The discussion relating to the marine corps, and the ultimate employment of that corps, has occupied the minds of many service people for the past two years. It is not with any desire to discuss the question of its use on board ship, which was so thoroughly gone into by Congress in the winter of 1908-09, that the writer gives his views, but rather to propose something which he believes will be of immense benefit to the marine corps and thus to the naval service. There has been established by the marine corps, at the naval station at New London, Conn., a school known as the "Advanced Base School," and the officers assigned there are doubtlessly receiving an amount of instruction in a little known curse which will be of inestimable value to them. However, up to the present time, in so far as the writer is aware, the instruction is purely theoretical. To be of lasting benefit and value to these officers and to the marine corps, this theoretical instruction must be supplemented by the practical work which would be performed by an advance base force in the seizure of a designated spot.
How are we to give this instruction to any such force?
If we assume, for discussion, that a commander-in-chief will not, except as a last resort, deplete his forces afloat by the detachment if a portion of them to seize and hold a spot as an advance base, it at once becomes apparent that some force additional to the fleet tree must be available for that duty.
There is no such force available at the present time as a force. There are men who have had work at different times and places in connection with such military operations but we have no body of men trained for the work and whose officers have had practical experience. What force can we take and train for this most important work?
There are on duty in the United States, on the east coast, marines who are available for this as well as their routine navy yard duties. These men are doing the things that perfect the recruit in his duties; they are receiving the training that is necessary for all soldiers at the outset of their military careers; but, aside from their target practice and parade ground evolutions, they are not learning the things that are so essential to the soldier in the field.
This is not a criticism of the system but a statement of what is being done at the majority of posts in the United States. The drill the men receive in battle formations and tactics is largely, if not wholly, confined to the drill they can receive on a rather small parade ground. Its scope is necessarily as limited as the parade ground.
I wish to impress upon the reader the fact that these statements are not made in a spirit of criticism but rather to show that what I propose is not only feasible but most desirable.
The question then is, "How train a force for advance base work?"
It has been the custom for many years for the Atlantic fleet to have its target practice and other fleet drills each winter in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Every winter, when the fleet goes there, I would mobilize at Norfolk, Va., a regiment of marines, fully officered and organized, and, with ships which the navy has available for transports, I would embark this force provided with the advance base outfit as outlined by the general board. This force I would have at the disposal of the commander-in-chief and he should be instructed to use it as he would in time of war in the occupation of an advance base. The actual crew of the transport I would limit to the force necessary to run the ship's machinery, man the boats, cooks, mess attendants, electricians, etc. The transports would then be convoyed by the fleet, or a portion of the fleet, and conducted to the rendezvous as though a state of war existed. Arriving at the rendezvous the regiment should make its preparations for landing with the advance base outfit and establish itself exactly as though on active service. The vast bulk of the advance base outfit, it must be understood, would of course take much time in landing, but the thing should be gone through just as though we were doing it to hold the spot from an active enemy.
Can anyone doubt that such training would be of the greatest value to officers and men? Would not the expense be as much justified as that connected with the annual army maneuvers?
The result would be that we would have a body of men who would have had the practical experience necessary for success in rime of war. On the other hand, by neglecting to so train an efficient force of officers and men, we are liable to have to take a green outfit of both to do work which appears vastly important tome.
Lieutenant-General Von der Goltz, in his book "The Conduct of War" (page 86), says, "However much their military expeditions may have been characterized by audacity, yet all great commanders have attached, the highest value to the possession of a good base." And again on page 92, "A fleet and a land army can afford one another immense support in pushing forward a base if the theater of war is bounded on one side by the sea."
While these quotations hold more for army than for naval bases, yet, the importance of having some immediate force ready to take and hold an advance base cannot be too highly estimated. It may even arise that the advance base taken primarily for the navy may from necessity be later occupied and used by the army.
Mr. Lea in "The Valor of Ignorance" (page 224) says, "Navies are not self-sustaining in any degree whatsoever. Nothing that is necessary for their maintenance can be gotten by them out of the sea. The vast theater of war where their campaigns are made and battles fought is as barren as the desert. In consequence, mutual bases are as necessary as fleets in every sea where nations have established or expect to extend their suzerainty. (The italics are mine.) And further he says, "The security of naval bases rests fundamentally with their land defense." These statements are based on the idea of the United States taking and preparing the territory already owned by them, but, inasmuch as mere appears to be no likelihood of the United States doing this is time of peace, there is all the more reason why we should have ready and trained a body which can at least offer sufficient resistance to an enemy until reinforced by the land army which any defense needs.
There will doubtless be objection to this plan of going each year to the South for drill. Some will complain of being routed out of their homes for three or four months; others will base their objections on their experiences with previous floating battalions; and the author frankly states that if the experiences of these latter officers have not been magnified he in no way blames them for their objection; but there will be this difference, that this force will have a definite object and a definite time of operation, and that when this is finished it will be returned to its stations. It must be understood that it is by no means intended that this regiment is to be kept with the fleet or that it is to be used except as a force to be instructed in advance base work.
So thoroughly do I believe that this programme will give us the training we need that I would recommend a force of similar strength to be used in Cape Cod Bay every fall for similar drills.
The outfit which goes to Cuba in the winter should, before returning to the United States, be taken for a trip to Europe both for the benefit of the men from the sea experience and also for keeping that part of the Government's announcement on the enlistment poster which offers an opportunity to see foreign countries.
Because our men have not the ingrained respect for discipline and authority found in other armies and navies, due to our different ideas of caste and social relations, we are apt to call it "independence of thought and spirit," characterizing the other men as mechanical in the performance of duty, etc. Nothing could be further from the truth. Our independence of thought and spirit too often turns out to be the pride of ignorance, whereby men, through some peculiar mental process, are ashamed to ask "How" and "Why" even when they are ignorant of the subject at hand.
The great ignorant public is too prone to pat the rankest militiaman or the rawest rookie on the back and tell him he can lick the world, and the poor ignorant rookie and militiaman believe it until they have met trained soldiers. Then their blood pays the bill which ignorance always presents.
But to go back a bit. Suppose such an outfit as suggested is on its way to some rendezvous for drill; how could it be occupied? Naturally the first consideration is that of landing the force after arrival and to do this the ships' boats, helped out by some flat bottomed lighters, would be necessary. Then, under the protection of the fire from the convoy or some designated ships, the debarkation would take place just as though in service.
After a foothold is gained we must begin the landing of the material of the advance base outfit. While this is being done by a portion of the force others would be preparing the land defenses, gun emplacements and store houses, laying out camp, clearing the ground, etc.
All those things which would have to be done in active service add be done by this and similar forces once or twice a year and the result would be that we would have a force at the disposal of the Government always ready and trained for its work.
The question of the administration of discipline while the troops were on board might cause some discussion ; however it is believed this point could be settled between the commanding officer of the ship and the commanding officer of the regiment on board.
The time will come when we will be called upon to perform work which foreign armies have found it takes years to teach men; then we will find that our men who are "so quick to learn" are but little better than a flock of sheep. They won't have time to learn and it won't be their fault that they don't know. It will be the fault of those who are in positions to know the importance of such training yet deny us the opportunity to obtain it. The responsibility for our ignorance will be placed by the public on the shoulders where it belongs, and then the loss of important places will bring home the shortsighted policy of neglecting every real preparation for their defense. Only when we have tried and have Ken the willing but ignorant application of force to the problem n peace time can we realize what the result will be in war.
We must therefore begin now and we must work constantly to secure even a passable degree of efficiency in a class of work entirely our own and of which we should make a specialty.