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High-Low”
($ee E. R. Zumwalt, pp. 46-56, April 1976;
R. L. McIntyre, p. 76, July 1976; J. T. Hayward, PP- 69-72, August 1976; H. Sanders, pp.
^5-76, September 1976; R. D. Heinl, p. 91, October 1976; P. A. Young, p. 73, November 1976; G. E. Miller and E. B. Meyer, pp.
79-86, December 1976 Proceedings)
PUBLISHER’S NOTE: "High-Low Mix: Heat and Light”—The decision to publish a condensation of the "High-Low” chapter of Admiral Zumwalt’s book, On Watch, in our April 1976 issue was not made lightly by our Editorial Board. Nor was the Board’s specific approval of that issue’s cover given without considering the fact that there were those who might perceive (and resent) it as a transparent political ploy to assist the Admiral who was then running for political office.
What our Board hoped to gain by publishing the chapter condensation was a professional discussion on our C&D pages of this controversial issue by all those who wish to contribute positively, whatever their rank, position, or point °f view. What our Board hoped to gain hy the unusual cover was to get people to read the article, and to buy the book through our book order service.
It was hoped from the outset that the resultant comments from our readers Would, for the most part, focus on the •ssues raised by Admiral Zumwalt. But 11 was realized, too, that occasional references to the personalities who had been and are so involved in these issues would occur, especially since Admiral Zumwalt had opened this door with the candor with which he discussed personalties in his book.
In the past seven consecutive months, deluding this one, comments stimulated by On Watch, the "High-Low” chapter in particular, have been published on our pages. While the merits of each comment can be argued, hopefully each one has caused the interested reader t0 examine his or her thinking on the high-low concept, "unions” within the
Navy, the requirement for aviation captains to command aircraft carriers, and much, much more.
Our purpose at this point is simply to remind ourselves and our readership of what we feel the Naval Institute is and what it should continue to be. We are a forum wherein we hope to advance professional knowledge in a responsible way. We hope that we can accomplish this by facilitating objective controversy which is focused on such areas as ideas, concepts, goals, procedures, missions, requirements, capabilities, priorities, issues, policies, and problems.
At the same time, we would strongly prefer to avoid, or at least not foster, controversy which is based on highly subjective assessment of personal motivations. However, as we have learned during the past seven months, this is sometimes extremely difficult to accomplish.
In its deliberations about the wisdom of discussing specific controversial, many-sided subjects in the future, the Board may turn, as it has in the past, to the words of Captain G. V. Stewart, U. S. Navy, which first appeared on these pages three decades ago, as Captain Stewart encouraged all to enter our forum:
"This freedom of speech is no paltry thing to be set aside for temporary favor from higher up or as a dutiful homage to one in authority. It is th<c great freedom, the acme of freedom, for from freedom of speech flow all the other rights which we hold inalienable. Men have martyred themselves, have lost their hopes and lives so that we may possess the privilege of speaking our opinions and convictions without fear, and without punishment from those who differ with us and who prefer us silent and acquiescent.”
To which we add two closing observations: first, that those earlier critics who believed we would not print serious and intense controversy should now be convinced otherwise; and, second, that the open debate of important professional issues, on the pages of Proceedings and in other forums, offers a strong assist to our senior people who must make the decisions relative to those issues.
Francis B. Leuthe—l wondered, when I read Admiral Zumwalt’s article, whether the German Etappendienst (secret supply service) of World War II was studied by him or his department, as part of his researches into the possible uses of the American merchant marine in Project 60. A great deal of the literature of the naval effort of the Third Reich in distant (i.e. non-European) waters mentions the servicing and replenishment of German raiders, by German merchantships, usually based in foreign ports. Because the Etappendienst was a hush-hush project, apparently initiated circa 1927 by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, then Chief of German Naval Intelligence, generally little seems to be known of its workings. As far as can be determined, supplies were purchased by German representatives in foreign ports and then sent to a venue in some sequestered harbor, or point on the high seas, that was determined by codes, either carried in sealed envelopes on the naval vessel, or stipulated by message. Despite its simplicity, in principle, it seems, nevertheless, to have been very efficient. According to Felix Riesenberg, Jr., an expert on the history of the American merchant ma-
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in the Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose of the Proceedings is to provide a place where ideas of importance to the Sea Services can be exchanged. The Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in the Proceedings.
The decisions in 1942 which placed fast carrier task forces in battle in the Coral Sea represented fundamental strategic planning undertaken by both the U. S. and Japanese high commands, with the bloody Battle of the Coral Sea serving as the culmination of the "First South Pacific Campaign.” Lasting from January through May 1942, the campaign encompassed Japanese invasions of Rabaul on New Britain, Lae and Salamaua on the north coast of Papua, Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, and attempted invasions of Port Moresby, Ocean and Nauru Islands.
John B. Lundstrom offers the first detailed analysis of the fundamental strategies employed by Japan and the U. S. in the South Pacific from January to June 1942, including Japanese equivocation regarding advances in the South Pacific and the vigorous actions of Admiral Ernest J. King to reinforce the area despite efforts by others in Washington to deploy scarce American forces into areas of less desperate danger.
Writing in clear, concise, and readable style, Lundstrom combines strategic insight and careful scholarship with previously untapped source materials to present a book which may make previous writing on the first six months of the naval war in the South Pacific obsolete. 1976. 176 pages. Illustrated. List price: $14.50
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THE FIRST | !C | TOE FIRST SOUTH |
SOUTH |
| „ PACIFIC CAMPAIGN |
PACIFIC |
| Pacific Fleet Strategy December 1941-June 1942 |
CAMPAIGN | >v a |
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Pacific Fleet Strategy, | ■* —■• . |
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December 1941-June 1942 |
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By John B. Lundstrom A NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS BOOK | m. ■ |
rine and merchant marine operations, generally, none of these ships was ever intercepted and sunk while going to or from a rendezvous.
The U. S. Navy has neglected the merchant marine, as a source of support in distant waters, in this century, generally, despite the fact that, in its opening years, most of its auxiliaries were manned by civilians. The brass simply accepted the dictum of Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison in his History of Naval Operations in World War II, that merchant tankers did not have the seamanship to refuel naval vessels at sea—until, that is, Admiral Zumwalt experimented and found that this was not true. It was truly sad for the Allies that the Germans did not have, or share, this belief about their own merchant navy. With no bases outside European waters, German raiders hardly could have existed without their helpful merchants.
Our modular vessels of today would doubtless be more serviceable in this regard than the break-bulk cargo carriers of the last generation. Easily stowed, pre-proportioned parcels of food, munitions, spares, medicaments, etc., would more quickly be off-loaded than in the old days, making these ships far less vulnerable to detection or attack, thanks to the gain in time.
The unitary system of furnishing supplies from transports at sea, adopted in 1944, should lend itself to the modular system better than to the break-bulk.
The only difficulties seem to be political.
"Survival of the Fittest:
Five Years Later”
(See W. W. Turkington, pp. 58-65, October 1976 Proceedings)
Commander C. W. Larzelere III, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, Aircraft Ferry Squadron Thirty-One—As commanding officer of the "Navy’s Only Ferry Squadron,” I can safely say that VRF-31 pilots have many opinions concerning Lieutenant Commander Turkington’s article on promotion opportunities within naval aviation. By its very nature, this
squadron demands professionalism and maximum aviation experience. As a result of this requirement there are in excess of 30 "passed over” lieutenant commander aviators in Aircraft Ferry Squadron Thirty-One. Before I proceed further, let me state emphatically that my squadron couldn’t have better pilots. These gentlemen are the greatest. With the exception of a very few, they are superb naval officers, and all are outstanding aviators. But, why were they passed over? Unusual career patterns, less prestigious warfare specialties, and aviation community criteria for grading fitness reports are all prominent factors.
Although I have asked that they write comments to you, I believe none will be forthcoming. They are a proud group who would prefer to continue to perform as before without reflecting on painful promotion experiences and in some cases bitter disappointments. It will do them personally very little good to "beat a dead horse.”
Those who have not been "passed over” have indicated to me that they would be reluctant to publicly criticize a "system” that held their careers in the balance.
Lieutenant Commander Ronald W. Clark, U. S. Navy, Air Transport Squadron Forty—A wise old Navy chief once said: "When you see a system failing and men performing constantly below par (either intentionally or unintentionally), you can count on something being wrong with the basics.” Lieutenant Commander Turkington’s well-written and thought-provoking article probably raised more questions than it answered concerning several of the basics which will determine the future success of our Navy.
Whether determined objectively, as statistically supported by the article, or subjectively, as can be done simply by listening to wardroom discussions on any ship, in any squadron, or on any air station, aviation junior officers do not have confidence in the ability of fitness reports and detailing procedures to determine predictable career prospects. In short, many (perhaps a majority?) very talented young officers believe they are being expended by that nebulous "sys- tern.” The end result is a great loss to the Navy when these individuals make their career decisions—to leave the Navy.
I will limit my discussion to a very large and increasingly important group of naval aviators—those in the "support community.” I assume the support community members are included in the "others” category used in the article. Whether by choice, or for the needs of the service, or just plain luck, the first- tour junior officer (lieutenant and below) leaves this support community with no warfare specialty. Moreover, because other communities have become almost entirely "closed looped,” especially evident in the past five years, support community individuals are fighting an uphill battle. Very early in their ca- teers they must transition to another community in order to become fully qualified.
The inception of the Wing concept (e-g- Commander Tactical Support Wing One) has increased the visibility of the support community’s contributions to the Navy’s mission accomplishment, however the community’s individual officers are not represented. Therefore, as individuals, they historically have been expended for the system. (There are exceptions, of course.) Many individuals have demonstrated productivity and potential; yet, each is trapped by the limiting myth that if one does n°t earn a warfare specialty during one’s first tour, it is interpreted to mean the pilot has "no potential.” The end result, in terms of career planning, is a devastating self-fulfilling prophecy.
Is it valid to assume that promotions by community would rectify this particular situation? No, not until the "community” is strong enough to "close loop” itself and produce an officer PQS program, postgraduate air logistics/fleet Support expertise, or whatever is required to provide a viable career progression to an "inbred” flag representative.
The point of this commentary is not to debate the concept of total equal opportunity for promotion by community. The point is that the very basics of human productivity/potential recognition within the Navy are in question.
The basic element to successful overall Navy team mission accomplishment depends on superior individual performance and development. Any system which fails to reconcile these two elements will result in wasted talent, effort, and money, and has the potential of becoming totally self-defeating.
It is imperative that we retain confidence in the judgment of those senior Navy leaders responsible for ensuring that the U. S. Navy of the future controls the seas. This mission only will be accomplished by a Navy team, composed of individuals, each with unique past contributions, talents, experience, qualifications, proven performance, and, therefore, potential.
If individual contributions continue to be discounted without more clearly established guidelines for what is expected of the junior officers, then we stand to lose much more than a promotion system.
Captain Jack Caldwell, U. S. Navy (Retired)— Lieutenant Commander Turk- ington makes some indictments of the Navy’s aviation promotion system which are painfully true:
► "While there are rewards for excellence, they appear to be predominantly distributed to select groups.”
►". . . a significant number of 'best qualified’ officers may find a viable operational career path—and opportunity for command of ships—closed to them late in their careers.”
► ", . . most policy level billets at the Bureau of Personnel have been held by specific categories of pilots, yet these billets do not appear to require specific expertise and could be filled on a nonparochial basis.”
► ", . . there is not equal opportunity for all equally qualified officers to gain promotion.”
Lieutenant Commander Turkington notes that the much heralded Operational Technical Management System (OTMS) and other personnel management changes have had no effect whatsoever on the glaring inequities of Navy officer promotion practices. He cites a 4 to 1 advantage to an attack carrier squadron (CVW) pilot over his land- based ASW contemporary in making it all the way to captain as an example of the inequality at work. He is right, of course.
Unfortunately, it always has been thus. Perhaps those of us who look back from the vantage point of retirement have an even clearer view of promotion inequality than does the young officer just becoming aware of its existence. The only solace I can offer young officers is the observation that it has been worse in the past.
If Lieutenant Commander Turkington examines the promotion records for the decade of 1950-1960 and the years immediately preceeding the Vietnam War, I believe he could assemble some really shocking data on "promotion opportunities.”
And then, he should add one more factor to his analysis: the promotion rates of non-Academy officers relative to their contemporaries from the U. S. Naval Academy. I believe he would find that Academy officers in, for example, the years 1956-1958 had better than a 5 to 1 advantage over equally qualified non-Academy officers in promotion to commander and something on the order of 9 to 1 for captain.
Add statistics like these to the CVW bias over ASW and the non-Academy ASW pilot had little chance for a viable career.
Automatic promotion bias had an inhibiting effect on some of my nonAcademy friends, which affected their confidence, and therefore their performance. It was a vicious circle. On the other hand, the Academy officers knew they were good for captain if they did not get into serious trouble, so they were very confident.
Lieutenant Commander Turkington noted the pattern that prevents some officers from making admiral is established early in their careers. For example, the non-Academy officer will find himself forced into accepting the "no win” jobs, like CIC officer on board ship or maintenance officer in a squadron. During the 1950s, I knew of no instance where a Naval Academy officer was assigned as CIC officer in a carrier. It was a bad job, so it was reserved for nonAcademy officers. In squadrons the Academy officers were assigned as operations officers. The really difficult job of maintenance officer, where chances of getting into big trouble were good, was
generally handed to some non-Academy type.
As I reflect now, I can see that many of the best naval aviation officers I knew did not make it past commander. They were tough, outspoken, and non-political. And, most were non-Academy. 1 am left with the strong impression that the Navy wasted the talents of many fine officers while promoting to captain and admiral too many officers whose main qualification was their ring from Canoe U.
But will this "system” change? I doubt it.
Quartermaster First Class Af. J. O’Donnell, U. S. Coast Guard Reserve—1 was a bit startled by the naivete shown in Mrs. O’Beirne’s article. Of course, her remarks are primarily addressed to the problems of officers’ wives, but the perceptions she relates of the stresses in a sea-service family’s life are at marked variance with my own and my wife’s experiences.
While some measure of self-reliance was forced on my wife by the service’s policy of ignoring the familial problems of the serviceman himself (let alone his dependents), I believe that my wife was resourceful enough and objective enough to seek out whatever assistance she found necessary in my absences at sea, be it in the service community or in the civilian world. (The service was often lost as a place to turn to, in a balancing of costs vs. aggravation.) She was able to cope effectively with the official semidisapproval of dependents of junior enlisteds. (Sea pay, service housing, and moving expenses are typical of benefits routinely denied to first termers, and the old saw holds much truth that says, "If the Navy/Coast Guard wanted you to have a wife and kids, they would have been part of your seabag issue!”).
I frankly envy service wives who can afford the luxury of depression over an absent husband. I find it difficult to sympathize with the self-pity of a highly-educated, reasonably sophisticated young woman (representative, I think, of the consorts of the nuclear engineers who make up the FBM [fleet ballistic missile submarine] wardrooms Mrs. O’Beirne is immediately concerned with), in a fairly major city such as Groton or New London, in reasonably comfortable quarters often provided by the Navy, who is unable to adjust to the absence of a husband for three months.
What of the wife of the lowly seaman apprentice exiled to NavSta Midway Island, forced to remain separated from her husband by 10,000 miles for a year or more, with no more service support than a pittance of quarters allowance?
I envy these women, the wardroom wives, who are unable to cope with the service routine of a ship (or boat) sailing without extensive bitterness, whether it be verbalized or otherwise manifested.
What of the wife of the petty officer who is shanghaied to a ship sailing on a six-week, regularly scheduled patrol, a scant four hours before the ship sails? What kind of disruption occurs at home when the poor third class calls home to say, "Honey, I won’t be home for supper tonight—or for the next six weeks. Kiss the kids goodbye for me.”?
I envy these women, the ladies of officers and gentlemen, who can financially afford the idle time to feel sorry for themselves during the 90-day deployment.
What of the wives of enlisteds who have no time for such typically soap- opera problems, because they are too busy trying to supplement the servicemans’ pay by working, or searching for another household corner to cut?
Mrs. O’Beirne addresses in her article the problem of enlisted men, who are used to taking orders on board ship, abdicating parental responsibility upon return home. In passing, I might mention that if this is a significant factor, then the Navy is failing disastrously in developing leadership in its junior enlisted men, which will have long-term detrimental effects on the operational efficiency and morale of the fleet. I found the service to be a maturing experience, and certainly had far more confidence and leadership ability at the time of my release from active duty as a quartermaster, than at the time I reported on board my first ship as a seaman apprentice. If the Navy is, as it is often perceived as doing, stifling the initiative of its junior enlisteds, such a phenomenon as is described may be a symptom of a far deeper shortcoming in the Navy.
Conversely, officers may return accustomed to giving orders, as enlisteds are "conditioned” to taking them, overpowering the wife’s normal adaptive abilities, and thus aggravating the very situation addressed in the article. The
theory that officers tend to look on their wives as female stewards seems to find support in Mrs. O’Beirne’s observation that some officers prohibit their wives fr°m participating in service-family activities, even going so far as to destroy invitational materials.
Officers’ wives tend, if I read part °f the article correctly, to rely on their husbands’ "positional authority” (rank) ln attaining support services, and their authority” is remote during the deployment. The wife’s own "personal authority,” her own ability to get things done, seems to atrophy. A seaman apprentice’s "positional authority” is nonexistent, thus treatment of his dependents doesn’t change in the serviceman’s absence or presence. I suppose a value judgment is needed as to whether a poor hut stable range of available benefits is ro be preferred to a series of wild fluctuations in the quality of family support, With highs and lows irregularly available from a demented Fairy Godmother.
Mrs. O’Beirne is atypical of captains’ wives in that she recognizes the problem t° an extent and its potential effect on ^eet morale, and has done something to focus official attention on it, and hopefully to improve it. Certainly, none of toy captains’ or officers’ wives ever took the least notice of, let alone interest in, me or my family. I recognize that her background as a general’s daughter and naval officer’s wife (and, to be sure, her accurate assumption about the readership of the Proceedings) tends to bring emphasis to the problems of the wives of the commissioned corps. I believe, however, that the factors of isolation, lack of information, and lack of social support are far harder on the wives of enlisted personnel (who often do not have the education or experience to help themselves adjust as quickly or as well as °fficers’ wives) than one would conclude from the article.
Maty A. Hewett—As a Navy wife of 25 years, I found much in Mrs. O’Beirne’s article with which I agree. Having had experience with wives’ groups, both officer and enlisted, I have seen a range °f organizations that reached from the close-knit to the near non-existent.
During my husband’s career in submarines, destroyers, an aircraft carrier, and ashore, I have observed that the type of wives’ group is determined to a major degree by the personality of the wife of the commanding officer and leading chief. In my opinion, it is a "duty” that should be assumed by them just as that assumed by their husbands.
It is unfortunate that more official support is not given the activities of wives’ groups since they can, to a major degree, help to alleviate problems that are faced on a day-to-day basis by the left-behind Navy wife. Since a disgruntled wife directly affects the morale and duty of her husband and often is the cause of his premature depature from the service, it should be of more official concern.
I must take exception to one statement by Mrs. O’Beirne, though she has possibly given an explanation of this statement in another part of her article. She states, "I can remember our first married year, my husband’s second year on board a destroyer. During that year . . . the wives never got together.”
Though my husband and I were leaving the William M. Wood (DD-715) at about the time Mrs. O’Beirne was "joining the Navy,” I had found the Wood’s wives’ group to be one of the most close-knit and congenial of any with which I’ve had contact. Perhaps the answer to the difference in impressions is contained in her statement, "Many Navy wives do not know what services are available to them.” Possibly we older wives were remiss in not providing the welcome, information, and help that should have been provided. In any case, it is heartening to hear that she, as the wife of a commanding officer, has attempted to provide this service in her "command.”
"Cinderella Carriers”
(See R. L. Evans and F. L. Palmer, pp. 52-64, August 1976; B. Wall, pp. 94-95, October 1976; L. P. Zeola, p. 88, December 1976 Proceedings)
Lieutenant David C. Hume, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), General Manager of the Schenectady Gazette—The tribute to the Gambier Bay (CVE-73) recalls the little- publicized heroic rescue operation following her sinking.
A small group of LCls (infantry landing craft) and two PCs (patrol craft) were directed ro proceed to the area and pick up survivors. These ships, under the skillful direction of Lieutenant Commander James A. Baxter on the PC-623, picked up over 1,100 survivors from the Gambier Bay and accompanying escorts and returned them to Leyte Gulf.
The only account I have ever read of this mission was in Samuel Eliot Mori- son’s book on Leyte.
"Is TacAir Dead?”
(See G. G. O’Rourke, pp. 34-41, October
1976 Proceedings)
Commander J. R. Grajfman, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer Fighter Squadron Twenty-Four— Captain O’Rourke’s excellent article on the future of TacAir (tactical air power) is imaginative and thought-provoking. However, his premise is that "the basic philosophy of avoidance of ground defenses is probably obsolete,” and "the only viable alternative is destruction.” I must disagree. In most scenarios, the requirement to destroy, rather than avoid, ground-based air defense systems leads to an impossible tactical air problem because of the large numbers of air defense weapons. I therefore submit that avoidance is essential, and also that it can only
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be accomplished through electronic countermeasures (ECM).
Captain O’Rourke accurately points out the dependence of air defense systems on electronic emissions, and that we do not sufficiently emphasize ECM. We must reassess our priorities and adopt a unified aircraft/ECM design philosophy.
The EA-6B tactical jamming aircraft has proven to be an excellent investment; however, fighter and attack aircraft must possess a highly effective self-contained defensive ECM capability to achieve required operational flexibility. I believe an effective capability can be obtained by adopting a simple philosophy. New aircraft should be designed with sufficient central computer capacity to control ECM transmissions, and also have the capability to carry a semi-submerged ECM pod. The ECM package would be podded to achieve flexibility, semi-submerged to minimize drag, and possess sufficient power to be effective when carried by larger aircraft. Standardized suspension, power, and cooling requirements and digital interface would make the pod compatible with all aircraft. Requirements for changes in threat processing or ECM techniques would be accomplished by central computer software modifications; ECM capability changes necessitating hardware changes would only require a pod exchange and not extensive aircraft modification.
Adopting a realistic TacAir ECM philosophy won’t cost a nickel, and this proposed philosophy is loW risk and does not push the present state-of-the-art. In any case, unless we are willing to sustain a very high TacAir attrition rate when the next conflict occurs, we had better place more emphasis on ECM.
The Single-Seat Cockpit and the NFO
(See October 1976 Proceedings)
Major Paul Webb Chapman, U. S. Marine Corps—The October Proceedings contains articles that mirror confusion generated in Washington concerning tactical fleet aviation. On one hand Captain O’Rourke ("Is TacAir Dead?”) tells our development managers that for future conflicts we had better give serious thought to our requirements vs. threats encountered in the technological bomb/ air hassle environment. On the other, Captain Halleland ("The F-18”) reports with joy the "unsurpassed capability” of the new single-seat fighter.
In between those peaks and valleys, Lieutenant Commander Chappell ("In VS, The Enemy Has Been Found and the Enemy Is Us”) indicates the unused talents of the NFO (naval flight officer) in the world of an antisubmarine squadron. It is almost amusing that conceptually an NFO might take a pilot seat in the S-3, but is not considered for the F-is.
This casual observer suggests that those three gents sit down and discuss cockpit workload. I believe Captain O’Rourke is on the right track, but he neglects to discuss the manpower required to work the switches and knobs and to provide an extra set of eyes in the lifetime that passes in a heated air- ground or air-to-air engagement. Captain Halleland shows that through electronic wizardry the disadvantages of single-seat to twin-seat are reduced to a paltry 10%. In passing, he does indicate that a tight-budget environment affects, among other things, crew size.
What has not been examined is the possibility that a way to save money and billets in Navy and Marine Corps aviation is to reduce the NFO population. One wonders if that is not the real reason for the decision to go to the single-seat F-18, especially for the Marines.
Whether or not the O’Rourke idea is implemented, Halleland fails to describe the scenario when a portion of the black boxes does not work and his 10% disadvantage grows to 80%. Also not addressed is the major problem of visual focus for a fighter pilot running an intercept using HUD (head-up display). The problem stems from focusing on the wind screen presentation, then
switching focus to see a bogey eight miles away.
It might be a good idea for Washington to consult with fleet operators concerning crew requirements rather than electronic trade-offs. It is not a question of cost—it is one of life and death in combat.
"The U. S. Coast Guard and the Control of Oceanic Pollution”
(See H. D. Williams, pp. 146-159, May 1976; '
R. E. Corliss, p. 78, September 1976 Proceedings)
W. 0. Gray, Senior Advisor, Transportation Operations Division, Exxon Corporation— Although it is an informative article on the Coast Guard’s key role in the control and prevention of pollution, Com- , mander Williams leaves several erroneous impressions which should be corrected. Of particular concern to me is the direct and implied thesis that independent action by the U. S. Coast Guard represents the only means of effectively protecting the ocean environment. | While the U. S. Coast Guard is one of the preeminent maritime safety organizations in the world, it is clearly beyond its means alone to cope with all international problems of ship safety or pollution control. |
The statement that "most crude oil tankers lack dedicated ballast tanks” is not accurate. The majority of modern crude tankers have and use dedicated ballast tanks satisfying between 25% and 40% of their total ballast needs. The balance is handled by the LOT (load on top) procedure.
The suggestion that "only about half the world’s crude oil tankers use LOT procedure” is misleading. Beginning in the mid-1960s, increasing numbers of crude tankers adopted this scheme and very few now are believed to be operating without applying LOT.
Reference to structural casualties leads the reader to believe that the U. S. record is clearly superior to that of most °rher nationalities in tanker pollution. The U. S. Coast Guard’s own data and analysis demonstrate that this is not the case.
The description of VLCCs (very large crude carriers) "built to minimum scantlings and the steel with which they are built may be unsuitable for any trade route other than that for which they were intended originally” indicates that Commander Williams has not done his homework on how scantlings or steel are selected for tankers. Neither is a function of trade route. The use of minimum scantlings is a common prac- rice the world over without any detriment to safety.
It is not at all clear which "conglomeration of compromises” to reduce construction costs or steps toward automation have impaired ship safety in terms of design or operation. The allegation later in the same page that "the safety record of the superships has not been good” is contrary to the facts. Numbers of objective studies have shown a superior safety record for VLCCs compared to smaller tankers and nontankers.
The article indicates that the 1973 IMCO (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization) Convention WH1 not be applicable other than to ships ordered after 1975. This is not the case. Many of its provisions apply to listing as well as new tankers, and those provisions concerned with minimizing accidental pollution are incorpo- tated in the 1971 amendments to the 1954 Pollution Prevention Convention. Although those amendments have not been brought into force, virtually all tankers ordered after 1971, which includes a large proportion of VLCCs, comply fully with these provisions.
While perhaps it is justified to describe the enforcement provisions of the 1973 IMCO Convention as "weak,” your readers should know that more powerful enforcement provisions, such as "port state” enforcement mechanisms to supplement flag state enforcement, were endorsed by industry during the drafting °f this convention but were eliminated hy the wish of governments, such as our °Wr>, in the interests of leaving such matters to the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference.
Commander William’s proposal that the Coast Guard control pollution of waters off our coast unilaterally through the "Letter of Compliance” program and biennial Coast Guard inspection seems predicated upon a belief that if our Coast Guard does not approve plans, inspect ships, and require design improvements, no one will. We do not believe that this thesis is sound, or that senior Coast Guard officers with broad knowledge of the international scene would agree. In fact, improved knowhow and criteria for building safe tankers in recent years have been developed to a greater degree by foreign yards, owners, and classification societies than by the United States, and the diligence of inspection agencies in a number of countries matches that applied by the U. S. Coast Guard. Further, the proposal takes no account of the potential for transportation chaos and very high shipping costs for all nations, were several countries to begin to demonstrate unilateral "leadership” in vessel regulation.
Your readers should not be left with the impression that large tankers are a particular menace or that the sole cure for safety problems is unilateral U. S. action.
Commander Hugh D. Williams, U. S. Coast Guard—Kitts careful review of Mr. Gray’s letter, a copy of which he forwarded to me along with three Exxon publications, I remain skeptical about the success to date in reducing tanker pollution. My skepticism stems from several sources: the obvious high costs involved in building and retrofitting tankers to reduce intentional discharges (dirty ballast pumping); the lack of strict uniform criteria for crew training and qualification; the lack of uniform standards for the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of tank vessels; and my experiences as a member of the U. S. Coast Guard’s National Strike Force engaged in pumping oil from damaged tank vessels and assisting in beach cleanup operations.
Mr. Gray notes that "the majority of modern crude tankers have and use dedicated ballast tanks satisfying between 25% and 40% of their total ballast needs.” What about the remaining ballast needs?
Regarding LOT (load on top), Mr. Gray writes that: "beginning in the mid-1960s, increasing numbers of crude tankers adopted this scheme and very few are now believed to be operating without applying LOT.” Then why does the U. S. Coast Guard have to play "eco-cop” so frequently along the U. S. coasts to investigate major spills from tank washing? And, why is the Mediterranean receiving 200,000-300,000 tons of oil each year, mostly from tankers? And, why is the Malacca Strait [a major tanker route] one of the world’s dirtiest waterways? This continuing sorry saga of intentional discharging clearly attests to the ineffectiveness of relying on the voluntary use of LOT. I believe LOT is a convenient "out” for owners or operators who want to avoid what Exxon estimates is a capital cost outlay of $1- $1.5 billion (retrofitting segregated ballast tanks) and $3 billion in new tankers to offset the lost capacity.
With respect to Mr. Gray’s comments on the design, construction, and operation of VLCCs (very large crude carriers), I question whether Mr. Gray’s comments included consideration of the accident statistics during the recent period, 1973-1976. Recent VLCC casualties included the Metula, Showa Maru, Michael C. Lemos and three others in Spain, Singapore, and France.
The U. S. Coast Guard "Letter of Compliance” program for chemical ships has demonstrated that no transportation "chaos” occurs when a country implements a plan review and inspection program to protect its people and shorelines. If the foreign inspectors and the international classification societies are as diligent as Mr. Gray implies, what is the problem?
Clearly, the U. S. Coast Guard cannot cope with all international problems of ship safety or pollution control. As I acknowledged in my article, oceanic pollution is an international problem. And, tankers are free to sail and pollute anywhere, including the coastal waters and harbors of the United States. If the Coast Guard can contribute to the reduction of oceanic pollution by the measures outlined in my article, then the benefits will be shared by all.
The Lucky Lou steamed under Brazilian colors for years and now is under the threat of destruction.
"Pearl Harbor and the
Colorado, Nevada, Taney, and Utah”
(See pp. 46-54, December 1976, Proceedings)
Commander A.L. Set on, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), founding editor of the USS St. Louis (CL-49) Hubble Bubble—No account of the Pearl Harbor attack could be complete without a mention of the USS St. Louis (CL-49) and the vital role she played that day.
That morning, when I saw a dark olive drab plane with a "meat ball” insignia passing close aboard astern the St. Louis in the Navy Yard near "Battleship Row” my first reaction was: "That stupid bastard! He’ll be court-martialed for this!” I thought it was a lone, berserk Jap pilot who somehow had gotten to Pearl and now would be in trouble with his navy and ours.
Dashing up the many ladders to my battle station in main battery control above the bridge, I saw the action develop fully.
As the gunnery officer’s talker on the 1JA command circuit, I heard a report that the sound-powered phones for the open antiaircraft stations were in the interior communication repair space deep down in the ship. Being nearest the hatch and familiar with all the ship’s spaces, I handed my phones to the nearest lookout and rushed out to get and distribute the phones.
Since I had to make my way from the bottom of the ship all the way up to sky control over my station, I had a good look at what was happening on all levels. Our crew acted as though this was another drill except for outbursts of cheering every time a plane was hit within our very limited firing bearings.
But the observations and deeds of others, older and wiser are more significant now.
The captain, ex-submariner George A. Rood, recalled before he passed away in 1971 that no one gave the word to "commence firing.”
"Our battery people,” he continued, "knew what was up, knew what to do and did it . . . [they] took the initiative and opened fire with everything that would bear.”
"Incidentally,” he said in an aside, "I claimed six enemy planes shot down, and we were officially credited with three.”
"And, in the same way, our engineers knew what was required and commenced getting up steam on all boilers . . . so . . . we were able to get under way on reduced boiler power.”
"I knew that if any Jap submarines were present, they would be lying off the entrance ready to torpedo outgoing vessels and so we buckled on speed.”
In the foremast structure "in a good position to observe the play” was Lieutenant Charles A. Curtze, on temporary duty for Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet, who recalls:
"St. Louis put to sea through the narrow shallow entrance out through the reef making turns for about 25 knots but pushing or dragging her displacement in the water ahead or astern making good perhaps 10-12 knots. Torpedo evasion tactics were not possible.”
An enemy submarine was waiting. The midget sub fired two torpedoes on a perfect collision course. If the St. Louis were sunk at this point, Pearl Harbor would be bottled up for months. This was a most crucial moment in the Pearl Harbor attack.
"The Jap got over-anxious,” Captain Rood said, "and fired before we had cleared the dredged part of the channel.” Lieutenant Curtze, now a retired admiral, watched the torpedoes. The first "enroute to impact our starboard side abreast of turret three was apparently set too deep, struck a spit of coral and in exploding drenched us. A second torpedo running hot on a diverging track, a spread of about 10°, was countermined by the first or also hit a spit.”
"Captain Rood, with what seemed to me to be uncanny prescience and certainly with outstanding shiphandling, twisted the St. Louis past Waikiki just off the five fathom curve and around Diamond Head where the St. Louis was attacked again. He swerved parallel to
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the torpedo track. . . . This may have been fired by an I Class boat,” Lieutenant Curtze continued.
Throughout all this action, a teen- aged seaman, Daniel Patrick O’Connor, manned the wheel, standing his first watch as a special sea detail helmsman (the regular helmsman was ashore). O’Connor saw only the compass rose and the wheel indicator. But he was the proudest man on board when the captain came to him after it was all over and said, "Son, Well done.”
That night, at sea, most of the crew stayed up awaiting the now-late plan of the day for Monday, 8 December 1941- It contained a short but memorable message: "The Captain wishes to congratulate the entire ship’s company for their splendid conduct during the trying Sunday’s engagement.”
From there, the St. Louis went on to earn 11 battle stars in every kind of enemy action, setting all kinds of gunnery records, and suffering a comparatively low loss of life. From the moment of Pearl Harbor throughout the entire World War II, she was known throughout the Pacific Fleet as "Lucky Lou."
Today, Lucky Lou has recently been decommissioned in the Brazilian Navy where she was the Almirante Tamandare. She was sold to Brazil in 1951 to bolster Western Hemisphere defenses at the outbreak of the Korean Conflict.
Once again, the St. Louis is sounding the call to man her battle stations—this time it’s to "Save Lucky Lou" from shipbreaker’s torches and the scrap heap. A USS St. Louis (CL-49) Association is being formed to preserve her as a museum, as an example of one of the finest cruisers the world has ever seen with a war record second to none.
Ship’s company and supporters are requested to write to A.L. Seton, 220 Otis Avenue, Staten Island, N.Y. 10306 for specific assignments.
"Flight Surgeon”
($ee C. C. Yanquell, pp. 46-59, September
1976 Proceedings)
Commander Harry A. Kinchley, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—This is a true story of naval aviation, by a man that never forgot he was a "flight surgeon,” but always remembered he was a member of naval aviation. I predated the captain a few years, beginning as a gunnery pilot flying N-9S at Pensacola. Captain Yanquell’s narrative shows naval aviation and the flight surgeon forking together as a unit. The combination of the two makes naval aviation what it is today.
Canada’s Auroras (Orions)
Due for Delivery in 1980
^ John Farquharson, Canadian military unter and television commentator— Canal’s signing of a contract with the Lockheed Corporation for 18 Orion long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA) guarantees that the Canadian Armed Forces, and Maritime Command in particular, now have a suitable replacement for cbeir shrinking fleet of obsolete Argus antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and ensures a continuation of a vital Canadian link in the NATO defense shield.
An earlier deal for Orions fell through when Lockheed could not produce $300 million in interim financing. Also, Ottawa was unwilling to back a corporation which was in financial and political trouble around the world. The new agreement delays the delivery of the new lrpa fleet by one year. It also calls L°r installation of some sophisticated antisubmarine detection equipment to be delayed further.
Specifically, the contract between Lockheed and Canada’s government calls for delivery of 18 advanced versions of the P-3 Orion aircraft, designated CP-i4o Auroras, with the first delivery scheduled for May, 1980. By stretching out the dates of delivery, the two parties teduced the immediate demand for operating capital to what Lockheed esti- ntated would be less than $50 million.
It is intended that the new $22 mil- u°n dollar aircraft will accomplish a variety of missions: search and rescue, antisubmarine warfare, ship surveillance, ice reconnaissance, and Canadian sovereignty patrols.
The CP- i4o Aurora will have several differences from the P-3 LRPA version, all designed to reduce aircraft cost. These changes and differences include:
► Replacing the Loral Electronics Systems EW 1017 wide-area coverage passive electronic support measures system with the IBM ALR-47 system employed in the U. S. Navy’s Lockheed S-3A aircraft.
► Rearranging the flight instruments to more closely resemble a commercial flight deck. Or, as one ex-Argus officer explained it, "Put good men in the pilot’s seat and flight deck, and then design the aircraft contol center around them.” Tape or vertical instruments meant originally for LRPA will give way to standardized engine instruments.
► Deleting a Category 2 instrument approach system while retaining the P-3C automatic flight-control system.
► Housing the canister containing sidelooking radar sensors and line-scanning cameras within the bomb bay so that it can be added in the future without modifications.
Canada’s former Defence Minister, James A. Richardson, said that, in addition to the $697 million Lockheed contract, other expenses of $334.7 million will bring the total cost to $1,032 billion. Still, this is almost $30 million lower than the original $1,061 billion that the cabinet estimated the LRPA program would cost. The cost of each aircraft will be $21.23 million each. This comes to a total of $382.4 million for the air fleet of 18. Justifying this costly LRPA effort and the choice of Lockheed as the prime contractor, Defence Minister Richardson stated that the U. S. State Department reported: "it is the present judgment of the U. S. government that prospects are favorable for Lockheed to continue as a viable corporation.”
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But, the whole LRPA program has many critics. In addition to the bad press Lockheed has received for its operations in Japan and the Netherlands, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Cameron, Royal Canadian Armed Forces (Retired), defense critic of the Winnipeg Free Press, has been a critic of this whole LRPA Lockheed Orion affair. He points out, first, that an armed forces team of experts
wrestled with the entire problem of replacing the original 32-plane aging Argus fleet back in 1967. It was partly due to Trudeau cabinet delays, to playing "musical chairs” as defense minister after defense minister—Hellyer, Ca- dieux, Benson, MacDonald, Richardson, and now Danson—took over, that the Argus replacement fleet replacement problem was never solved until now. Costs for the 32 maritime patrol bombers were well within Department of National Defence (DND) annual budget, about $400 million. Even by 1972, DND could probably have bought 32 Lockheed P-3As for about $600 million. Now the costs have zoomed up to a cool $1,032 billion and numbers have shrunk from the needed 32 aircraft to only 18.
Then, there was "Project Phoenix” where new Arguses, like the Phoenix of old, would arise from their own ashes. For about half of the $1.0 billion dollars for the 18 P-3S, all the 32 Argus LRPAs could have been soundproofed and updated with needed electronics and avionics to "do all that is militarily feasible,” according to Air Vice-Marshal Cameron. "Our Argus aircraft are not about to fall apart for lack of the means to keep them flying.” He pointed out that this just means that "these venerable aircraft will have flown much nearer the 50,000 hours they are capable of” than the average "of about 15,000 hours they have done to date.” It is only the attraction of something new, comments Cameron bitterly, that kills the will to keep the Argus flying.
An even more telling criticism by Air Vice-Marshal Cameron is that only one of the major Canadian Armed Forces commands will benefit from money spent on the LRPA. All "other” commands will be starved to pay for the new LRPAs. This means that, despite the defence ministry’s recent announcement about buying new Leopard I tanks from West Germany, the Canadian Armed Forces are not likely to get new tanks, trucks, TOWs, or any other new military equipment.
America is concerned about Canada’s ability to patrol her NATO and NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) responsibility for 4.15 million square miles of the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, plus 785,000 square miles of the Pacific. If that was not enough, Canada has jurisdiction over yet another 1.8 million square miles of ocean within NATO and Canada-United States defense agreements.
The Russians have established a base on a floating ice floe in the high Arctic north of Melville Island, near M’Clure Strait. And, last year Canada cut back on air patrols "to save fuel.”
While the former Director General of Information, Brigadier-General L. C. Morrison, carefully denied publicly that decreased Canadian air/sea surveillance may have increased Soviet military probing of Canadian and American air and sea space, recent developments have not borne him out.
According to Brigadier-General Morrison, the Soviet "Bear” long-range bombers fly from Cuba or the U.S.S.R. through the United Kingdom-Iceland gap. The 520 m.p.h. "Bears” probe the "CanLant” fringe. "But,” alleged Morrison in an article, "we have no reason to believe they are transiting Canadian airspace.”
What General Morrison seems to overlook is that such Soviet long-range electronic reconnaisance planes constitute a definite threat to either Argus or Aurora aircraft. Both the Soviet "Bears” and their "Badgers” are much faster, bigger, long-ranged, and are defensively/ offensively armed with 23-mm. cannons "in dorsal, ventral and tail positions,” according to The Observer’s Basic Book of Aircraft.
The Soviet Air Force’s twin 23-mm. cannons are no popguns. Needless to say, the Argus, Orion, and Aurora aircraft are not defensively armed with such air cannon for protection against a known Soviet threat.
A reporter on board an Argus asked the plane captain if Canada should have a 100-mile coastal limit increased from the present 12-mile limit. The major snorted, "You can have a village speed limit of 20 m.p.h., but it makes no difference at all if you don’t have a village cop to enforce it.” Cynical or not, the inference is unmistakable: Canada now has, and will have in the future, little "muscle” in the form of maritime patrol armed bombers.
Meanwhile, the Argus LRPAs continue to fly for Canada’s defense. But, the armed forces’ history of attempting to get a single vehicle or item to do a dozen jobs seems to be repeating itself in the move to replace the Argus fleet with the new Auroras.
"What Canada really needs,” said one published report critical of the Lockheed deal, "is not a mere 18 Auroras a long four years in the future, but about 40 P-3 Orions straight off the Lockheed assembly lines right now to re-equip the four Argus squadrons with new aircraft.” Canada has defense responsibilities and, in view of the latest news and developments, her U. S. and NATO allies mean to hold her to her strict commitments.
The Navy Gets Bad Press:
And For Good Reason”
(See D. F. Buckley, p. 84, September 1976
Proceedings)
Larry J. Huffman, veteran newsman—The present-day U. S. Navy is a highly complex, far-flung organization, with a wider span of duties than any other service. Despite this, it remains one of the most colorful.
Why, then, is that same Navy a forgotten service where the news media are concerned? And whose fault is it? Is the Navy doing enough, within the scope of
one-voice” Pentagon attitudes, to get the message across that is needed to spur mterest in maritime affairs by the American public?
As pointed out by Daniel F. Buckley, extreme difficulty is often encountered by newsmen in obtaining stories. I do n°t believe, however, the solution lies only with base and ship commanders and their information officers. Corrective measures must be taken on a much higher level.
This is pointed out graphically by Mr. Buckley’s request to visit the guided- missile cruiser Canberra (CA-70), to which the information officer reported that clearance must first be obtained from Washington. As of the date of Mr. Buckley’s article, such clearance had not been received. Thus, it is necessary to gtve those selfsame ship and base commanders and public information staff wider latitude in disseminating information without fear of second-guessing from higher headquarters.
There is need by the powers-that-be to recognize that a problem exists, and a comprehensive program should be undertaken to correct a lack of information that does not allow the Navy to gain the recognition it deserves and desperately needs.
In the vast reaches of Middle Amer- lca, little is known about naval activities save for home-town items released by the Fleet Home Town News Center, and possibly professional magazines sent to Veterans.
As is the case with all services, the Navy must not only sell the President and Congress on naval programs and needs, but must also gain the backing of the people through concise, simple stor- les made available to the news media.
Complex, professional analyses available through the professional journals are not enough. There can be little question that something is sadly lacking in Navy relations with its final constituents.
The overall Navy public relations program is lacking in effectiveness. A complete overhaul of both program and attitude seems needed.
In order for the Navy to get its message across to the mass spectrum of public opinion, three basic channels for news must be utilized. First of all is the power of television, through the national network news and public affairs programs, requiring stories of visual impact. Secondly, there are the wire services, The Associated Press and United Press International, both of which require stories and, if feasible, accompanying photographs that can easily be translated into newsworthy items. Third come the mass circulation magazines, which require items that can be both newsworthy and of human interest, without pressing deadlines due to problems of time.
Since the three pipelines of information have different needs, so also should the Navy develop different methods of getting the message across. Although this may require some changed attitudes inside the Navy, the results would more than make up for any possible inconvenience public information officers might experience.
In addition, the United States Naval Institute could be of great help, with the possible institution of programs that would give wider publicity to worthwhile articles.
I propose, in the paragraphs which follow, to give some tips on what might be done, from the working newsman’s viewpoint, to remedy the existing problem and lay a groundwork for a better flow of information. Most importantly, I hope to show how changed ideas of the concept of news will make it easier for items to appear on television, across the AP and UPI wires, and in magazines.
Despite advertising to the contrary, the main channel for news remains the national wire services, which transmit news over a variety of circuits to all papers, large and small, which subscribe. Both AP and UPI have two prime types of news. First is so-called "spot” or immediate news, and second is "time” news, or items that may be transmitted for use several days in advance.
To cover the "spot” news category, an effort must be made by the Department of the Navy to provide simple and accurate news as soon as possible after it happens, with emphasis given to photos accompanying the story. In this manner, the news services can get the "straight word” quickly, and any accompanying photos will tend to make it more likely that the stories will get all-important wire time.
With the changing emphasis of news, it is not enough to state that two ships collided, or that a blaze broke out on board a vessel. Human interest helps assure attention. Here, heroic action by identified individuals is an almost-certain opening. The military correspondents of the wire services are usually inundated with material. Therefore, those items with the most human interest, made available fastest, and with the least technical jargon, stand the best chance for dissemination.
In the area of "time” copy, both the Department of the Navy and the United States Naval Institute can help provide items. In order to accomplish this mission, however, simple and straightforward summaries and condensations should be of prime importance. This editor can remember only one recent instance where an item has gained widespread use. That story appeared in the Proceedings regarding the comparative habitability and armament of U. S. and Soviet naval vessels. Having read the article in the Proceedings, it was apparent that heavy rewriting into news style was necessary by the reporter before the story was relayed to the U. S. public.
In this area, the U. S. Naval Institute could perform great service to the Navy by offering, on a regular basis, summaries and simplified items of many of the important articles which appear monthly.
Switching to national television news, visual impact bears prime importance. The average half-hour television news program carries news equivalent to only about two-thirds of a single newspaper page. In order to assure equal chance at access to this valuable time, the Navy must provide high-quality visual aids that can be covered within only a very few minutes. Even if not of prime "spot” news importance, the stories which have a chance at television time must be both impressive visually and concise in content.
Items such as night carrier operations, test-firing of weapons, sea trials of new vessels, and possibly even dry dock operations provide examples which may make the small screen. The Navy has a tremendous advantage over other services in this area, and should target such items as often as possible.
Mass circulation magazines comprise the third area in which more effort should be made. Here, there are two main avenues. First are the weekly newsmagazines; and second are the monthly publications.
For the newsmagazines, deadlines make absolute "spot” news an impossibility. Stories for those publications should center on the aftermath of "spot” stories, again with the human interest angle highlighted. An advantage in this field is the fact that more information can be presented, and partial coverage may also be picked up by the wire services.
The monthly publications provide other problems. Here, items must be both of human interest and more indepth than the other channels of communication, due to the long lead-time necessary before publication. Items of interest here, to retain timeliness despite deadlines, may be of the long-range policy type. Included in this category might be the direction of shipbuilding, Navy policy toward racial relations, and stories concerning daily operations of various divisions of the Navy.
Despite their disadvantages, the magazines have the advantage of reaching a highly-intelligent readership, which may become a powerful friend of the Navy in important places.
In conclusion, I believe the some- times-parochial attitude of the Navy must be changed, and a realization of the importance of a "good press” must be emphasized. Obviously, I am not advocating any breach of security in order to publicize the Navy. However, the land, sea, and air duties of the Navy provide a unique opportunity to get the message across to the American public.
It has often been reported that Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King would have been happy to have held only one press conference during World War II, at which he could have stated, "We won.”
In a wartime atmosphere, such feelings might have been understandable if not permissible. In a time of peace, even uneasy peace, this is far from enough. A conscious press effort needs to be made.
"The Sea in the Making
of America”
(See G. G. Reynolds, pp. 36-51, July 1976
Proceedings')
Lieutenant Michael R. Adams, U. S. Coast Guard— It has always been my understanding that the Proceedings was to serve as a forum for the expression of thoughts and items relating to the "advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge” for members of the naval and maritime communities. I fail to see where Dr. Reynolds’ article fulfills any of these requirements.
Although I certainly should be extremely hesitant to argue any of the professor’s points (for he is unquestionably an eminent naval historian with a hard-earned Ph.D.), I found his article to be little more than a vastly shallow overview of what most, if not all, naval officers should already know about the value and importance of maritime affairs in the history of our nation. Almost any single paragraph of Dr. Reynolds’ article is more than aptly covered by at least one book, many of which are contained within the library of the well-rounded naval officer.
It seems as though rather than making use of the Proceedings’ "Bicentennial issue” to provide some interesting background on specific naval history or (of even more value) to provide for some expression of what to anticipate in the next 200 years, the Proceedings has blundered into wasting 16 of its pages on what is, for the most part, a rehash of college (or even high school) history.
"Guardians of Sea Power”
(See R. P. Beebe, pp. 27-33, June I960; C. H. Amme, J. W. Campbell, T. Roff, pp. 108-111, September 1960 Proceedings)
Commander Arthur J. Hodgdon, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Having recently retired, I have had the opportunity to read many of the Proceedings articles that I had skipped over during more busy days on active duty.
All engines came to "stop” as I read and re-read "Guardians of Sea Power.”
Captain Beebe discusses the "bad day at the Naval War College” as the staff leafed through a special studies project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund entitled "International Security—The Military Aspect” on 13 January 1958. The panel members who wrote this section failed to include in their findings any real appreciation of the role of sea power in supporting the national interest. The panel director was Henry A. Kissinger, who went on to be the director of the Rockefeller project. Captain Beebe quotes a naval officer, who, at the request of the President of the Naval War College, reviewed the Rockefeller-Kissin- ger findings and submitted them to the college. The report was silently "filed.” However, Kissinger’s book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy became policy.
Perhaps a group of courageous naval officers of inquiring minds could develop and speak for sea power from a peak of unassailable competence in the style of Mahan, thus assuring the proper defense of our America.
It is beginning to appear that the disservice the Rockefeller-Kissinger group perpetuated on our Navy 18 years ago is now being carried forward in a like manner by the Brookings Institute, which is attempting to do a similar "job” on our beloved U. S. Marine Corps.
To reverse such trends as the foregoing would most certainly require bold courage and superior leadership, and, more important, would require placing the national interest above personal gain, promotion, etc.
Commander Arleigh Burke convinced Admiral "Tip” Melrill to implement his (Burke’s) doctrine on destroyer torpedo firing situations in the Solomon Islands. Farragut took his wooden ships past the New Orleans forts using, most successfully, the doctrine of the calculated risk.
Sea-going naval officers have the "feel” for doctrine which is not available to landlubbers in think-tanks and can make correct decisions at sea in a more capable manner than a civilian ashore.
Would the Rockefeller, Kissinger, and Brookings institutes accept a study report on their businesses and holdings by a group of naval officers? Would such a report be valid?
Division Officer’s Guide
Apartheid: Shadow Over South Africa”
($ee ]■ A. Rondeau, pp. 18-27, September 1976; G. K. Meriwether, pp. 86-87, December 1976 Proceedings)
The South African Navy: Guardian of the Ocean Crossroads”
(See N. L. Dodd, pp. 94-97, September 1976
Proceedings)
Commander Andrew B. Bennett, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—This excellent article succinctly emphasizes the economic and strategic value of the Republic of South Africa to the United States and for the entire Free World as well. It should be made required reading for those whose duties and interests involve foreign policy, including U. S. Congressmen.
The article reflects this writer’s own observations and impressions gained during two visits to South Africa. I believe that for economic reasons and from a strategic standpoint it is imperative for our nation as well as for the Western powers to lift embargo restrictions to the Republic of South Africa and to vigorously promote trade and ruutual aid.
Current diplomatic negotiations may lead hopefully to a peaceful solution of the long-standing racial problem. Of likewise importance for the world at large is the increasing threat to the security of the shipping routes in the Indian Ocean and thereby the supply of °il from the Persian Gulf on which the Western world still depends. The following factors should be considered when discussing this area:
^ The leading Communist nation’s Widespread presence in the areas sur- tounding the Indian Ocean and its undenting efforts to widen its spheres of influence there.
The extreme vulnerability of the Suez Canal as shown during the 1973 Arab- Israeli War.
^ Mozambique on Africa’s east coast, bordering, in part, on South Africa, and Angola on Africa’s southwest coast are n°w under Communist control in the Wake of Portugal’s withdrawal. It beanies apparent how all this poses a direct threat to the security of the Cape (°f Good Hope) sea route.
To quote an essential declaration on the Indian Ocean area from Geography and National Power by William W. Jeffries, Senior Professor, U. S. Naval Academy and published by the U. S. Naval Institute, "Perhaps in no other section of the world is the dependence of United States interests upon her friends so dramatically demonstrated. The area is so remote from American ports and so difficult to penetrate with a large invasion force, that the United States must rely to a large degree upon the good will and viability of the friendly powers within the area.”
A. Gregory Thielmann—\ wish to take issue with the articles by Captain Jacques Rondeau and Colonel Norman Dodd. Both writers exhibit a surprising naivete in urging, either explicitly or implicitly, a closer relationship between the United States and the Republic of South Africa.
I will not attempt to debate the merits of apartheid, for I believe the ugly realities of the South African system are generally appreciated in the Western world.
I would, however, like to discuss the viewpoint that U. S. interests are served by increased military cooperation between America and South Africa. The Soviet Navy does not have the endurance and flexibility of the U. S. Navy for a number of reasons. In order to effectively conduct operations on a sustained basis at great distances from the Soviet homeland, the Soviet fleet needs foreign bases. Preventing the Soviets from establishing air and naval bases along the African littoral should be an important objective of U. S. foreign policy. But what could be more disastrous for that objective than for Washington to seek closer military ties with South Africa? What would be the effect on America’s image of exchanging "one man, one vote” for access to ports and arms sales? It is doubtful that such a policy would dissuade the governments of Angola and Mozambique from establishing closer military ties with the U.S.S.R.
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The U. S. Navy has changed considerably since the sixth edition of Division Officer’s Guide was published in 1972. Renewed emphasis has been placed on the moral and human aspects of naval leadership, while some of the customs of the past have been altered. These changes arc reflected in the seventh edition.
This new edition contains an important new chapter devoted to counseling, human goals, and welfare which emphasizes the complexity of personal relationships and the steps which can be taken to meet the inevitable human problems that arise. Another new chapter covers correspondence, including report and memorandum writing techniques. The book also reflects the long overdue recognition of the surface warfare officer who must now qualify formally in the same fashion as the aviation or submarine officer.
Chapters on organization, administration, training, discipline and inspections represent the distilled and updated experience of thousands of junior officers who have gone before. This resulting volume is designed to help any new division officer face his responsibilities with both confidence and understanding.
1976. 286 pages. Illustrated. Index.
Surely both expedience and principle argue for continued avoidance of any U. S. military involvement with the South African government.