GERMANY QUITS LEAGUE AND ARMS CONFERENCE
The German Withdrawal.—Even before the abrupt withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and the conference on limitation of armaments, it had seemed to many observers that the conference was working amid ever-increasing difficulties. In a period of intensified nationalism, each nation was more suspicious of others, more unwilling to surrender any special advantage it might have. To reduce the instruments of national security at such a time seemed like putting the cart before the horse, or at least assuming unwarrantedly that the instruments of war are the causes of war. The conference had in fact been diverted from its original purpose of reduction of armaments to the question whether or not Germany should be allowed to rearm. And in considering Germany’s demand for equality, France was troubled by the belief, in support of which she had collected plenty of evidence, that Germany had already rearmed far beyond the limits of the Versailles Treaty.
Hence the terms offered to Germany, after much discussion among the former allied powers and the United States, were at best a dubious compromise. As set forth by the British Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, they provided:
(1) A preliminary four-year period during which the armies of Continental powers would be re-organized as short-term militias, and a system of international supervision of armaments would be established.
(2) Another four-year period during which, if the supervision proved satisfactory, all powers would begin actual reductions. Certain aggressive weapons would be abolished, a common list of permitted arms would be established for all countries, and Germany at the end of this period might attain real equality of status.
Obviously this granted no immediate rearmament for Germany, though Sir John Simon pointed out that the immediate increase of her Army from 100,000 to 200,000 would justify some increases in weapons at once. Upon the rejection of these terms by Germany, the conference at Geneva adjourned until October 26 and then again until December 4, though the steering committee was to assemble on November 7 to make preparations for the December session. The American representative, Ambassador Norman H. Davis, returned to Washington for consultation,) but was expected back at Geneva in December.
Vote on German Policy.—On the day of Germany’s bolt from the League and arms conference, Chancellor Hitler secured from President von Hindenburg a decree dissolving the Reichstag and also the seventeen provincial assemblies, and calling for a new Reichstag election on November 12. Only one slate of government candidates was submitted for this election, and at the same time the electorate were called on to vote yes or no to the following proposition:
Dost thou, German man or German woman, approve of the policy of thy Reich government, and art thou ready to acknowledge this policy as the expression of thy own viewpoint and will and solemnly pledge thyself thereto?
The result, in the present state of Germany, was a foregone conclusion. In his speech of October 14, Chancellor Hitler enlarged on the historic service rendered by the National Socialists in stemming the tide of communism, declared again that Germany wanted not arms but equality, and said that, once the Saar was returned to Germany, “only a madman could think of war” between Germany and France.
No provision was made for the election of new assemblies in the 14 states and 3 free cities of Germany. According to an announcement of Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, one of the first tasks of the new Reichstag will be to approve a sweeping program of constitutional reforms which will wipe out existing state frontiers and weld the Reich into a single unit.
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Recognition of Russia.—Both the possibilities of increased trade with Russia and the situation in the Far East were presumably factors entering into the decision of the present American administration to open negotiations for renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Republic. President Roosevelt’s letter to President Kalinin, dated October 10 and made public ten days later, emphasized “the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the 125,000,000 people of the United States and the 160,000,000 people of Russia,” and expressed the belief that the difficulties impeding renewal of diplomatic relations were “not insoluble” and could be removed by “frank, friendly conversations.” The Russian reply remarked that the abnormal relations referred to had
an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned, but also on the general international situation, including the element of disquiet complicating the process of consolidating world peace.
Unofficial comment in Russia suggested that friendly relations between the “leading capitalistic state and the chief communistic state” might prove a deterrent to nations contemplating an infringement on the rights of the Soviet Republic. M. Litvinoff, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was appointed Soviet representative to visit Washington, and sailed for the United States on November 1.
As regards the trade benefits that might be expected to accrue from recognition of Russia, it was pointed out that American exports to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1933 showed a 64 per cent decline from 1932 and a much greater decline as compared with previous years. M. Litvinoff at the London Economic Conference declared that Russia might make purchases abroad amounting to $1,000,000,- 000 if granted long-term credits. In particular an increase might be expected in American exports of heavy industry machinery, automobiles and aircraft, pork, cotton, and copper. Our total public and private claims against Russia are estimated at about $800,000,000, of which $332,000,000 are made up of principal and interest on government loans to Russia after the downfall of the Empire. While refusing in principle to recognize most of these debts, the Soviet government is said to be willing on that account to pay an extra percentage for further credits, and to offset them she can present claims for damages inflicted by American forces on Russian soil during the intervention period.
Reich Bars Assaults on Foreigners. —A series of brutal assaults on foreigners in Germany, chiefly for failure to salute the Nazi flag in orthodox German fashion, led during October to strong protests not only from American Ambassador William E. Dodd but from the representatives of other powers. By October 10 at least 12 attacks had been made on Americans resident in Germany. On October 17 at his first formal meeting with the American Ambassador, Chancellor Hitler gave definite assurances that the attacks would end, and on the same date two offending storm troopers were sentenced to six months in jail.
EUROPEAN POLITICS
New French Cabinet.—The Radical Socialist Daladier Cabinet in France was overthrown on October 24 chiefly through opposition of some of its Socialist supporters to the balancing of the budget by cuts in the salaries of civil servants. The Daladier ministry came into power in January, 1933, after the downfall of the Paul-Boncourt ministry on a similar issue. On October 27 a new government was formed under Albert Sarraut, Daladier’s former Minister of the Navy. There were only minor changes in personnel, chiefly to include representatives of the Center party. The new cabinet will have the support of 28 members of the Socialist party, who separated from the rest of their group on the budget issue. In general the Daladier policies will be continued by the new government, including further efforts to balance the budget, opposition to inflation, and a firm stand against concessions to Germany in the matter of armaments. On this last issue the Daladier government went as far toward conciliation as popular sentiment would allow. M. Daladier was made Minister of War in the new cabinet, and M. Paul-Boncourt retained the office of Foreign Affairs.
FAR EAST
Strong Talk from Japan.—With the ascendancy of the military element in Japan, there seemed every prospect that the current estimates of $350,000,000 for the Army and Navy, constituting more than half of the 1934-35 budget, will be approved without much reduction. The argument for increased military appropriations follows the line that with Japan’s final exit from the League in 1935 the question of the mandate islands will rise, and at the naval conference in the same year Japan must increase her claims. By 1935 the Soviet Union will also have completed its second Five-Year Plan and will be ready for a more aggressive policy in the Far East.
In the Japanese cabinet the advent of Mr. Hirota in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has apparently brought that office into closer accord with the military element. In the November Current History, the foreign minister’s recent pronouncements are quoted as follows:
In a written statement handed to correspondents on September 16, Hirota bluntly warned the United States to keep out of Far Eastern affairs. He said: “If the United States desires an amicable solution of the pending problems with Japan it should first repeal the Japanese exclusion act and admit Japanese immigrants on the same basis as Europeans. Next, the United States should keep her hands oil Far Eastern affairs and place implicit confidence in Japan’s efforts to maintain peace and order in Asia. The world should be divided into three parts under the influence respectively of American, European, and Asiatic Monroe Doctrines.”
Mr. Hirota declared that the Washington and London conferences “were actually naval engagements, in which Japan submitted to the combined fleets of the United States and Great Britain. American activities were not confined to the conferences. The United States authorities deciphered cable messages exchanged between the Japanese delegation at Washington and the Tokyo government, and, during the London parley, sent a special envoy to Japan, whose unscrupulous activities left a very unfavorable impression.” Ordinarily this is not foreign-office language in any part of the world.
During September it was made public in Japan that while Dr. T. V. Soong was abroad the Japanese Foreign Office “warned” the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany, as well as the League of Nations, that economic support of China would be unwelcome to Japan. Furthermore, on September 3, the spokesmen of the War, Navy, and Foreign Offices combined in a warning to China that Dr. Soong must cease his anti-Japanese agitation in China. It was asserted that any disturbance of the friendly relations which Japan has been able to arrange with the Chinese officials in North China would be met by prompt action by Japan.
The announcement that the American fleet would remain in the Pacific for a while longer drew from the Japanese Navy office a sharp reply coupled with the reassertion of Japanese rights to the mandated islands. During September it became known in London that last Spring the Rev. Dr. Heaslett, Anglican Bishop of South Tokyo, was forbidden to visit an Anglican mission in the Bonin Islands on the grounds that the islands are fortified territory. The Navy Office explained that the Bonin defenses “remain exactly as they were when the Washington treaty was signed in 1922”—meaning, presumably, that they are “fortified territory,” just as had already been made clear to the Bishop.
General Araki’s Proposed Conference.—To correspondents on October 30 Minister of War Araki of Japan made the unofficial suggestion that Japan should invite the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, India, China, and Manchukuo to attend a conference at Tokyo sometime before 1935. The aim of the conference would be to “stabilize peace in the Orient,” take up the recognition of Manchukuo, and attempt a preliminary agreement on naval ratios before the naval conference of 1935. Comment in Washington was to the effect that the proposal was no doubt intended for domestic consumption, and that if made officially it would probably be declined by the Western Powers.
Resignation of T. V. Soong.—The resignation of China’s able Finance Minister T. V. Soong at the close of October, was attributed chiefly to his dissatisfaction with the growing inclination of the Nanking government to come to terms with Japan. Evidence of this tendency was seen not only in the North China truce but also in Japan’s statement late in October that her forces might soon be withdrawn from the border and the Great Wall.
UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA
Threatened Anarchy in Cuba.— Through October, though threatened with strikes, rebellion, and conspiracy, the government of President Grau San Martin in Cuba maintained its control, dependent almost wholly on the support of the armed forces. The government lost rather than gained in popular backing, and at the close of the month it appeared likely that even the support of the Student Directory would soon be withdrawn. At a turbulent meeting of the students on October 30, it was voted to continue confidence in the government for three days. Although the new government was recognized by Spain, Mexico, and some of the South American countries, American recognition was withheld, presumably on the grounds (1) that the government represented only a small minority, and (2) that it had failed to overcome the lawlessness prevalent throughout the island. Should the Grau government fall, the chances are that the Army will continue its dominant r61e, perhaps in combination with the ABC group, which is at present the strongest and most experienced of the revolutionary organizations.
Pan-American Conference.—The American State Department announced on November 1 that no change had been made in Secretary of State Hull’s plan to sail on November 11 for Montevideo to attend the Seventh Pan-American Conference which is to open there December 3.