benefit of the branch hydrographic offices throughout the country, and no organization is without one or more officers skilled in compass work. The contract between the Secretary of the Navy and the governor of a State requires, when a vessel is loaned a State, that the commanding officer and senior engineer shall have merchant marine licenses. Instead of this requirement applying to only these two officers, the States are requiring that every deck officer and every engineer shall have such a license. This requirement is the demand of the naval militia themselves.
What Is the Aim of the Naval Militia?
Simply, as stated before, to train in peace for war. But how? Their aim is to supply the Navy Department, on a telegraphic call, when emergency arises, a number of thousands of officers and men to be assigned to service as the Navy Department may deem best. It is important that this point be made clear. It will be explained later what is meant by organized and unorganized reserves, but for the present it is desired to explain that the naval militia (which is an organized reserve) has no belief that they can render the maximum service to the country by being assigned as an organization to any specific ship or duty. While conscious of their zeal and capacities, they are also conscious of their limitations, and believe that they can render the best service by being detailed as a part of the complements of ships already partly manned by the regular service. They will, therefore, when they have reported at a navy yard, be detailed as the Navy Department elects, in numbers dependent on the requirements of each case.
In every system of education, be it for the regulars, or reserves, or militia, the education of the officers is of paramount importance. This is the age of specialists, and in the naval militia, by proper direction, an invaluable corps of specialists can be developed. Navigators can be found who are not necessarily either engineers or turret officers; electricians and engineers or turret and gun division officers have their special qualifications. From no known source can there be recruited officers who can fill all stations as can the officers of the regular navy who have given their life to the work. But it must be apparent that if there can be found in the naval militia, or elsewhere, an officer who can satisfactorily fill one station—engineer, navigator, or electrician for instance— he thereby sets free the officer of more extended attainments. These classes are mentioned first not because of their greater importance, but because they are those who bring their life profession with them when they enter the naval militia preparatory to entering the navy in time of war. The commanding, executive and division officers, no matter what their profession in civil life, must be trained for the specific work on board ship.
The records from the fleet show that midshipmen, with an education mostly theoretical, are assigned as seconds, or even as firsts in turret and gun divisions on the battleships, and given a deck watch in maneuvers. The records also show that the gun divisions under these young officers have made highest scores. This is specializing in its highest degree. And the writer believes that with a consistent and progressive system of training, most valuable officers can be trained in the naval militia, sufficiently advanced to enable them to take up duty on any class of ship on which they are a minority in a complement of regular officers and men.
The officers then, of the naval militia, expect to enter the navy in time of war in such rank, and such positions as they have been found qualified to fill. They desire to be given the opportunity to "qualify" and, having qualified, to be given rank and duty accordingly. The impression seems to exist in the navy that in time of war a naval militia organization, with a superabundance of high rank officers, will expect to enter the navy as a body, and be assigned as such to a large ship, or to replace on such a ship regular officers and men of long service. Exactly the opposite is true, as, it is hoped, has been shown. In any case, the whole manner of the detail and assignment is in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy.
Organized and Unorganized Reserves
An organized naval reserve is a body of officers and men existing by authority of a national or state legislative Act and armed into units, "divisions," "battalions," or "ship's companies," according to the phraseology of the Act, and all united under one command.
An unorganized naval reserve, as its name implies, its without that combination of officers and men formed into units, but consists simply of individuals.
In the United States there is at the present time not one officer or man belonging to any official national naval reserve, organized or unorganized.
There is the imperative necessity for both an organized and an unorganized naval reserve. There is no conflict between the two; they are each to serve their important purpose, in their own way.
The organized reserve is to fulfill the requirements of the title of this paper—"Wanted—A First Aid." Since the whole body of an organized reserve lives in one locality, or at least is subject to one command, it is always to be ready to respond as a body to the call of the President. The whole organized reserve of the United States should be at the sea coast within thirty-six (36) hours from the hour of the issue of the call, or it has failed of its function. Diplomacy, fear of giving undue offence to the power with whom relations are strained, and with whom war threatens, will surely cause the delaying of mobilizing reserve ships until the last minute. When that fatal moment does come, our only hope B to be able to complete the first line of battle in the quickest possible time, and with the most efficient possible force. With an organized reserve, every detail can have been perfected in advance. Every officer and man can have his station billet in his pocket. It will need only a telegram to effect the rest. To illustrate, even from our own small experience, let there be cited the following from the records of the Spanish-American War:
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
April 23, 1898.
(Telegram) To Adjutant General Samuel Dalton, Boston, Mass.
Send Prairie's complement officers and men to her at once at Brooklyn Yard (Sd.) T. Roosevelt.
This despatch was received in Boston at 1.30 p. m., April 23, and the whole force—officers and men—was at the New York Navy Yard at 9 o'clock the next morning. Had the Prairie been at the Boston yard, or had the complement been selected from the New York militia, the order would probably have been complied with in six hours.
It is with the idea that this case, representing a small force, may at the proper time in the future represent a force sufficient to mobilize the entire reserve fleet that the organized reserve is regarded as a necessity.
It is, therefore, recommended that the government adopt and consistently pursue a definite policy concerning the creating and developing of a organized naval reserve. To this end, it is recommended that the strength of this force be:
1,000 Officers.
15,000 Men.
The solution of this problem is rendered simple by reason of the fact that there is an organized naval reserve, consisting of 540 officers and 5961 men, known by the title of naval militia, and which has for years been knocking at the door of the Navy Department asking for admittance to the ranks of the nation's defenders, asking for a more definite status, asking for more thorough instruction, asking for more responsibility, and asking in return nothing but the privilege of serving in the navy in time of war.
It has been stated above that the naval militia is a part of the volunteer militia of the States, such part, in fact, as the governor of the State may elect. It has been clearly demonstrated that the governor and the State legislature are willing to increase the size of the naval militia in proportion as they make good, in proportion as the demand for increase is impressed upon them. It is certain that in proportion as the Navy Department lends assistance, shows interest, gives encouragement, the naval militia advances. It is believed that not only can the size of the organized naval reserve above set down be attained, but that the requests for enlistment will be such that only the best men need be accepted.
Until the year 1903 the militia, land and naval, was a militia pure and simple. It could only be called out by a requisition on the governor of the State, who complied or not as he saw fit. The militia could not be compelled to serve outside their own State. There was no governmental control whatever. If there is one point made clear in his remarkable book that General Upton has left us on the military policy of the United States, it is the necessity for a—
National Army of Volunteers and Long Enlistments.
Our history is replete with instances of campaigns that could not be pushed to completion by reason of "short-time men," or campaigns abandoned by reason of "time-expired men." More than a hundred thousand men were called out at intervals by State governors for the defence of Washington, only to have the capital city fall a prey to a handful of British who found no one to oppose them. To remedy all these defects there has been passed by Congress the before-mentioned Act known as the Dick Bill, which, however, applies only to the land militia. To establish an organized naval reserve there is now before Congress the "Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Naval Militia and for Other Purposes."
This bill provides:
That in the event of war, actual or threatened—or rebellion—or whenever the President is unable with the regular forces at his command to execute the laws of the Union, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth such number of the Naval Militia as he may deem necessary—and to issue his orders through the governor of the State to such officers of the Naval Militia as he may think proper.
That whenever the President calls forth any part of the Naval Militia he may state in the call the period for which such service is required, and the Naval Militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States, unless relieved by order of the President.
Provided: That if no period be stated in the call of the President, the period shall be held to mean the existence of the emergency, of which the President shall be the sole judge.
That every officer and enlisted man of the Naval Militia who shall be called forth in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, shall be mustered for service without further enlistment, and without further examination previous to such muster, except for those States (if the case may so be) which have not adopted a standard of professional and physical examination prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy for the Naval Militia. Provided, however, that any officer or enlisted man of the Naval Militia so qualified who shall refuse or neglect to present himself for such muster, upon being called forth as herein prescribed, shall be subject to trial by court martial, and shall be punished as such court martial shall direct.
That the Secretary of the Navy is to provide for the participation by any part of the Naval Militia in any cruise, maneuvers, etc., of the regular Navy.
Authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to permit officers or enlisted men of the Naval Militia to attend at any naval professional school, or on board ship.
Authorizes inspections, and detail of Naval officers as instructors of the Naval Militia.
Authorizes the establishment of an "eligible list" for reserve officers. By this is meant that the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe qualifications, and prepare examinations suitable for each grade of each corps of the Navy. That officers of the Naval Militia may be given an opportunity to take such examinations, and if successful it shall entitle them to be enrolled on the list of "eligibles," and in time of war to be commissioned in the Navy in accordance with the rank in which they have qualified.
(All other features of the bill are administrative matters and need not be quoted here.)
This bill may not be perfect. A similar bill has enabled the army to make great strides towards the establishment of an efficient and increasing organized national guard. With such a bill as a base upon which to stand, the navy can build a structure proportional to the time, the patience, the heart it puts into the work. Defects, which time proves to exist, can be remedied by the same legislative body that passes the creative Act.
Unorganized Naval Reserve.—This desirable body should consist exclusively of—
The desirable discharged men of the navy.
To be limited to 50,000 men.
A bill has been introduced into Congress providing for a reserve of this character.
With two such reserves, it is believed the navy can face an emergency with a confidence it cannot now feel.
There is, it is believed, a confidence existing in the minds of the navy and the people regarding both the number and the character of the men who will flock to the colors in time of war that is not justified by the facts.
We may assume that the patriotic feeling will bring in, in time, sufficient men for all the requirements of the navy. However, it is the imperative necessity for men at the outset—men sufficient to man the reserve ships, to complete the first line of battle—that is our greatest requirement. Illustrations of more than one point will be drawn from the recent Japanese-Russian War. In no particular is the lesson more instructive than in this that when the Japanese began war on February 6, it was the Japanese Navy that sailed from Sasebo, moving on to its advanced base on the Russian frontier from which it never receded.
Enlistments in the Spanish-American War
In view of the often-expressed belief that in time of war there will be a regular stampede towards the naval recruiting stations, the return of the discharged man-of-war's men, the reported thousands of American sailors on the Great Lakes, etc., let us examine the following figures from the Report of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, for 1898:
For the Year—June, 1897-1898 | Men | Apprentices |
Applications for enlistment | 71,112 | 3,212 |
Rejected for physical disabilities and other causes | 63,135 | 2,269 |
For the Year—June, 1898-1899 |
|
|
Applications for enlistment | 38,687 | 3,069 |
Rejected for physical disabilities and other causes | 31,346 | 2,154 |
These figures show the great necessity for some weeding-out system.
The real point is, however, the enlistments as they actually occurred. They were:
During the year 1898, month of— |
|
April | 2,314 |
May | 3,660 |
June | 2,910 |
July | 1,228 |
August | 237 |
September | 109 |
October | 205 |
November | 187 |
December | 225 |
| 11,075 |
In other words, it took two months, including a period of five weeks, after war had been declared to get 5974 men. It must be remembered that the U. S. S. Maine had been blown up in February. Relations with Spain were most strained. War seemed inevitable, was declared on April 21, and the country was elated over the victory in Manila Bay on May 1.
The 5974 men enlisted during two months are less than the strength of the present naval militia, which, as an organized naval militia, is available on telegraphic call, and should be on board ship in thirty-six (36) hours.
It will be observed that of the applicants for enlistment about 12 per cent were accepted. It is further a matter of record that of the 11,075 enlisted, the naval militia furnished 3832. And as an additional instance of the value of preparation, the records show that when the naval militia organizations presented themselves for examination for enlistment, there were accepted between 85 and 95 per cent. The number enlisted for the war was 11,045. The strength of the navy at the time was 12,500. In other words, the strength was doubled. By a similar token, a war at this time would require an additional 45,000 men. Each year that passes will increase the need for a reserve; for the reason that each year adds to the "ships in reserve." At the time of the Spanish-American War the effective navy was in commission. Little if anything was added that increased the real fighting strength of the navy, a condition that will not exist again.
It is believed that the foregoing demonstrates the necessity of an organized reserve, and the means by which it can be created.
The unorganized reserve is to consist of the desirable discharged men of the navy. By the payment of a small "retainer" these men are to enroll themselves in the Navy Department, and be available in time of war. It is presumed that they left the navy because they prefer to take their chances in civil life. Their character is such that we must assume they attain even more than an average success. With success in business will naturally follow the interests inherent in human nature—wives, families, homes of their own, local affiliations. To regain these men in time of war will be a priceless boon for the navy. To create such a reserve is invaluable. It is a question, however, that needs must be carefully considered as to whether these men, with the interests as enumerated, will be able to meet that instant response so much needed ; whether to arrange their affairs will not require a few days here, perhaps weeks. Admitting that such is the case, the value of the plan is in no sense diminished. For, with the first emergency met by an organized reserve, the individuals of the unorganized reserve come just in time to man the later ships, to fill vacancies, and to furnish the trained leaven to the mass of recruits that are being enlisted.
There is, however, one feature that is likely to be lost sight of, and which is vital to any plan of reserve that is dependent on voluntary service. This feature is the "human element." Man by nature is a gregarious animal; he loves the contact, the association of his fellow men. This is illustrated not merely by the crowding of the population into the cities from the country, but by the further and more intimate grouping of men into clubs, into the so-called "secret societies"—the Knights Templar, Odd Fellows, and many others—whose total membership amounts to millions. Men who have a common interest desire to get together, at least at intervals, to discuss those interests. It is frequently called talking "shop." To keep going a movement that is once started it is necessary to assemble the members to exchange views; it is necessary to inject a certain amount of the social into the "shop." This is the experience of the world. It is believed that herein lies the danger of an unorganized reserve. With the individuals located at places rather remote from each other, with no common meeting place, with no enthusiast to keep alive the interest of the more or less indifferent, we must not be surprised if the organization falls to the ground by reason of a lack of a cementing force. This is shown to a degree in the navy league of the United States. The writer has discussed the subject with isolated members, and has been told exactly what is set down above: To keep the interest alive, the members must get together. The fact remains that in a population of some ninety millions, and with the navy at the pinnacle of its popularity with the people, the membership of the navy league is still small. Nor must any analogy be drawn from abroad. In England, for instance, all ports are practically sea ports, and all England is interested in matters concerning the sea.
The Cost
It is not easy to estimate the cost of an institution the existence of which may save a nation's honor. Still, since the question is asked "What will it cost?" meaning dollars and cents, let the answer be given in dollars and cents. The general government appropriates each year for "Arming and Equipping Naval Militia," $100,000, increased this year to $125,000. This pays for the uniforms, small arms, and equipments, coal for cruising, ammunition, medical stores, etc. The force thus provided for numbers 6500. The government further loans to the naval militia organizations vessels, boats and certain equipments for training purposes, and keeps the vessels in repair. This sum, when charged up against the organizations, more than doubles the expenditure. It has been the practice heretofore to loan to the naval militia vessels that were of little value to the navy. Vessels of such a character were expensive, as is any old type and largely worn-out machine. The system adopted by the Navy Department this year, however, will result in greater economy to the Navy Department, and vastly greater benefit to the organizations being trained. This system consists in loaning to the naval militia, or in placing in "Commission in Reserve" and assigning them to the naval militia for training purposes, vessels that have a real military value—vessels that when war is declared will be called into active service. It can readily be shown that by maintaining the vessels in this status, always ready for service, is a distinct financial gain to the Department, entirely apart from the valuable service they are rendering in the building up of a trained personnel. For instance, the gunboat Detroit cost, while lying at a navy yard, out of commission, and therefore receiving no care in her up-keep, $530.00 per month; and the small cruiser Boston cost $750.00 per month. Both these vessels were recently stricken from the navy list and advertised to be sold as being unfit for repair.
But from any point of view, education is an article of great cost, as any man of a family will testify. Or, seen from another point of view, if we take all the property making up the educational plant of a city, and add to its value the expenditures in salaries and wages, and divide this by the school attendance, or by the number of graduates, the cost per individual turned nut will be astounding.
In the case in point, however, the mind must not divorce itself entirely from sentiment; this particular education, the training of a "Reserve," is not merely to save the billions of dollars that an unsuccessful war will entail, but it is to save as well the nation's honor.
For What Shall the Reserve Be Trained?
The answer is simple. The "Reserve" should be trained as ire trained all recruits, all officers and men who are to serve in the navy, for general service. It is not necessary to enter into the discussion as to what will be the character of the service of ix reserve in time of war, whether it be in the "first line," "inner line," or what. The Navy Department in its wisdom will assign die most fit to the most important stations, of which it will be the sole judge. The difference between the more fit and the less fit should not be a question so much of the character of the training is of the degree of excellence attained. No organization, regular or reserve, can claim for itself any duty it is manifestly not qualified to fill—the claim must be based on the ability to perform the duty. In this particular, it is believed profit can be derived from the experience of others. There existed in England up to the year 1903 an organization known as the Royal Navy Artillery Volunteers. The duty of this organization was to man certain coast defence fortifications, smaller vessels operating along the coast in rather restricted waters. In fact, the duty was distinctly confined to local waters. In that year—1903—a commission was appointed to inquire into the matter of reserves. The conclusion of this commission, in brief, was that it was best to return to the old Nelsonian doctrine that the "enemy's coast line was England's frontier," and that the matter of a coast defence of the character implied in the duties of the Royal Navy Artillery Volunteers was abandoned, and that organization was wiped out of existence. Henceforth, there was to be no class of reserve not available for all kinds of duty, and the training was to be given in the British borne fleet. On the abolishing of the above-mentioned body a new one was created to be called the Royal Navy Volunteers. This is an organized naval reserve, the only one in England, and its nature is exactly like our naval militia, with that further control by the general government that might be expected in England, and which is the hope of the naval militia for their own organization here. It seems to be inevitable that the same spirit that actuates a man in time of peace to join a "Reserve" organization, will actuate him in time of war to be keen to get to the front. It is a splendid manly spirit that is worth fostering. The question then remains—can he be sufficiently trained, and if so,
How Shall the Reserve Be Trained?
The answer to this question again is simple. It consists in developing, improving, perfecting the system that is being now employed with the naval militia.
There is no question but that the naval officer will welcome any efficient body of "Reserves." He is willing to lend a hand in the training of those reserves. It is also equally true that the naval officer who falls in with the naval militia becomes convinced of the value of that body.
What Is the Present Scheme of Training of the Naval Militia?
By their regulations they are obliged to attend at not less than twenty-four drills during the year, and to take part in the summer exercises. This is a mere outline—the minimum requirements. To nearly every organization throughout the country a naval vessel of some type is now assigned. On this vessel are made many short cruises in addition to the annual cruise. This will be found to be in excess of the requirement of almost any naval reserve in the world. The scheme that is being developed in the training of our naval militia—worked out in all ignorance of any system employed abroad—is, however, the embodiment of the doctrine that the enemy's coast line is our frontier, and that all reservists must be available for all kinds of duty. All training that does not bear directly on naval duties have been abolished. The armory work during the winter is made to bear directly on the work afloat during the next summer. To this end let there be cited some of the apparatus supplied the armories, and the character of the instruction books issued:
Signals.—An ardois, two illuminated semaphores, two complete sets of signal flags, hand semaphores, and wig-wag.
Ordnance.—A 4-inch (or 3-pounder) gun, latest type of mount, with Morris-tube apparatus, telescopic sights, etc. A sub-target gun. All vessels assigned the Naval Militia are equipped with either two 4-inch or two 3-pounders, depending on their size, and competitive target practice is to be held under strictly naval requirements.
Navigation and Seamanship.—The armories and ships are equipped with all necessary training gear. The libraries are supplied with ample books, and the compass course at the U. S. Naval Observatory in Washington as been thrown open to the Naval Militia officers, and such a number have either taken the course there or have availed themselves of the branch hydrographic offices throughout the country, so that all organizations have navigators versed in the compass.
In accordance with the plan that all training should be strictly naval, and that the officers and men should be familiar with naval practices, the following books and pamphlets have been prepared and issued during the current year:
Naval Militia Publication
No. 1.—Training of Gun Pointers.
No. 2.—How to Stand Watch.
No. 3.—Method of Conducting Target Practice.
No. 4.—Tactical Signal Book for the Use of the Naval Militia.
The following are some of the publications purchased and issued:
Hints for Junior Officers Doing Line Duty.
On the Management of the Ships in a Fleet.
The Modern Officer of the Watch.
On the Care .and Management of Steam Machinery and Boilers.
Nulton on the Compass.
The above are essentially for the education of the officers, and have been especially selected, or prepared, for that purpose. They are additional to the standard works on all professional subjects, and to the books issued for the education of the enlisted men, such as—Petty Officer's Manual, Boat Book, Recruit's Hand Book, Ship and Gun Drills, etc.
With the preparation derived from the winter's study and drills, the season's work begins about May and lasts till November. It will be too long to do more than give a summary of the character of the summer's exercises. Where possible, groups of naval militia vessels are assembled for what may be called squadron drills. This is particularly true on the Great Lakes, where squadron exercises have been held for several years. Regarding these exercises, suffice it to say that the vessels are manned, navigated, maneuvered exclusively by the naval militia. And it is no slight tribute to the skill of the officers to state that this squadron navigated at eight-knots speed, preserving good distance and formation, through the St. Claire Lake and River, and the Detroit River from Lake Huron to Lake Eric, encountering the immense mass of shipping that traverses those waters, at one time finding themselves on the Lime Kiln Flats with three lines of passing merchant vessels abreast, and yet never having a break in the formation. On the Atlantic Coast the Massachusetts Naval Militia, with 369 officers and men, manned the U. S. S. Chicago on a cruise from Boston to Hampton Roads and return, encountering dense fog, and rough weather, and, with their own navigator, entered and left both Boston and Hampton Roads without a pilot. The Connecticut Naval Militia accompanied the Chicago, manning the Machias. The California Naval Militia cruised in the Marblehead from San Francisco to Bremerton, Wash., via Portland, Ore., and returned to San Francisco. The Louisiana organization cruised similarly in the Gulf of Mexico on the Isla de Luzon, and other organizations made equal cruises in the vessels assigned them. Two points call for especial notice as emphasizing the progress in the training, and the attitude of the Navy Department in this matter of the naval militia.
These are the placing of valuable naval units "in commission in reserve," assigning them to the naval militia for training purposes, and the assignment of the naval militia to the battleship fleet for the period of their summer exercises. In the first instance, the U. S. S. Chicago, Ozark, Tonopah, Amphitrite and Cheyenne have been so assigned this year. In the other instance, the assignment of the naval militia to the battleship fleet for their exercises, neither the navy nor the naval militia can adequately express their gratitude to the present commander-in-chief of the Atlantic fleet for the interest he has shown in this matter of reserve training, and for the precedent he has established in this regard. One week of his own summer program he set aside, and fourteen battleships were detailed for the exclusive training of the naval militia. The plan is to assign about sixty men and four officers to each ship. The naval militia thus see the latest type of ship, under the normal conditions of naval life. It is believed that by a plan that involves a system of alternation between the battleship fleet, and exercises on their own State assigned vessel, the naval militia, or by whatever title the naval reserve is called, will be given the nearest approach to ideal training.
The subject of how the naval militia is being trained has been gone into at some length, at the great risk of tiring the reader, because the gist of the whole matter lies here, that if this system is correct, or approximately so, it need only be improved, and perfected and applied to any reserve, organized or unorganized, that may be created.
This, then, is believed to be the situation—that there are required an organized naval reserve of 1000 officers and 15,000 men, and that the instrument is at our hands in the naval militia; and an unorganized naval reserve of 50,000 men to be recruited from the desirable discharged men of the navy.
The recommendations from the Navy Department for the creation of a naval reserve have contained the same phraseology for many years. They involve the incorporation of the Revenue Marine Service, Light House Service, Coast Survey, Merchant Marine and yacht squadrons. It would seem that this scheme is along the lines of robbing Peter to pay Paul. It would seem that the duties devolving upon all the above bodies, with the exception of the last, will be as important in time of war as in peace. The British government has awakened to the fact that if it called ix Royal Naval Reserves into the navy, its invaluable merchant marine must either be laid up or pass into the hands of foreigners.
These facts prove that our reserve must be created apart.
Much can be done by legislative action; much by Departmental aid and sympathy; but in a country where all military service, as well as the preparation therefore, is voluntary, a "Reserve" is only possible when it is created by a serious and patriotic impulse within the hearts of the people. The inculcation of this spirit should be begun at home. It should be developed practically at schools, and every high school in this country should include military training.
Sons of the sheltered city—unmade, unhandled, unmeet—
Ye pushed them raw to the battle as ye picked them raw from the street.
And what did ye look they should compass?
Warcraft learned in a breath,
Knowledge unto occasion at the first far view of Death?
But ye say, "It will mar our comfort." Ye say,
"It will minish our trade."
Do ye wait for the spattered shrapnel ere ye learn how a gun is laid?
For the low red glare to the southward when the raided coast towns burn?
(Light ye shall have on that lesson, but little time to learn).
-Kipling