(Member U. S. Naval Institute.)
I venture to submit the following remarks to the members of this Institute, because, when I first made some little acquaintance with the United States Navy, some thirty years ago, I considered it was, as regards its engineer officers, the best organized navy in the world. And now it appears to me that the paper by Lieutenant Fullam, U.S.N., on "The System of Training and Discipline required to Promote Efficiency, etc.," and the Prize Essay by Ensign Niblack, U.S.N., on "The Enlistment, Training and Organization of Crews for our New Ships," and the discussions thereon, published in these Proceedings, Nos. 55, 57 and 58, plainly show that the United States Navy contains officers who are quite as progressive and broad-minded as any men in the world; and that, therefore, the remarks in this paper will be freely and fairly discussed on their merits, and that all weak points will be fully and fairly shown up.
In these days of rapid development of machinery, we are all of us tempted to wish that a vast leap forward could be made at once, so that we may have our power produced without the use of coal and steam on board ship. For more than thirty years the hope has been indulged that the use of liquid fuel would enable us to avoid the horrors of coaling ship; but even to-day we seem to be far off from this step forward being taken. Those who have had to superintend the coaling of a man-of-war in a tropical climate, when the steam has been up and the coal has been old and dusty, can alone realize what an immense blessing liquid fuel would be to all on board if it could only be brought into constant use. But there are certain objections to its employment on board vessels of war, which objections do not apply to its use on merchant steamers or fast mail boats, so that we must expect to see it employed successfully in the mercantile marine before it is used in vessels designed for fighting. It is true that those enterprising people, the Italians, are making strong efforts to introduce it into their war ships; but it is possible that an action at sea, in which high-explosive shells may be used, may very much alter their views on this subject.
But far better than liquid fuel would be the use of stored-up electricity for the propulsion and production of power for the use of war-ships. Could we bottle up in a volume of one cubic foot, and in a weight not exceeding 100 pounds, and at a cost not exceeding one dollar, sufficient electricity to develop one horse-power continuously for 1000 hours, we should have arrived at a state of almost ideal perfection as regards power for propulsion and power for working the various machines on board ships of war. Then we could dispense with coal bunkers, boilers, funnels, heat, smoke, dust, dirt and stench, and nearly all the other abominations connected with steam.
Personally, I should rejoice in such an improved state of things on board ships, for I have no love for things as they are. I have no reverence for things simply because they are old, although I have a very great dislike to any change that does not bring an improvement commensurate with the trouble and expense of effecting the change. But I am certainly not prejudiced in favor of coal and steam, although I have been connected with them all my life.
Now, although I do not venture to say that within the next thirty years some new inventions in chemistry and electricity may not render electric propulsion possible and profitable, yet, unfortunately, I cannot see any hope of its introduction in the immediate future.
At this moment we have as little to do with the distant future of thirty years hence as we have to do with the remote past of three hundred years ago. It is almost as great a folly to look too far ahead as it is to be always looking back upon the past. In some armies and in some navies it is the fashion to allow the past to dominate the present. With that fashion I am not in accord. It is simply childish to be governed by the iron rules of past practice. On the other hand it is presumptuous conceit and vanity to disregard the lessons of past experience.
Let us for one moment consider a large example of the result of slavish obedience to the rules of the past. Let us turn our eyes to the year 1866, and to the Austrian army under Marshal Benedict, enslaved by the rules and traditions of the past, and we shall see the frightful fruit arising from the worship of the dead past—we see the field of Sadowa, the crushing of a mighty army and the humbling of the proud Austrian empire.
Let us look again to 1866. We see the Prussian army governed by the thoughts and reason of living men. Those men had learnt a living lesson from the experience of the past. They had learnt that things must progress—that there is no standing still. They had altered their arms, their drill and their tactics, under the guidance of the progressive Von Moltke, who would not be bound by the practice of his youth or by the traditions of his predecessors. And we look again upon the field of Sadowa, and we see the glorious success of the Prussian army which had learnt from the experience of the past, from the wars in Europe and from the great civil war in America. It had learnt to cast aside the leading-strings of its childhood and to think and to act as reason and circumstances required, and thus it crushed and conquered the army which was governed only by the rules and practice of a dead generation.
It is useless to multiply instances to show the value of progress in war matters. Those who are opposed to progress should prove their case by showing how and when nations have suffered by adopting improvements in arms, improvements in organization and improvements in tactics.
I venture on the foregoing remarks because it has been my fate to meet with so many people who object to all change and who express their preference "for the good old times" when there was neither steam nor engineers on board of men-of-war. But amongst American officers there is probably less of this desire for retrogression than amongst any other naval officers in the world. Nevertheless, the views I have held for many years are sufficiently novel, I believe, to require these introductory remarks, and it is my desire that these views may be fully and freely criticized.
I need not attempt to call your attention to the giant strides which have been made in the application of steam, hydraulic power, compressed air and electricity to the modern men-of-war since 1860. But the advance between 1860 and 1870 was not so great as that between 1870 and 1880, and that again was not so great as the advance between 1880 and 1890. What the advance will be between 1890 and 1900 I will not now attempt to predict, but of this we may be certain, that it will not be less than that made during the last decade.
But whilst enormous changes have been effected in the engineering materiel of all navies, how very little change has been made in the engineering personnel to correspond with the change in the materiel and the altered conditions of naval warfare! And in this respect of engineer personnel, the progress of the United States Navy has not been in proportion to the development of the materiel. Yet for the past four years the steam department of the U.S. Navy has been presided over by the most energetic and most capable officer that has ever held the position of Engineer-in-Chief in any navy.
No one who has read the Annual Reports of the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering can believe that the non-development of the engineer personnel is due to the absence of effort on his part. But, unfortunately, the dead past, old practice and ancient traditions still actuate all governments in dealing with their navies.
No naval war on a large scale has occurred to bring home to any government the importance of the engineer force on board ship. And yet scarcely a day passes that evidence is not forthcoming of the vital importance of the naval engineer, and that on him primarily rests the lighting efficiency of every navy.
As I retired from the British Navy upwards of four years ago, I do not think I can be considered guilty of boasting if I say that in my opinion the engineer department of the Royal Navy has been for some years as efficient as that of any other navy in the world. I may go still further, now, and say that at present it is more efficient than the engineer department of any other navy, because the English Admiralty has of late years very wisely increased the power of the engineer officers over the men and materiel of the ships actually afloat. Yet I do not hesitate to assert my complete conviction that the engineer branch of the British Navy is not even yet organized for efficiently discharging the duties which will be required of it in time of war.
Let me give one small example of those things which are occurring every day in all navies.
"On the 13th July last, during target practice on board H.M.S. Trafalgar, the locking bolt of the after turret was broken, and the turret was practically useless for three days, although the ship's artificers worked day and night at the repairs." Here we see one-half of the fighting power of a ship of 11,940 tons and 12,000 horse-power disabled for three days by the breaking of a single bolt. But if the breaking of a single locking bolt disables the half of the fighting power of a 12,000-ton ironclad, and the repairs of that defect require the labor of the whole of the ship's artificers for three days and nights, what may we expect when a ship has been engaged for an hour with an enemy of equal fighting power? How many mechanics will be required to repair damages after one heavy shell has exploded inboard? This question is easy to ask, but not so easy to answer.
If two similar ships fight, and each receives similar injuries, so that they are compelled to separate for repairs, then if one of those ships carries, say, thirty mechanics whilst the other ship carries sixty mechanics, the latter ship ought to be repaired and in fighting condition first, and should most assuredly capture or destroy the ship carrying the smaller number of mechanics.
It may be argued that the number of mechanics cannot be increased without reducing the number of fighting men on board. That is the one great fallacy which has prevented the development of the fighting power of all navies. Skilled mechanics are of all men the most easily drilled to become good fighting men with rifles, heavy guns, torpedoes or pistols. And the drill necessary to make them effective combatants also improves them as mechanics. (See Appendixes A, B, C, D.)
But the question may be asked. How are these combatant mechanics to be employed on board ship during peace ? My answer is: They would mount guard and do deck duty in lieu of the marines. There are in all armies corps of combatant or military engineers, and in all navies there should be corps of combatant naval engineers.
It takes some years to make a man an efficient sailor, and it takes some years for a boy to become an ordinary skilled mechanic. But the great civil war of 1861-5, and numerous other wars, have clearly proved that good soldiers can be speedily made out of intelligent men. The recent reduction of the period of training of the German soldiers proves how much can be done in these days in making soldiers out of fairly intelligent men.
There is plenty of enterprise, daring and love of adventure amongst the young mechanics of England and the United States, but they have a sentimental objection to enter the navy under the name, style or title of "coal-heaver" or "stoker 2d class," especially as there is no prospect of rising from those ratings to those of machinist, artificer, or warrant officer.
It has, therefore, been my desire for many years past that the whole of the naval engineer branch, from the engineer-in-chief to the newly entered coal-heaver, should be formed into one body to be called "The Corps of Naval Engineers." (See Appendix C, pages 50-52.)
It is not to be expected that good mechanics could be got immediately to enter the navy in sufficient numbers to do duty as coal heavers, and therefore the ratings of the engine-room men would have to be something as follows:
Naval Engineers.
Rank.
Fireman, 2d Class, Fireman Mechanic, 2d Class, Seaman, 3d Class.
Fireman, 1st Class, Fireman Mechanic, 1st Class, Seaman, 2d Class.
Leading Fireman, Leading Mechanic Seaman, 1st Class.
Chief Fireman, Chief Mechanic, Petty Officer, 3d Cl.
Machinist, or Artificer, Petty Officer, 2d Cl.
Chief Machinist, or Chief Artificer, Petty Officer, 1st Cl.
Assistant Engineers Ensign, or Sub-Lieut.
Engineers, Lieutenants.
Chief, or Staff Engineers, Lieut.-Commander.
Fleet Engineers, Commanders.
Engineers-in-Chief, or Inspectors General of Naval
Engineering, Captain.
Director-General of Naval Engineering Rear Admiral.
The oilers and water-tenders would not be separate ratings; the men for those duties would be selected from the chief mechanics and machinists. The pay of the fireman-mechanics, leading and chief mechanics, should be 25 per cent, more than the pay of firemen, leading firemen and chief firemen.
The above-named ratings of men and petty officers would comprise the engine-room men only. But the "Corps of Naval Engineers" under the control of the naval engineer officers should include the whole of the shipwrights, armorers, electricians, dynamo tenders, torpedo artificers, blacksmiths, plumbers and tinsmiths; and the whole of the materiel of the ship and all its arms and machinery should be entirely in the care of the engineer officers of the ship. (Appendix C, page 51.)
This UNIFICATION of the whole of the mechanics under the principal engineer officer of the ship would enable the whole of the mechanics to be concentrated on the repair of the most important defects, either of the ship, the propelling machinery, the gun mountings, torpedo machinery or electrical plant. And all the defects in all the materiel would be made good much more rapidly if there was a supreme head of the mechanical work, for then there could be no conflict of authority or friction, as there would be only one united body, instead of a large number of petty little departments to squabble about where each one's authority begins or ends. The captain would hold the principal, engineer officer responsible for the efficiency of the whole of the materiel, and the engineer officer would have the means and the power to sustain that responsibility. There would be a fair division of labor and responsibility. The captain and line officers would navigate and fight the ship, they would represent the nation, and deal with all international questions. The naval engineers would keep the materiel in repair, propel the ship, and fight as required, on board or ashore, under the orders of the captain or line officers.
I recognize as much as any man the difficulty of making a radical change in the personnel of such a conservative institution as the navy of any country is. But the statesman who is responsible for the organization of a navy should not be dominated by the ideas and practices of a dead past. His first and his last duty is to consider the efficiency of the navy for the hour of battle and for the week afterwards.
The naval organizer has to consider all sides of a many-sided question, and to determine the correct position and organization of the naval engineer corps he must study the position, duties and organization of the line officers.
The responsibilities of the captain and line officers are so great, it is necessary for them to know so much of a hundred things altogether outside of their ship, that they surely have no time to spare to play with hammers, files and oil cans in their endeavor to become practical mechanics.
It is necessary that the line officers should know the political state and condition of foreign countries, the state and tendency of commerce and local trade abroad, the condition of foreign navies, the strength or weakness of individual foreign ships, the capacity of foreign ports and the armaments of foreign seaboard fortresses, so that they may become broad-minded, capable, prudent but dashing naval commanders. Captains are not immortal, and in future wars the casualties may be so great that the command of ships may have to be taken by junior officers. How necessary is it then that the line officers should become acquainted with the most important portion of their duties—the duties of command—whilst the preservation and repair of the materiel is delegated to those officers who have a special aptitude and v/ho have had a special training for the most efficient performance of those duties.
The duties of the executive or line officer are of such a varied and important nature that if they are to be properly learnt and properly performed those officers cannot have time to learn the details of engineering as applied to steam propulsion, torpedo and gun fittings, electric light, etc.
The capacity of most men is limited, whether they be line officers, engineers or politicians. We have very old authority that there is "No royal road to learning." Yet not a few people on the European side of the Atlantic think it is only necessary to call a man a naval captain and then he instantly becomes endowed with a receptive capacity which will enable him to acquire as much knowledge of a difficult subject in five minutes as an ordinary man would acquire by five years' study and practical experience.
Not long ago a distinguished naval officer stated that the captain of a man-of-war should not only be able to order the engineer to repair a broken crank-shaft, but that the captain should be able to direct the engineer how to do it. Is this a specimen of modesty or of what? If ships had never been lost by bad navigation and worse pilotage we might imagine that the naval captains who belonged to the same navy as the speaker were very capable men who may possibly have sufficient time to study some practical engineering. But unfortunately ships have been lost by the ignorance and inefficiency of their captains and navigating officers, and before the executive officers occupy themselves with engineering it would be well for them to become perfect in their own special duties. Surely, if it were necessary for a captain to tell the engineer how to mend a broken shaft, it is only to be supposed that it would also be necessary for the engineer to tell the captain how to navigate and fight his ship. Such a confusion of duties would, however, be only fit for the inmates of a lunatic asylum. The engineer most assuredly should know better than the captain how to mend his broken crank-shaft, and the captain should know better than the engineer how to navigate and fight his ship.
There is no reason why the Engineer should not have as much zeal for his work, and feel as much patriotism and pride in the honor of his flag as any other naval officer; and there can be no doubt but that they are as much to be relied on to perform their duties as any other officers. But surely they must be fully trusted and given full control of all the machinery on board ship and full control of their own staff, otherwise it is impossible for them to perform their duties properly. In the British Navy, thirty years ago, the stokers were stationed at heavy guns, and received extra pay as trained men. At that time they were so frequently called out of the engine-room for gun and sail drill, cleaning copper on masts and sides, boat work, etc., that the engine-room work was quite neglected, the men were overworked, and the engineer officers driven to despair. The state of affairs got so bad that at last the Lords of the Admiralty had to interfere and issue orders that the stokers should not be drilled or qualify for the rating of "trained man," and further stringent orders were given that the men should not be taken out of the engine-rooms without the knowledge and consent of the engineer officers. This was most beneficial to the engineer materiel of the British Navy as well as to the personnel. But that was when the engineer force formed but a small percentage of the total number of the ship's company; and, further, it was when the duties of the engine-room did not require such high skill and ability and such great physical strength and endurance as are required now. It is probable that the British Navy has more men engaged in tropical service for long periods than any other navy. And certainly the heat that the naval firemen have to endure in modern men-of-war is far in excess of the heat of the fire-rooms of the fastest mail steamers running in any part of the world. I well remember the chief engineer of an American steamer visiting my ship in the harbor of Acapulco. We had come into harbor the day before, our fires had been banked and we had wind-sails up and the ventilators trimmed to catch the breeze. After walking round the engine and boiler rooms that American engineer quietly remarked, "Well, you must have one consolation in this ship—you have not much to fear in the future, for whatever you do in this life, you can't get into a much hotter place in the next world than what you have got here." He further informed us that the maximum temperature of his engine room when running from Panama to San Francisco was 27 degrees below the average temperature of ours.
I merely mention this to show one of the differences between the condition of men-of-war and merchant steamers. As years go on the differences become greater instead of less. And in my opinion it is absolutely necessary that means should be taken to provide healthier conditions for the engine-room mechanics and firemen on board men-of-war. This can be done only by giving them fresh air and daylight by spells of deck duty. They cannot have spells of deck duty and drill unless their numbers are largely increased. Their numbers cannot be largely increased if they are not drilled up for fighting purposes, otherwise the fighting power of the ship would be reduced; and therefore it is evident that for real fighting efficiency and for speedy repair of the ship after an engagement, the engine-room staff must be:—
1. So large as to be far in excess of the staff of a merchant ship of similar horse-power.
2. It must be in excess of the ordinary requirements of a man-of-war during peace time. Thus, if the present number of mechanics and firemen of a given ship be 100, then according to my views the number would be increased to 200, and the marines and idlers would be reduced by 100 men. The naval engineers for deck duty would therefore equal in number those employed below.
3. The deck party of engineers and the engine-room party of engineers would change duties every fortnight, say, on every alternate Monday at noon. The deck party thus becoming the engine-room party, and the engine-room party going on deck.
4. When steaming the engine-room party of engineers should never be called upon to do drill of any kind, or to do any deck work whatever. They should never be employed on any duty when off watch, and they should never be worked in the engine-room "watch and watch" for more than 24 hours.
5. When in port executing ordinary repairs, cleaning bilges, etc., the engine-room party should never be employed on deck or do drill of any kind until the engineer officer in charge has reported to the captain that the machinery is in all respects complete and ready for war service at a moment's notice.
6. When, owing to excessive heat or hard steaming in the tropics, etc., the engineer officer considers that it is necessary to increase the number of firemen in each watch, or to increase the number of watches from three to four, so as to give the firemen a "longer spell off," he will make written application to the captain for as many of the naval engineers from the deck party as he requires.
7. After an action or any disaster, when many defects may have to be made good, the engineer officer should make written, application to the captain for the whole of the naval engineers of the deck party, as well as the engine-room party, to be placed at his disposal entirely until all defects are made good and the ship is once more ready for fighting. Until the defects are made good not a single man should be employed in drill or in doing any deck duty whatever.
On a former page I have referred to the numerous and important duties of the executive or line officers. Let me again refer to them. The executive officers in the British Navy are supposed to have a thorough knowledge of, 1, seamanship; 2, navigation; 3, nautical astronomy, meteorology, etc.; 4, marine surveying and compass correction; 5, pilotage; 6, gunnery, infantry drill, machine guns and field artillery; 7, torpedoes, automobile and stationary; 8, naval tactics; 9, fortification, and other military subjects, such as transport and commissariat duties; 10, naval and military history; 11, international law; 12, foreign languages—French, German, Spanish, Italian.
In addition to these very necessary subjects, they are supposed to acquire a good knowledge of marine engineering and naval architecture, pure and applied mathematics, physics and chemistry. It is almost a matter for surprise that they are not required to have a profound knowledge of surgery, medicine, geology, mineralogy and theology.
Surely there can be no more necessity for the executive naval officer to spend his valuable time in studying naval engineering and architecture than there is for the skillful surgeon to study steel-making and the cutlery trade because he uses instruments made of steel.
Certainly if the executive officer can acquire a thorough knowledge of the twelve subjects above named, which are absolutely necessary for the efficient performance of his proper duties, the engineer officers may be trusted to be able to undertake the care, the management and repair of all the machinery, gunnery, torpedo and electrical fittings on board ship, and of the ship itself; and certainly the engineer officers should have control of the whole of the mechanics on board. Not only that, but the engineer officers should be drilled at heavy gun, rifle and battalion drill, so that they may be in full control of their men.
The number of engineer officers has been cut down very low in the British Navy and still lower in the U. S. Navy. I say they have been cut down dangerously low, because in war time a very slight accident may disable the two or three engineer officers and leave the engineer department entirely headless. And I can conceive nothing more dangerous than trusting the machinery of a man-of-war to the hands of mere mechanics, who have not sufficient scientific knowledge to utilize their own practical experience.
So far as the experience of the British Navy goes during late years, its efficiency has increased in proportion to the development of the engineer branch. The English Admiralty recognize this fact. For a long period I worked to get the engineer officers drilled, (see extracts from my letters to the British Admiralty dated 1877 and 1885 in the appendix) and at length an Admiralty circular. No. 17 N, was issued on the nth March, 1886, ordering that leading stokers and stokers should be trained in the use of arms, etc. Furthermore, the engineer students were ordered to undergo a course of rifle, pistol, cutlass and battalion drill, and they proved themselves to be more than the equals of the other officers in smartness and proficiency in all drills. The great ability shown by the engineer students in passing their examinations in torpedoes, gunnery and hydraulic fittings, electric light, etc., was a source of astonishment to the very able examining officers.
In concluding this paper, which only glances at some of the salient points of a large question, I would beg leave to state my conviction that the United States system of having an independent Bureau of Steam Engineering is by far the best that can be devised. But I am of the opinion that the Bureau should be heavily manned with good men, and that it should not be overloaded with work. The work of the Bureau should be divided into two branches:
1. The designing and manufacturing branch, having control over the work in the various navy yards and contract work.
2. The examining, testing, and trustee branch, whose duties it would be, first, to examine and report on the progress of the work at the various navy yards and contractors' works; second, to test the machinery, etc., on its completion, and to accept it or reject it according to its merits; third, to take charge of all new and old vessels and to keep them efficient (when out of the hands of the navy yards), and ready for active service at a moment's notice. This latter department would then act as an effective check upon the manufacturing department, which latter in some cases, in Europe at least, has been tempted to sacrifice efficiency for cheapness.
The officers of the examining branch ought to be senior to or of higher rank than the officers of the manufacturing branch. When the loss of H.M.S. Megara, in 1870, caused a committee to be appointed to inquire into the matter, I made proposals similar to the above; and at length this plan has been recently adopted by the Admiralty placing the steam reserve officers under the Admiral Commander-in-Chief at the various ports, instead of their being, as formerly, under the orders of the Admiral Superintendents of the various navy yards, who were officially the heads of the ship-building yards and engine factories.
As regards the charge of the machinery when it is on board ship, the whole of the hydraulic gear, the turrets, electric light, air-compressing machinery and torpedoes, torpedo-boats, steam capstans and steering engines is in the charge of the English naval engineer officers. The captain, therefore, has always a body of scientifically trained and practical mechanical officers to hold responsible for the efficiency of all the mechanical appliances on board. The hull of the ship also, as regards its interior parts, double bottoms, watertight doors and compartments, pumping and flooding arrangements, etc., are all in the charge of the engineer department; and I maintain that no navy can be truly efficient for fighting purposes where this system is not fully carried out.
No half and-half measures will avail. The executive or line officers must be the navigating and the fighting officers for excellence; they must have the control of the weapons and of the men who use them. But the engineers must have the sole care of the material and of the mechanical personnel to keep the machinery in fighting order, and to repair it after an engagement or disaster, and thus to prepare it for fighting again.
There must be no division of the mechanics on board, as at present, some under the carpenter, some under the gunner, and some under the engineer. All must be under the engineer if there is to be fighting efficiency.
So far the object of this paper has been to heap additional work, drill and responsibility on the engineer officers. I must now say something as to the necessity of bettering the conditions of the engineer officer's life. More than any other officer, the engineer requires good cabin accommodation, where he can rest at any time. For long periods I have had to keep "watch and watch," four hours on and four hours off, and so I have known what it is to require quiet cabin accommodation. Furthermore, all the engineer officers should be ward-room officers—that is, they should not mess in the steerage.
As regards title and relative rank, I cannot but think that as the English Navy has largely borrowed of the United States Navy in years gone past, so now the United States Navy may with advantage borrow from the English Navy somewhat. Thus the engineer officers on first entry for actual service afloat, after leaving the training college, should receive the title of "assistant engineer" with rank of ensign. After four years' service, and passing the necessary examination, the rank of "engineer" should be obtained with the relative rank of lieutenant. The next step would be that of chief engineer with relative rank of lieutenant-commander. And then the next step would be that of fleet engineer with relative rank of commander. The officers appointed to Dockyards and to the Navy Department of Washington should have the title of "engineers-in-chief," or inspectors-general of naval engineering with the relative rank of captain, and the chief of the bureau should receive the tide of director-general of naval engineering and should bear the relative rank of rear-admiral.
FORMATION OF AN EFFECTIVE NAVAL RESERVE.
So far as I can see, no step has been taken to form an effective reserve of the engineer force for the United States Navy, so as to provide for a war with any great naval power. Whether such an effective reserve is necessary depends upon the foreign policy of the government of the United States. That it is necessary for the British Navy is, in my opinion, beyond all question, and the method I have proposed for the establishment of such a reserve is shown in the Appendix C, pages 52-55.
My aim has been to obtain efficiency for the hour of battle and for the week afterwards, and that object I pursued during the time I was in the English Navy; and it is still my object, although I have no personal interests to serve, as I have neither relatives nor friends in any navy. I know that my views are not approved by many officers of all classes. On the other hand, I know that many officers who have seen some sea fighting agree heartily with these views.
I say there is in these days no room on board a modern man-of-war for the man who is only a marine and nothing more, or only a fireman and nothing more, or only a mechanic and nothing more. Whatever he may cost to obtain, the man for the naval engine-room must be a stoker, mechanic, marine gunner, similarly as the English man-of-war sailor is a seaman, a gunner, a rifleman, a torpedoist and a diver.
I can only hope that these few remarks will be amply discussed and receive the severest criticism of the members of the Institute, and that those that do me the honor to oppose my views will remember that I write not for the piping times of peace and fair weather cruising, but for THE HOUR OF BATTLE AND THE WEEK AFTERWARDS.
APPENDIX A.
Extract from Letter by George Quick to Admiralty, Dated, 1877.
ENGINEER SERVICE OF THE ROYAL NAVY.
Suggestions:—Engineer Students.—The present method of educating the students in mechanical skill and pure mathematics is all that can be desired, but I think from my own knowledge of many of those who have been students that more time and attention should be given to drawing and physical science than at present.
Drill.—There is, however, another point of great importance to which I have never seen any allusion made; that is, that for the due performance of his duty it is necessary that the engineer officer should at an early age acquire some idea of command, not of a ship, but of the men under his control. To give that idea of command there is, in my opinion, no method of education so effective as military drill.
I venture, therefore, to suggest that a portion of time should be devoted every week to the instruction of the students in rifle, cutlass and heavy gun drill, even if the time of study has to be increased by six months—that is, from six years to six years and a half; although I do not think that is absolutely necessary, as I am of opinion that the term of mere mechanical labor in the workshops might be reduced with advantage, for from my experience of the service I am led to conclude that a military spirit and officer-like feeling would tend to the preservation and proper use of the machinery of the fleet far more than any manual skill in mechanical labor possessed by the persons in charge of it.
With engineers having a military spirit and officer-like feeling, there would be every exertion made to preserve the machinery in the best working order. It is the prevention of the necessity for repairs, combined with the capacity to effect repairs after an action, in the shortest time, that constitutes the highest art of the seagoing naval engineer officer.
The proposed system of drill would also induce a more systematic routine in the engineer department than is general at the present time. And in the event of large numbers of the combatant officers being disabled in action, ashore or afloat, sick or absent in the vessels taken from the enemy, landing parties, etc., the engineer officers would be available for directing, under the orders of the commander of the ship, the mechanics, stokers and domestics, whom I suggest should also be trained to the use of small arms.
Drill of Mechanics, Stokers and Idlers.—Taking into consideration the very large proportion that the mechanics, stokers and other civilians bear to the pure blue-jackets and marines in modern ships of war, it appears to me necessary that so large a number of persons should receive some instruction in rifle, cutlass and gun drill.
If the plan suggested be carried into effect I believe it will positively increase the efficiency of the men in the performance of their ordinary duties, for there can be no doubt but that military drill, teaching the habit of physical obedience to the word of command, is of great benefit physically to all who are brought under its influence.
APPENDIX B.
EXTRACT FROM LETTER BY GEORGE QUICK TO ADMIRALTY, DATED NOYEMBER, 1885.
ENGINEER OFFICERS.
1. Having regard to the vast increase in the power of the machinery of modern ships, and the greatly increased range of the duties and responsibilities of the engineer officers, and the large number of men under their control, I am of opinion that there is an urgent need for a considerable change in the rank of these officers.
From the Navy List of the 1st October, 1885, it appears there are now of ships built and building 92 vessels of 3,000 indicated horsepower and upwards, with engine room staff of from 32 to 118 men, exclusive of engineer officers. This gives an average of 5,925 indicated horse-power and of over 69 men under the control of every chief engineer of these ships. The total power of these 92 ships is upwards of five hundred and forty-five thousand indicated horse-power for propelling engines alone, exclusive of all the numerous auxiliary engines for steering, hoisting purposes, electric light, turret work and torpedo machinery. Or, excluding all ships under 4,000 indicated horse-power, there remain 73 ships of an average of 6,600 indicated horse-power and with an average engineer staff of over 75 men.
For the control of this vast total of more than half a million of indicated horse power of machinery and of upwards of six thousand four hundred men there were on the 1st October last on the active list of the Navy (excluding inspectors of machinery) only 19 officers of the relative rank of commander, and none of the relative rank of lieutenant of over 8 years' seniority, all the other chief engineers on the list except the above mentioned 19 being junior to lieutenants of 8 years' seniority.
Such a scarcity of officers of the relative rank of commander does not exist in any other branch of the public service, regard being had to the total number of men belonging to the department, to the enormous money value of the material under the control of these officers, and to the vast importance of the duties of the department from a purely fighting point of view.
In modern warfare the breakdown of the engineering department during action means the total loss of the ship.
2. That the Navy has hitherto existed without engineer officers holding higher rank than they do is no argument in favor of their retaining their present low position. For, in fact, the number of engineer officers in the relative rank of commander was much larger in years gone by than it is now, or than it is ever likely to be again under the existing regulations. For, in the course of a few years when all the engineer officers of the rank of engineer will be qualified for the rank of chief engineer, the rate of promotion to the rank of chief engineer will be much less than it is now; and few engineers will be promoted before arriving at 44 to 45 years of age. I have not the slightest doubt but that the engineer department is quite as efficient as any other department in the Navy (if not much more so), and that it is far more efficient than the steam department of any other navy in the world; but I am of opinion that it could be made very much more efficient for combatant and all other purposes by the changes I shall propose to be made.
3. I have no hesitation in asserting that the very small improvements which have been made during the past 8 years in the position of the junior engineer officers have been productive of great benefits to the efficiency of the service, and I am confident that any other improvements which are made in the position of the engineer officers generally will be amply compensated by a further increase in efficiency. It is very certain that the duties of the stokers are of the most arduous and disagreeable nature, very trying to the health, temper and discipline of the men. There is no romance or interest in shoveling coals in the bunkers or into the furnaces, nor in cleaning boilers, bilges, etc., like there is in the blue jacket's work on deck. And the management of the men under these circumstances is very frequently a most difficult task for the engineer officer of the watch, or the one who has charge of the men for the day. I cannot but speak in terms of the highest praise of many of the stokers I have known, men who have worked hard, were careful and cautious in the performance of their duties, strove to improve themselves as workmen, and gave no trouble to the engineer officers. But I have known many other cases in which the stokers have given an immense amount of trouble to the engineer officers, whilst they were cunning enough to keep a good "deck character" by not breaking their leave and by being very obsequious to the ship's police. It has been, as a rule, very difficult to get such men punished for crimes in the engine-room, because their good "deck character" saves them; and then, when it begins to be understood that the engineer officers cannot get the men punished for engine-room offenses, discipline and ready obedience in the engine-room are very difficult to maintain. I know one case in which an engineer officer having reported a stoker for having been asleep when on duty, the unfortunate officer was accused of neglect of duty in allowing the man to go to sleep, but the stoker was not punished. This decision led to much insubordination amongst the other men, and it was not until another engineer officer had laid a complaint before the Admiral on the station and obtained satisfaction that matters began to go on in a satisfactory manner in that ship's engine-room.
During a time of peace when only ordinary cruising duties have to be performed the maintenance of discipline is, as I have endeavored to show, in some cases very difficult; and it appears to me that in action and in times of great danger it may be, in some cases, utterly impossible for discipline to be kept, if the engineer officers have not higher rank and greater legal control and power over the men than at present.
In two cases of imminent peril that I know of, the stokers remained in the stokehold doing their work quickly and quietly; but, in two other cases I have heard of, the engineer officers had to prevent the men by force from bolting up the ladders to get out of the engine room and stokehold.
4. This brings me to an important point as to the training of stokers and engineer officers. The immense influence of military drill upon men generally to improve their discipline and to make them better workmen in all occupations of life is strikingly shown by the superiority of the man who has been a marine or in the army, when entered as a stoker, to the ordinary men who are entered as stokers without any military drill I have for many years noticed this, and having regard to the very large number of stokers and other undrilled and unarmed persons on board English ships of war, I have endeavored to get a certain amount of military drill for the stokers on first entry into the service, and some little practice of the same kind afterwards at sea.
If this were done there would be less objection to the engine-room staff of stokers being increased in numbers. That it would improve their discipline and their work in the engine-room I am also completely convinced by what I have learnt from French and German manufacturers and large employers of labor, of the vast improvement in the character and conduct of their workpeople since the institution of compulsory military service in those countries.
5. The duties of the engineer officers as well as of the stokers have become of a far more combatant nature than they were formerly; and I consider it is most desirable that the junior engineer officers should be required to undergo a course of military drill.
This is no new idea of mine, as I drew up a paper on the subject in 1877-8 for Admiral Moresby, who was then captain of H.M.S. Endymion. But it was not popular with the engineer officers nor with stokers a few years ago. A great change of opinion on this point has, however, taken place, I believe, and I have been told by stokers who have been employed in torpedo-boats, etc., that they felt very strongly they ought to have instruction in the use of arms to defend themselves, and that arms ought to be supplied to them. They also said that they thought they ought to be taught at least how to discharge the torpedoes, in case all the deck people of the boats should be killed or disabled. I do not think it is desirable to attempt to make men "Jacks of all trades," but as modern warfare requires so many mechanical operations to be performed, I am decidedly of opinion that the whole engineering staff should have a certain amount of drill in the use of arms. It has been proved by experience that as a rule the well-drilled man (soldier or sailor) will make a good workman, and it has been equally well proved that the good workman will drill well and quickly and make a very good shot. Cleaning and polishing brass work on deck I do not consider as drill, and stokers should not be employed at such work unless the complement of stokers be largely increased.
6. Up to the present time engineer officers have been "civil" officers. I am of opinion that the time has arrived when they should be made military officers, similarly as the navigating officers are, and that they should wear similar uniform to the navigating officers, but with the distinguishing marks of the engineer officer as regards velvet between stripes, etc.
This change of uniform alone would largely increase their power and authority over their own staff in the engine-room; but I am of opinion that the principal engineer officer on board a ship should have the power of awarding minor punishments to his men direct, or at least of bringing the men directly before the captain instead of bringing them as now before the first lieutenant or commander.
This removal of the engineer officers from the civil to the military branch is the greatest change I have to propose. It has been recommended before by an Admiralty Committee, and I know that a very large number of the engineer officers are desirous of it solely for the purpose of obtaining increased efficiency in the engineer department.
7. Whether the engineer officers are removed to the military branch or not, I consider it is most desirable that the following alterations in the titles and in the relative rank of the engineer officers should be made:
1. That the head of the engineer department at the Admiralty, whether the appointment is held by a civilian, as at present, or by a naval engineer officer, should receive the title of "Director-General of Naval Engineering" or "Director-General of the Engineer Department of the Navy," and that he should, if a naval engineer officer, hold the relative rank of rear-admiral, whilst holding that appointment.
2. That the titles of chief inspector of machinery and inspector of machinery be abolished, and that the officers now in those ranks should receive commissions as "engineer-in-chief " with the relative rank of captain in the Navy, according to date of commission. The seniority of these officers to date from the date of their first commission as "inspector of machinery." Thus if an officer was promoted to the rank of inspector of machinery in 1875 and to chief inspector in 1880, then his seniority as an "engineer-in-chief" would date from 1875.
The number of "engineers-in-chief" should be 12, and they should be appointed for service as follows: One for each reserve at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, Malta (4). One for each dockyard at Devonport, Malta, Bermuda, Hong Kong, Halifax, Cape of Good Hope (6), and 2 others available for employment on special service, at the Admiralty, or in large fleets, or otherwise as required.
3. That all chief engineers now on the Active List, of and above 7 years' seniority, should receive commissions as "fleet engineers" and have relative rank with commanders in the Navy according to date of commission.
Those few "chief engineers" who now rank with commanders to have their commissions as "fleet engineer" antedated, so as to give them the same seniority relative to commanders as they have at present. Thus the seniority of the present senior chief engineer in the Navy would be dated as "fleet engineer" the 27th September, 1881.
I am of opinion that the principal engineer officer of every ship of 3,000 indicated horse-power and upwards, or which has an engine-room complement of 40 men and upwards, should not have a lower relative rank than that of commander. As there are 92 of such ships built and building, and as this number is likely to be increased, I am of opinion that there should not be less than 100 engineer officers of the proposed rank of "fleet engineer." These would be employed somewhat as follows:
For ships built and building of 3,000 I. H. P. and upwards, 80
For the Admiralty, 2
For reserves at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham (3 at each), 9
For dockyards at Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham and Sheerness, 9
For dockyards at Gibraltar, Jamaica, Esquimalt, 3
For Victoria and Albert and Osborne Royal yachts, 2
Total, 105
From the foregoing it is evident that there will be plenty of appointments open for the proposed number of "fleet engineers." This rank of fleet engineer should be granted;
(a) To those officers who have 7 years' seniority as chief engineer and 20 years' total full-pay service in all ranks.
(b) To those chief engineers who have two years' full-pay service as such, and shall have distinguished themselves in the presence of an enemy, or for conspicuous professional merit, such promotions to be "special" and not to exceed the rate of two in any one year after the first year of the introduction of the rank of fleet engineer.
(c) The total number on the Active List at any one time of the fleet engineers holding that rank by such special promotion shall not be more than 20.
(d) The Admiralty to have the power during the first year of the introduction of the rank of "fleet engineer" to give ten special promotions to that rank.
(e) As a rule two or more fleet engineers should not have seniority of the same date.
(f) The Admiralty to retain power to specially promote chief engineers to the rank of "engineer-in- chief" for very distinguished service in the presence of an enemy, or for great professional merit and services, similarly as they have at present; that is, after five years' service as chief engineer.
8. In order to have one uniform title in the navy to indicate or distinguish one particular degree of relative rank throughout all branches, I have to propose that those "chief" engineers on the Active List who may not be immediately promoted to the rank of "fleet" engineer should receive commissions as "staff" engineer with the relative rank of "staff lieutenant" according to date of commission. The date of the seniority of the "staff" engineers to be that of their present seniority as "chief" engineer. Thus a chief engineer whose seniority is, say, 1st July, 1882, would become a "staff" engineer with seniority of 1st July, 1882.
9. Engineers.—The position of the engineer officer of the rank of "engineer" requires to be greatly improved. As previously shown, there are 92 ships built and building of 3,000 indicated horse-power and upwards, and with engine-room complements of from 38 to 112 men, and there are 83 ships of under 3,000 indicated horse-power and over 1,000 indicated horse-power. It appears to me of the utmost importance that at least the two engineer officers next in authority to the principal engineer officer of a ship of over 4,000 indicated horse-power should have the relative rank of lieutenant with seniority according to date of commission, and that the engineer officer in charge of small vessels under 1,000 indicated horse-power should also have the same rank. There can be no doubt that the duties and responsibilities of engineer officers are increasing more rapidly than those of any other class in the service.
I have, therefore, to suggest that all engineer officers now on the Active List as "engineers" should rank with lieutenants under eight years' seniority according to date of commission. They would thus be always junior to staff lieutenants (if that title be adopted) or to lieutenants of eight years' seniority. The number of officers required for the service must be determined by the number of ships built and building. At present, I believe that about 300 engineer officers of this rank of "engineer" are required for active service.
10. Assistant Engineers.—All assistant engineers of whatever age or length of service are, according to the present regulations, junior to sub-lieutenants and all assistant paymasters. This is felt by them to be a very great hardship, and I am of opinion that assistant engineers should rank with sub-lieutenants according to date of commission.
APPENDIX C.
EXTRACTS FROM PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OP A COMBATANT CORPS OF ROYAL NAVAL ENGINEERS, WITH AN EFFECTIVE RESERVE OF NAVAL OFFICERS AND MEN, BY GEORGE QUICK, FLEET ENGINEER, DATED 29TH JANUARY, 1887.
DISCIPLINE AND DRILL OF THE STAFF OF THE STEAM DEPARTMENT.
From the Navy List of 1st October, 1886, it appears there are now one hundred (100) ships, built and building, of 3,000 I.H.P. and upwards, with engine-room staffs of from 29 to 119 men, exclusive of officers.
This gives an average of over 70 men, under the control of the engineer officer of each of these ships; and an average of 6,222 I.H.P. for propelling engines, exclusive of all other kinds of machinery. The total number of men in the engine-room staff of these ships is 7,066.
Besides these men, there are many others not classed as combatants, such as armorers, blacksmiths, carpenter's crew, plumbers, etc.
Having regard, therefore, to the large number of unarmed and undrilled persons in our ships of war, forming as they do so large a proportion of the ship's company, we would recommend that all these so-called "idlers" should be exercised in the use of rifle, pistol and cutlass; and also in the case of artificers and stokers at heavy gun drill, instead of their valuable time being expended in sail drill, as at present.
The immense influence of military drill to improve discipline and make better workmen is strikingly shown by those men who have been marines, when entered as stokers, compared with the ordinary men entered. That it would improve the discipline and work in the engine-room is undoubted.
The duties of stokers are of the most arduous and disagreeable nature, very trying to health, temper and discipline, and their management by the engineer officers is often a difficult task, even in times of peace; in action, and in times of great danger, it may be utterly impossible for discipline to be maintained, unless the engineer officers be given greater legal control and power over them. More especially is this apparent when we consider the conditions under which a future naval action would be carried on, so far as regards the engine-room department; with all water-tight doors in engine-rooms and stokeholds closed, the stokeholds under forced draught, necessitating the securing down of all hatches, the only communication with the executive officers being by means of a voice-tube to the bridge or conning tower.
It is therefore necessary that the principal engineer officer should have the power of awarding punishments of a minor nature to the men of his department, and referring graver offenses to the captain, instead of laying every little complaint before the senior executive officer as at present. The junior engineer officers should also be instructed in heavy gun drill as well as in rifle, pistol and cutlass drill in order to exercise their own men, so that the engineer officers might, under the direction of the captain, have over their own staff similar control to that exercised by the executive officers over the seamen.
Moreover, in the case of future warfare, it is reasonable to anticipate that some of the enemies' ships would be captured. Such ships would either have to be destroyed, or prize crews placed on board to take them to a British port. Such crews must necessarily contain a large proportion of officers and men of the steam department, which could not be arranged, under existing circumstances, without crippling the fighting power of our own vessels.
This consideration points out the necessity of largely increasing the proportion of ranks and ratings of this department, in the complements of our men-of-war. In times of peace, this increase of numbers might partly be employed with advantage in their usual duties, the present complements being, in many cases, barely sufficient to maintain the efficiency of the department; but in order to usefully employ the whole of such increase, it would probably be found necessary to detail them for other duties. It is therefore thought that the exceptionally good conduct of the engine-room staff, under the ordinary circumstances of the service, justifies the experiment being made of forming a part of the "guard" of trained stokers, instead of Royal Marines. By thus relieving a portion of the engine-room staff of the confinement entailed by their ordinary duties, and giving them more open-air exercise, the effect on their health would be most beneficial.
THE FORMATION OF THE WHOLE OF THE ENGINE-ROOM STAFF AND SHIP’S ARTIFICERS INTO ONE BODY FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR OF THE SHIP.
Within the last fifteen years the battle-ships of the Navy have undergone vast changes in their construction and armament, more especially as regards the number of fighting machines fitted on board, such as breech-loading guns and Vavasseur gun-carriages; torpedoes with above-water and submerged discharging tubes; torpedo pressure pumps and air reservoirs; electric lighting machinery, both for search lights and internal lighting; hydraulic engines for revolving turrets, and hydraulic loading gear for the guns; also steering and capstan engines and ventilating machinery.
For the preservation and repair of these machines there are various ratings of artificers, some under the direction of the gunnery officer, some under the torpedo officer, and others under the engineer officer, whilst there is the carpenter's crew for the repair of the hull.
But where there is such a divided responsibility as at present, it is impossible that the work can be carried out, and repairs executed in a thoroughly practical and efficient manner, especially as neither the gunnery nor torpedo officers have received any practical mechanical training. Neither can this machinery be kept in a thoroughly efficient state at the smallest possible cost, under existing circumstances; for, in order that the work done by these artificers may be efficiently carried out, they should be under the supervision of officers who have received a thoroughly scientific and practical training, and who can, when necessary, show them how the work should be done.
In order, therefore, to combine the efficiency and economy in utilizing this large staff which is essential to the thorough efficiency of our fighting ships, it is necessary that the whole of the artificers of all classes—armorers, blacksmiths, plumbers, shipwrights, stokers, tinsmiths, lamp trimmers, etc., (except coopers)—should be merged into one body under the engineer officers, and forming the corps to be called the "Royal Naval Engineers;" the different ratings therein, with the various rates of pay, to be retained as at present, or be modified in such manner as may hereafter be determined by the Board of Admiralty.
The engineer officer of the ship should be held solely responsible to the captain for the preservation and efficient working condition of the whole hull, engines of all descriptions, guns, gun carriages, hydraulic gear, torpedoes, torpedo gear, electric light, and all other mechanical appliances on board, and for all spare gear and stores appertaining thereto.
By thus placing all stores under the charge of the engineer officer, needless duplication would be prevented, and a reduction obtained both in the weight of stores carried and in the space occupied, together with simplification of the store accounts.
It is considered that by conferring the name, style or title of "Royal Naval Engineers" on all the artificers, mechanical workmen and stokers in the Navy, it would be a very great inducement to smart and able young mechanics to join the service in much larger numbers and for the present rates of pay. This view is confirmed to a great extent by the class of men found willing to join the corps of Royal Engineers.
It is also desirable to establish the rating of "mechanic writer," who should be capable of keeping accounts and writing a good hand; one or two being included in the complement of each ship (according to size), and thus relieving the engineer officer of much clerical labor, and enabling him to devote greater attention to the personal supervision of his staff. All men of the corps, possessing the necessary qualifications, to be eligible for this rating.
PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMATION OF AN EFFECTIVE RESERVE OF ENGINEER OFFICERS.
In 1870 Mr. Childers, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, abolished the reserved list of executive officers as being utterly useless, and made them all retired officers.
Yet, an efficient reserved list is required, and the formation of one is not an unsolvable problem if a sufficiently broad view be taken of the subject and of the requirements of the Empire. Indeed, the institution of this reserved list of efficient officers of moderate age is, in the case of the engineer officers, an Imperial necessity. In the "Royal Naval Reserve" there are only two engineers (their commissions bearing dates May, 1865, and February, 1882). In 1877, when there was a large demand for engineer officers and artificers to man the reserve fleet, it was found almost impossible to obtain them; and although some officers were obtained from the mercantile marine and the large engineering firms, they would have been of little use at sea until they had gone through a long course of training on a modern man-of-war. If war were actually declared against any great naval power, or combination of naval powers, few merchant service engineers would be found to join, and, if they did, they would be comparatively useless owing to their want of training.
And although we have on the retired list 180 chief engineers and 200 engineers and assistants, these can in no sense be considered an effective reserve; because, when an officer is retired, he, as a rule, keeps up neither his knowledge nor his interest in the service; and those who have been on the retired list for upwards of two years, without practical experience, are in these rapidly moving times nearly, if not quite, useless, it being necessary for officers to keep constantly in touch with the service to retain their efficiency.
Furthermore, the coast defenses of this country are in a most unsatisfactory state; and any satisfactory scheme for the reorganization of our coast defenses must include, for the service of each station, one or two torpedo-boats, mines for the defense of harbors, etc. The Royal Naval Engineers would be admirably suited for this work, both for the care and maintenance of the material and for the instruction of men in the reserve and of the naval volunteers.
The establishment of the "Effective Reserve List" could be easily brought about by the following arrangements, which would give the additional advantage of creating a healthy flow of promotion on the active list, as many officers would willingly go into the "executive reserve" who would not go on the retired list, and thus sever their connection with the service altogether:
1. Entry on the effective reserve list to be by permission of the Admiralty only, and not to be claimed as a right.
2. Officers to be eligible for the reserve list at the following age:
Rank | Lowest age for permission to enter Reserve | Age for retirement from Reserve compulsory |
Engineers | 35 years | 55 years |
Chief engineers, staff engineers | 40 years | 60 years |
Fleet engineers | 45 years | 60 years |
3. Officers on the reserve list may, on their own application, and by the consent of the Admiralty, be transferred to the retired list at any time before arriving at the age for compulsory retirement from the reserve list.
4. Officers on the reserve list who may be incapacitated for the performance of the active duties of the service shall be retired by direction of the Admiralty as their Lordships may see fit in each case, so that the reserve list may be kept really efficient for active service.
5. No promotion to be given to officers on the reserve list, except for war service or active service afloat.
6. Officers on the reserve list to attend at one of the naval ports for a period of two months every two years for practice in naval duties, and to receive information or instruction in new naval appliances, etc.
7. The number of officers on the reserve list to be as follows, and to receive the retired pay due to their age and service, all junior time being allowed to count, together with an allowance of reserve pay at the following rates:
No. | Rate. | Amount. |
200 Engineers | At 2s. per diem | £7,300 |
70 Chief and staff engineers | At 2s. 6.d per diem | £3,194 |
30 Fleet engineers | At 3s. per diem | £1,643 |
300 Annual cost of reserve £12,137 |
Average for each officer per annum, £40.
8. Officers on the reserve list to receive while serving at a naval port a subsistence allowance of 3s. per diem, in addition to the above.
9. When officers on the reserve list are employed afloat on actual service they shall receive the full pay of their rank, and will count all time so served for increase of full, half, reserve and retired pay.
10. Officers on passing from the reserve list to the retired list to count half the time served on the reserve list for increase of retired pay.
In consequence of the officers on this reserve list being really effective and available for active service afloat, all costs should be charged to the votes for effective service.
PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMATION OF AN EFFECTIVE RESERVE OF ENGINEROOM ARTIFICERS AND STOKERS.
1. All petty officers and men who have completed their service for pension to be medically examined to ascertain their fitness for future service, if required.
2. All petty officers and men found physically fit to be passed into the effective reserve, and remain therein until attaining the age of 55 years, unless they should be found to have become unfit for active service before attaining that age.
3. All petty officers and men of the effective reserve to be placed in three divisions, as nearly as possible equal in numbers.
4. One division of the effective reserve to be called up for exercise and training in the special duties of their service ratings for a period of two months in every year, preferably from the middle of May to the middle of July, so as to be employed in the reserve squadron during the summer cruise, instead of men being drawn away from the steam reserve as at present.
5. If there be more men in the division of the effective reserve called out than can be usefully employed in the reserve squadron they should be employed in the steam reserves at the principal naval ports.
6. The petty officers and men of the effective reserve should all as far as possible be employed on the special work to which they have been previously trained, and according to the ratings held at the time of their being pensioned.
7. During the time they are called out for training the petty officers and men of the effective reserve should receive the full pay of their ratings and free provisions, in addition to their pensions,
8. In consideration of being formed into an effective reserve, and having to keep a sea kit always ready for immediate service, an allowance of reserve pay, in addition to pension, to be received according to the following scale:
Chief petty officer, 4d. per diem.
1st class officer, 3d. per diem.
All other ratings, 2d. per diem.
The charges for provisions and pay in excess of the men's ordinary pensions to be charged to the votes for effective service.
APPENDIX D.
EXTRACTS FROM LETTER SENT BY GEORGE QUICK TO THE ADMIRALTY, 1891.
I beg leave to call the attention of the Lords of the Admiralty to the desirability of forming a corps of Royal Naval Engineers, to be composed of skilled mechanics, for the performance of engineering and stoking work of the navy, and to do guard and deck duty also, in place of the Royal Marines.
It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the speedy repair of the machinery of ships of war after an action, for the gaining of only a few hours in effecting repairs after a battle may decide most important naval operations following upon either a slight or severe engagement.
It is not a good argument to say that English ships will carry as many artificers or mechanics as foreign ships, and that consequently there is no need to increase the staff of mechanics on board our ships. For if two similar ships engage and each receives similar injuries so that they are compelled to cease fighting and withdraw for repairs—then if one of those ships carries say only thirty skilled mechanics for effecting repairs, whilst the other carries sixty mechanics, the latter ought surely to be in fighting condition first, and must assuredly capture or destroy the former. The naval battles of the future must be in the hands of the seamen-gunners and the drilled firemen-mechanics, for there is no room for or need of the marine on board a modern man-of-war. It is not possible to teach marines in a year or two to become useful mechanics or good firemen and to drill them very quickly into doing all the military duties of marines on board ship. Such a change could not be effected suddenly, but as I advocated the drilling of stokers and engineer officers more than thirteen years ago (and which was adopted only within the last six years), so now I advocate the extension of the system, as the sooner it is adopted the better it will be for the navy.
In the ships of the present day there is no room for the man who is only a "stoker" and nothing more; nor is there room for the "marine" who is only a soldier and nothing more; nor is there room for the man who is a "mechanic" and nothing more.
But what is wanted is the man who can be a fireman, mechanic and marine all in one, and I maintain that such a man can be made if my proposals be adopted, and that there will be but little difficulty in obtaining capable recruits in large numbers if their prejudices or sentiments are duly considered.
I have written on this subject for many years, and on the 29th of January, 1887, I forwarded officially to the Admiralty, through the Commander-in Chief at Devonport, several copies of a pamphlet on this subject. On page II of that paper it is stated that "It is considered that by conferring the name, style or tide of Royal Naval Engineers on all the artificers, mechanical workmen and stokers in the Navy it would be a very great inducement to smart and able young mechanics to join the service in much larger numbers than at present, and for the present rates of pay."
Since my retirement in 1887 I have had many opportunities of ascertaining the feelings of a large number of young mechanics in all parts of the country, and I have found many of them express a strong desire to see the world by taking service in the Royal Navy for a few years as "Firemen Mechanics," providing they were called "Engineers," and providing they had a chance of promotion in case they wished to remain in the Navy.