PROFESSIONAL NOTES
Prepared By Lieutenant Commander F.W. Rockwell, U.S. Navy and Lieutenant J.B. Heffernan, U.S. Navy
GREAT BRITAIN
Two 35,000-Ton Battleships.—London, October 30.—The keels of two monster British battleships will be laid early next year, one at a shipyard on the Clyde and the other on the Tyne. Although the Washington naval armament agreement limits the size to a maximum displacement of 35,000 tons, the new ships will be the most formidable warcraft afloat.
They will be about 680 feet long and 106 feet in breadth. This enormous beam is made necessary by the elaborate means of defense against underwater explosions from torpedoes, mines and air bombs. In these two ships the anti-torpedo bulge will be fitted inside instead of outside the hulls.
Each will carry nine 16-inch guns in triple turrets as their main batteries. The total weight of a broadside salvo from these 16-inch guns will be nearly 20,000 pounds. These dreadnaughts also will mount large batteries of anti-aircraft guns. Their speed will be about equal of that of the fastest American or Japanese battleship. Each will cost about $40,000,000.
The construction of these ships has been decided upon definitely, notwithstanding reports to the contrary. The British naval building program has not been affected by the recent political changes, even the Labor party being anxious to have them built.
One of the ships probably will be named the Lion, after Admiral Beatty's famous flagship, which is destined for the scrap heap. Both of these vessels are scheduled for completion in the fall of 1925, whereupon four battleships of the King George V class will be scrapped.—H.C. Bywater in Baltimore Sun, 31 October, 1922.
Washington, October 30.—Construction of two 35,000-ton battleships of the size, speed and armament outlined in H.C. Bywater's dispatch will give the British a very decided "edge" over the American Navy for years to come, according to ranking naval experts here.
Today's reports were the first definite information here on the size and type of battleships the British would build in conformity with the terms of the Arms Conference treaty, which allowed them to build two new battleships, and they aroused keenest interest.
Comparative figures show that on completion of three ships in 1925, England will have the largest warships afloat, and theoretically at least, the most powerful. Except for the battle cruiser Hood, pride of the Royal Navy, with her 41,200 tons, the two new fighting craft will be in a class of themselves.
Next to them in size come the leaders of the Japanese fleet, the Negato and Mutsu, having a tonnage of 33.800 tons each. Next are the two new super-dreadnaughts of the United States Navy soon to be completed, the Colorado and West Virginia, of 32,600 tons each.
These two are the vessels the United States was permitted under the treaty to complete, to preserve the 5-5-3 ratio when Japan insisted on retaining the Mutsu, which under the original Hughes proposal was doomed to be scrapped.
50 Feet Longer Than the "West Virginia"
The proposed British sea monsters are only slightly shorter than six battleships of the Indiana type, which, under the terms' of the treaty, the United States must scrap: they are approximately 50 feet longer than the Colorado and West Virginia, more than eight feet greater in width and carry nine 16-inch guns instead of the eight on American ships.
Comparison of the total broadside salvos shows that the Britishers each will have 20,000, as opposed to the 16,800 pounds of each American ship. In this connection it is pointed out that when the two British ships are completed the United States Navy will have three warships carrying heavier than 14-inch guns, while the British will have 15 carrying 15 and 16-inch guns.
Also Has Two Light Cruisers
In addition to this Great Britain has two light cruisers that carry four 15-inch guns. These were not mentioned in the naval treaty. The United States has no cruisers of this type and cannot build them under the treaty.
It is considered highly probable that the speed of the two new battleships will be considerably in excess of both ours and the Japanese. On her trial runs the Maryland, sister ship to the Colorado and West Virginia made a little less than 22 knots, while the Mutsu ranges a little better than 23 knots.
To bear out their contention that the construction of these two super-dreadnaughts will make the British Navy stronger than ours, one ranking naval officer pointed out that when both nations complete their new capital ships Great Britain will have the advantage in tonnage that amounts practically to one capital ship. Great Britain will have 20 ships in her first line to our 18, with a tonnage of 558,95° to our 525,850. He estimates that the exact ratio of 5 to 5, on which the treaty is based, will not come into effect until the replacement program of our older ships, which starts' in 1930, has run its full course.
Cheaper Than in U.S.
It was pointed out that the cost of $40,000,000 each will give British constructors much more leeway than such a figure here would, as labor and material are both cheaper there.
For a short time after the Colorado and the West Virginia join the fleet, so far as capital ships' are concerned, the American Navy will have a shade on Great Britain. However, completion of the two ships will tilt the scales, leaving the American Navy trailing even in that phase in which she is supreme in capital ships.—Baltimore Sun, 31 October, 1922.
The New Battleships.—The fact that the Admiralty, as we were able to announce last week, has invited tenders for the construction of the hulls and machinery of the two battleships which this country is empowered to build under the terms of the Naval Limitation Treaty, should finally dispose of the rumors which have been persistently circulating for many months, to the effect that the vessels in question were not to be proceeded with, their construction having been deemed inadvisable both for economical and technical reasons. Despite what has been said to the contrary, the Admiralty, we are given to understand, has never had the least intention of abandoning these ships, which it holds to be essential to the maintenance of that one-Power standard upon which its policy is based, a standard that involves keeping the navy at sufficient strength to ensure the safety of the British Empire and its sea communications as against any one other naval power. Nor will anyone who surveys the naval situation as it exists today deny the necessity of building the two new capital ships if the Admiralty is right in continuing to regard vessels of this type as the supreme embodiment of offensive power at sea. On that controversial question we have more than once expressed our views, and need only add here that the balance of evidence, theoretical as well as practical, is such as to vindicate the continued primacy of the great ship, for some years' at all events; and it is the business of our naval authorities to legislate for the requirements of the discernible future, not for what may be needed at some period beyond the range of human prevision. We think, therefore, that the nation at large, notwithstanding its fervent desire for retrenchment, will approve the official decision with respect to the new battleships, for it is by no means' prepared to sacrifice that measure of sea power which the Admiralty declares to be the minimum compatible with security for the country and the Empire. There could be no greater error than to assume that the British people have become indifferent to their navy or to the interests which the navy safeguards.
Owing to the many firms which have been invited to tender, bidding for the hull and machinery contracts promises to be unusually keen. The shipbuilding and affiliated industries are still suffering from an unprecedented shortage of work, and because of this circumstance the award of the contracts is awaited with intense interest in the districts affected. For the same reason, the Labor element has for once abandoned its traditional antagonism to armaments and is using its influence to procure the laying-down of the ships at the earliest possible date. The stake which the wage-earning community has in the work is, indeed, no inconsiderable one. Speaking in the Upper House on July 11, Lord Lee, the late First Lord of the Admiralty, said that the two ships at current prices would cost £6,500,000 apiece, or, including all accessories, reserves, stores, etc., both afloat and ashore, something like 18,000,000 apiece. Of this total of £16,000,000, at least £10,000,000 will be paid out in wages over a period of about two and a half years, so that the allocation of even one ship will be an immense boon to the wage-earners of the district that is fortunate enough to secure it. The Royal Dockyards are definitely out of the running as far as these two ships are concerned. Neither Portsmouth nor Devonport could undertake the building of a vessel of 3S.000 tons with its present facilities, and to enlarge the slips sufficiently for that purpose would entail an expenditure which the Admiralty regards as inadmissible at the present juncture. It would, moreover, involve a delay of nearly two years, whereas the reinforcement of our navy by modern capital ships is already overdue, and cannot be longer deferred. These were the main considerations which led the Admiralty to put all the four battle cruisers out to tender last year, and they apply with equal force now that the original program has been reduced by the Limitation Treaty to two ships of smaller dimensions. The largest men-of-war hitherto built at the Royal yards were those of the Queen Elizabeth class, displacing 27.500 tons, and having a length of 644ft. overall. The new battleships are to be of 35,000 tons, and their length will not be far short of 700ft. Their beam, according to our information, will be 106ft., which will make them the broadest warships so far designed by any country, though it is only 9 ½ in. more than that of the Hood. This remarkable increase of breadth, as compared with ships of the pre-war area is, of course, due in the main to the development of structural protection against underwater explosion, and especially to that ingenious and highly effective device known as the bulge. When the plans of the Hood were being prepared, it was realized that her completion would raise the question of dock accommodation in an acute form, as the ship would be unable to dock in any naval yard in this country, with the exception of Rosyth. The four "modified" Hoods of last year's program, since cancelled, were to have been considerably larger—47,000 tons was the displacement, as mentioned at the Washington Conference—though the Admiralty stated that the dimensions had been kept within limits which would obviate the necessity of any larger docks being provided other than those already existing. Still, had we been compelled to go on building vessels of that great size, the provision of additional docks capable of accommodating them would soon have become imperative, and we have therefore to thank the Limitation Treaty for sparing us heavy expenditure, quite apart from that involved in unrestricted battleship competition. As things are, our present docking resources will doubtless prove adequate for a long time to come.
Although their armament has not yet been disclosed, there is every reason for believing that the new ships will mount guns of the same caliber as those with which the "modified" Hoods were to have been armed: viz., 16in. It is also possible that, in spite of the greatly reduced displacement, they will carry the same number of these weapons. The much lower speed which has obviously been accepted for vessels redesigned as battleships proper instead of battle cruisers will mean a great saving in machinery weights, and the margin thus obtained is most likely to be employed in keeping the offensive and defensive attributes as far as possible up to the original standard. As, however, only two ships are to be built in place of four, there will be a corresponding reduction in the value of the armament contracts issued in connection with the building program. It should be noted, also, that the guns and mountings for the cancelled battle cruisers, part of which were ordered twelve months ago, will be used for the new battleships. The Vote for "Armaments" in last year's Navy Estimates stood at £6,726,000, and it was then proposed to ask for £6,683,000 under the same Vote in the Estimates for the current financial year. For naval guns, the cost of manufacture alone was estimated at £1,148,550, of which sum £810,000 was for the guns of the "modified" Hoods, and projectiles for those guns were to be manufactured at a cost of £800,000. All such items of expenditure have, of course, been reduced in consequence of the deletion of two ships. It is as well to emphasize these facts, lest the beneficial influence of the impending warship contracts on the industrial situation should be exaggerated. That they will, in any case, be most welcome, goes without saying, but it will take a good deal more than the ordering of two 35,000-ton battleships to reanimate the shipbuilding and engineering industries of this country, which have suffered so cruelly under the abnormal economic conditions of the postwar period. From their point of view, the Washington Treaty has not been an unmixed blessing, for it not only reduced the amount of naval tonnage immediately in contemplation from about 190,000 tons to a mere 70,000 tons, but destroyed all prospect of further heavy contracts of this kind for a term of many years. On the other hand, prominent representatives of the industries named have been foremost in admitting that naval armament limitation will ultimately exert a healthful influence on the economic life of the nation, however unpromising its immediate effects may seem.—The Engineer, 3 November, 1922.
Speed Versus Battle Power.—That very high speed involves an enormous' sacrifice of other qualities has always been appreciated by students of naval construction, but the fact has been brought out with special emphasis by ships built within recent years. In the Renown, for instance, we have a battle cruiser of 26,500 tons normal displacement—32,000 tons at full load—which can steam at nearly 32 knots, but she mounts no more than six heavy guns, and her armor is so thin as to be easily penetrable at extreme fighting range. Judging from the fate which overtook our three battle cruisers at Jutland, all of which were plated quite as heavily as the Renown, the latter would have incurred grave risk of destruction had she ever gone into action against the enemy's capital ships. The Hood, a ship of approximately the same speed, has much better protection, and mounts eight heavy guns, but it is obvious from a comparison between her and battleships of contemporary design that a very large percentage of her huge displacement is accounted for by the propelling machinery. Her offensive power is represented by eight 15in. 45-cal. guns, and her vitals are protected by 12in. armor. The battleship nearest to her in point of size was the Massachusetts (since cancelled), which was of 43,200 tons, as against 41,200 tons for the Hood. The American ship, with a speed of 23 knots, would have been nearly 9 knots slower, but in all other respects she was vastly more powerful. She carried twelve 16-inch 50-cal. guns, had 16-inch armor over vital parts, and was so well protected below the waterline as to be all but unsinkable by torpedoes or mines.
According to statements made at the Washington Conference, our four "improved" Hoods, were to have been about 4,000 tons heavier than the Massachusetts, but, even so, it is said, they would have been armed with only nine 16-inch guns. It would seem, therefore, that British naval officers still consider high speed of sufficient importance to justify a big sacrifice of hitting and resisting power, though the contrary inference had been drawn from a speech made by Admiral Chatfield some two years ago. As, however, our two new vessels are to be battleships and not battle cruisers, they will probably show a notable improvement in gun power and protection at the expense of velocity.—Naval and Military Record, 1 November, 1922.
Warship Scrapping at Home and Abroad.—In this country it has been taken for granted that the scrapping of naval material was already in full swing in the United States and Japan, pursuant to the letter of the Washington agreement, but according to recent information this is not so. Some weeks ago the Tokyo Navy Department issued a statement to the effect that, while plans had been made for disposing of warship tonnage condemned by the agreement, Japan did not feel warranted in scrapping a single ship until the treaty had been ratified by all the Powers concerned. For this reason she was awaiting the decision of France, who has not yet made clear her attitude toward the treaty. Another Tokyo message stated that a strong party in Japan would be in favor of making the Five- Power Treaty a Three-Power Treaty should France and Italy fail to ratify the original instrument, adding that Japan was eager for financial reasons to carry out the terms of the treaty. Washington despatches on this subject indicate that, although the American Government is anxious to see the treaty put into force at the earliest possible moment, it has so far made no plans for an exchange of ratifications until all five signatory Powers are ready to record their formal approval of the compact. It would, indeed, be contrary to diplomatic usage to give effect to the treaty until ratification was complete.
One Washington correspondent affirms that should Japan officially suggest an easier exchange of ratifications by the three Powers who are principals in the 5-5-3 arrangement, the proposal would be carefully considered by the State and Navy Departments. It is recalled that the American, British, and Japanese delegations agreed that the 5-5-3 ratio should stand as regards the three Powers, whatever action might be taken by France and Italy. On the other hand, American naval officials are said to be strongly averse to carrying out the provisions of the treaty unless and until it has been ratified all round. The one fact that seems to emerge from all these reports is that up to the present neither America nor Japan has begun to scrap any of their really important ships affected by the treaty, whereas Great Britain has already started to demolish a number of vessels that would certainly have been retained in the navy but for the limitation arrangement with the two Powers named. There is, of course, no suggestion of bad faith on the part of any Power, and if blame attaches to anyone it is to Great Britain herself, who seems to have been over-hasty in sending valuable ships to the scrap heap before there was any obligation to do so.—Naval and Military Record, 1 November, 1922.
British to Stick to Battleships.—It is significant of British opinion regarding the relative naval merits of battleships and airplanes that the next two great ships to be laid down in England are not plane carriers, but battleships. Their view evidently coincides with the great body of naval officers in this country, that the role of aircraft in naval warfare will be as an integral part of the fleet, and not as a substitute for that fleet. However erroneous this may prove in the remote future, there is no question that under present realities the attempt to use air power as a substitute for naval power would involve extremely dangerous chances that no person in a highly responsible position would be justified in accepting.
The British decision contains no element of snap judgment. To their extensive war experiences in bombing have been added many valuable experiments. Moreover, the press controversy instigated by Admiral Percy Scott and other prominent naval officers has led to widespread discussion and thought upon the relation between air force and sea force. The resulting official opinion probably comes as near to the correct one. m the light of present conditions and development in the near future on the water and in the air, as it is possible to reach.
The Substance of such British opinion, as nearly as it can be estimated from the evidence of their decisions and their public discussions, may be summarized as follows: That air power and sea power are co-ordinate, and aircraft must take their place with battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine layers, etc., as elements of a homogeneous force: and that the protection, aerial and constructional, that can be given to battleships against bomber and torpedo plane is deemed sufficient to warrant the perpetuation of the battleship type, so indispensable from a purely naval point of view.
This is substantially the same view held by the great majority of the best professional judges in the United States. But merely because the battleship is to remain is no reason for "slacking up in the development of aircraft, nor in equipping the fleet with them. These air measures should go forward as energetically here as they are sure to do in Great Britain, for undoubtedly the aerial role is of tremendous and increasing importance in relation to sea power.—Army and Navy Journal, 11 November, 1922.
Selecting Naval Instructors.—The attention of Flag and Commanding Officers is drawn by the Admiralty to the importance of the names of suitable petty officers being brought forward for duty as instructors in training establishments. The influence of instructors both in the training service and those establishments which deal with new entries must necessarily have a marked effect on the future of the Service, and therefore it is most necessary that petty officers who will make good instructors should be earmarked. Accordingly, in order that the names of suitable ratings may be noted at the depots, their conduct sheets in future should include a notation in red ink as to whether they are recommended or not for training duties. Stoker petty officers who are likely to make good instructors should be included in this arrangement.—Army. Navy and Air Force Gazette, 21 October, 1922.
Our Future Foreign Policy.—Following the break-up of the Coalition and the consequent return to party Government, important modifications in Britain's foreign policy are anticipated. In France, it is said, the resignation of Mr. Lloyd George has been hailed with glee, while in Germany the same event is reported to have caused profound depression. The Paris papers take it for granted that our new Government will adopt a more vigorous attitude toward Germany on the reparations question, and will also press for the conclusion of a military alliance with France. It would, however, be more prudent to await the verdict of the country before jumping to conclusions. If there are many people here who would like to see sterner measures taken with Germany, there are others who think the time has come to put an end to that intolerable state of semi-war in which Europe has lived for the past four year, by pursuing a policy of conciliation toward our late enemies'.
It were useless to pretend that British sentiment toward France has undergone no change since the war, or that a proposal to enter into formal alliance with her would evoke the same enthusiasm today as it might have done even a year ago. In the interval this country has been subjected to a perfect storm of vituperation by the French Press. We have been accused of treachery, deceit, and timidity in our dealings with Germany, and we have been threatened, more or less openly, with a great submarine program avowedly designed to undermine our naval supremacy. All this may have been the irresponsible vaporing of excited journalists, but in the recent Near East crisis we had unmistakable proof of French disinclination to help us out of an awkward corner. Before they assume any definite military obligations, therefore, the British people would like to have some pledge that the future policy of France will be rather less erratic and less provocative than it has been of late. They are ready to guarantee her against German aggression to the full extent of their resources, but only on condition that her treatment of Germany is not such as to make a fresh war practically inevitable.
In his vigorous speech at Leeds on Wednesday Earl Beatty denounced as fallacious the idea that developments in aerial warfare will lessen the Empire's need of naval defense. The British Empire, he reminded his audience, consists of something more than the British Isles. "The strength of this wide spread Empire lies in its physical as well as its moral unity, and its physical unity is, and must always be, maintained by the sea." The soundness of this proposition is scarcely open to dispute. But when the First Sea Lord proceeded to deny that aerial developments have robbed, or will rob, us of any of the advantages of our insular position, he was on less solid ground. So far as home defense is concerned we have certainly lost one great advantage that we formerly enjoyed by reason of our position as an island: viz., security against armed invasion so long as our fleet commanded the sea. Now that aircraft have attained such formidable powers, our great inland cities and centers of industry lie open to a devastating form of attack against which the sea affords' no protection whatever. To that not unimportant extent, therefore, the development of aerial warfare has unquestionably modified the strategical situation.
As The Times observed last year, when this question was under discussion: "The one function of the Navy is the defense of the population and the commerce of this country and the Empire against attack; and any tendency to assume that the sea, so long as it is kept inviolate from surface domination, is still a complete barrier against hostile invasion, would be deplorable. The country looks to the Board of Admiralty to take the broadest view of its' problems." The Naval and Military Record has been rebuked in some quarters for emphasizing the Navy's inability to protect the home country from hostile invasion by means of the air, but in our judgment it is vitally important that this fact should be realized by the community. Until it is realized we shall never get a well-balanced system of defense that will give us reasonable security against all forms of attack.
But when we turn from home defense to the strategical requirements of the Empire as a whole, few will question Earl Beatty's claim that sea power still remains the prime factor. For the time being, at all events, aircraft are essentially short-range weapons in comparison with ships, and however great an Air Force we might build up, it could not of itself do much to safeguard our Imperial communications. That will remain the task of the Navy for as long a period as human foresight can embrace. Within the limits of the Narrow Seas air power is probably destined to play a most important part in future naval warfare. Beyond those limits, however, it becomes merely an auxiliary to sea power, and enormous progress will have to be made before aircraft of any type can replace the larger ships of the Navy. The notion that airships, for instance, are already capable of superseding cruisers for the patrol of the ocean routes, either in war or peace, is utterly fantastic. Should the Admiralty decide to construct or to subsidize a certain number of airships, it will be because they regard these vessels as possessing some value for scouting and escort duty, not because they think them capable of taking the place of battleships or cruisers.
It is a fact not without significance that, whereas in this country there are naval critics who would be willing to scrap the fleet and stake everything on air power, every Dominion writer who discusses the problem of defense takes it for granted that surface ships, and especially battle cruisers and light cruisers, are the chief necessity of the future. The truth is that we at home have not yet discarded the North Sea habit of mind, and are too prone to examine every naval problem from the pre-war point of view. The best antidote to this is to study large maps. If this were done more generally there would be less of the absurd talk about defending Australasia and guarding the ocean highways, thousands of miles in length, by air power alone. We must still "send out our big warships to watch our big waters" if we wish to enjoy reasonable security against the risks of the future. To scrap the Navy would be to scrap the Empire.—Naval and Military Record, 25 October, 1922.
Gibraltar Aviation Base.—That Great Britain plans to make Gibraltar the most formidable air base in the whole world is alleged by the Spanish aviation magazine Avcar.
"The British," says the journal, "have of recent years laid much stress on the fact that owing to changed conditions of modern warfare, both on land and sea. Gibraltar to a great extent has lost its former strategic importance. But the historic rock now enters a new phase. British engineers are busy planning the transformation of Gibraltar into a huge subterranean air station. The hillside will be tunneled in all directions, with vast cellars in which great fleets of airplanes and seaplanes will be in absolute safety from enemy attack. Huge oil tanks, repair shops, bomb and aerial torpedo stores will be complete in the mighty arsenal.
"In the center of the rock a large hall will house the planes, with galleries running in all directions of the compass to outside landing stations. There will be several tiers connected with each other by powerful elevators. This plan will enable the British to concentrate the largest air fleet ever seen in the world in a place of absolute safety, ready at any moment to sally forth to support naval squadron or undertake offensives over a very wide radius of action.
"Gibraltar will thus regain its former importance as a strategic base, and again become the crouching lion against whom nobody will dare attempt to dispute British sovereignty over the columns of Hercules."—Aerial Age, November, 1922.
Coast Guard Service.—As was foretold in these notes a short time ago, the proposed reorganization of the British Coast Guard Service, which since 1856 has been under the Admiralty and has been regarded as the Navy's first line of reserve, has proved to be full of pitfalls, and there has been a very general protest against the proposed reorganization, or rather abolition and rebirth as three separate services. One can realize the attitude of the various departments represented on the committee; indeed, it is only a matter of 1856 over again, but the complaint is that it should have been regarded from a national point of view and not from such narrow angles at all. It is rather curious to notice how changing conditions have reversed matters' with the coast guard force. In the fifties, it was proved that the Navy was the only department which really benefited, yet the Customs and Excise Department had to pay for the force. This was seen to be unfair and, accordingly, the charge was transferred to the shoulders of the Admiralty. Now the Navy is the only service which hardly benefits at all, and they are naturally jibbing a little at having to bear the whole cost.
Meanwhile, the committee has convinced itself and a few other people that the proposed change would mean the saving of something over a million dollars a year. Unfortunately, there are still other people who stoutly maintain that three government administrations cost more than one and that, although there may be a great saving in the first year, or perhaps the first and second, the third is likely to see the beginning of interdepartmental jealousies and the foundation of three Stations side by side where the work is now done by a single coast guard post.
Still another point is brought forward by the shipping and commercial communities, who point out that on more than one occasion lately there has been deplorable loss of life owing to the under-manning of the various coast guard stations on the coast. In England, the coast guards man the rocket apparatus, but not the lifeboats, and an incomplete crew is as undesirable with the one as it is with the other. This is a matter of interest to everybody who is connected with the sea in any way, and it is to be hoped that some arrangement will be arrived at whereby the Admiralty retains control and is responsible for appointments and discipline, but that the other departments concerned have a say in the administration of the force and bear their share of the cost. For one thing, the coast guard is not by any means a bad billet for an old lower deck man, and the abolition of the force would make a difference when a youngster is considering the question of entering the Navy for long service.—Our Navy.
FRANCE
France and Naval Disarmament.—Reference is made in another column to the possibility of the naval disarmament scheme coming to grief through French opposition. We sincerely hope that French publicists are misrepresenting the real attitude of their governments towards the Limitation Treaty, for the rejection of that instrument would be nothing less than an international calamity. The mere prospect of a general reversion to unlimited battleship competition is enough to evoke a universal cry of protest, and we find it hard to believe that thoughtful Frenchmen seriously meditate a step which in all probability would have that result. It seems' rather late in the day to protest against a treaty which was signed nine months ago by the accredited delegates of France, after a prolonged discussion in which every clause was carefully examined and debated. The deplorable loss of the battleship France is now being cited as a reason for "reviewing the entire question of tonnage ratios"; but, in fact, such misfortunes are already provided for in the Treaty, and France is free to lay the keel of a substitute battleship at once if she so desires.
There is something manifestly artificial in this sudden agitation against the Washington agreement, and the true motive of the movement appears to be related more to politics than defense considerations. If the tonnage ratios specified in the Treaty applied to all types of naval craft, France might have legitimate cause for complaint. But that is not the case. The only vessels affected are the battleship and the aircraft carrier, and as regards the first it has notoriously fallen into disrepute in France. No restriction whatever is placed upon the multiplication of cruisers, submarines, or aircraft, these being the very weapons to which French opinion attaches primary importance. From no practical point of view, therefore, can the Treaty be regarded as disadvantageous to our friends across the Channel. It deprives them of nothing they formerly possessed, nor does it fetter in any way the development of their sea armaments along the lines which their own experts have laid down. France may argue that the Treaty, by stereotyping her present comparatively feeble standard of strength, would prejudice any future claim she might lay to a higher naval rank than is now assigned to her, but this is true only so far as strength in capital tonnage is concerned. There is nothing in the document that would invalidate her claim to a larger ratio of sea power in the event of a new disarmament conference taking place some years hence.—Naval and Military Record, 18 October, 1922.
France Plans to Rebuild Her Navy.—Paris—Aiming at the reconstitution of the French Navy, bringing it un to its pre-war strength, but taking into account the limitation imposed by the Washington agreement the minister of marine has elaborated a project calling for the expenditure of about $20.000,000, yearly for the next twenty years. The plan will be presented to the present session of the chamber of deputies.
Naval experts have recently been laying stress on the fact that France's sea defenses have never been so weak in comparison with other nations since Napoleonic days. Construction was suspended during the war and scores of ships are out of date. A writer in the Petit Parisien sums up the total of France's lighting strength as six dreadnaughts, five light cruisers, 38 large destroyers, 41 submarines, with three old style cruisers of the Voltaire type (10,800 tons,) ten others of a still older pattern and a dozen or so torpedo boats, practically useless.
As far as coast defense is concerned, none of the heavy batteries has a range beyond ten kilometers (less than four miles). Most of the hydroplanes and other aerial defense weapons' are out of date.
Comparing the navies of France and Italy, which were placed on the same footing at the Washington conference, it is found that while the number of dreadnaughts is the same for both, Italy has a much superior light surface fleet in number and quality.
The minister of marines purposes to ask for appropriations for tonnage annually. He will demand provision for 175,000 tons for cruisers; 330,000 tons for light cruisers, torpedo boats and destroyers and 65,000 tons for submarines and small coast defense craft.—United Press Dispatch.
French Navy Notes.—Can it be contended that aerial and ballistic progress has rendered fleets obsolete and made maritime power an empty word? Our admirals demonstrated the absurdity of the prevailing idea among the French public that, since aerial bombardment flotillas could operate with ease within a radius of 700 miles from our shores, a French battle fleet is no longer necessary, and our Republic has other means, more economical and effective, of discouraging aggression by any Power. It was shown that the armored fighting ship, though no doubt bound to develop, will ever remain the instrument of the command of the sea and the ultima ratio of seapower.
To react against the anti-battleship tendencies was a vital matter. Not passing crazes of the ignorant public, but the experienced and responsible professional seamen of the Conseil Superieur must dictate the naval policy of the country, and for the immediate present they are in the majority for the battleship.
Now, what type of battleship to adopt? Considerations of cost and time work against the construction, that has been prepared, of 33,000-ton ships to carry six guns of 18-inch bore (3,3001b. shells), together with up-to-date anti-aerial and anti-submarine defenses, and there appears to be a majority for the completion at St. Nazaire, within twenty months, of the 25,300-ton quadruple-turret Normandie, that was laid down in July, 1913, and launched in October, 1914, and was pushed up to 60 per cent of her total completion. As guns and motors are partly ready, the modifications which it is intended to make in the defensive and offensive power would cost a minimum of time and money, and by 1924 the battle fleet would receive a flagship having twice the fighting value of the French type and partly benefiting from the lessons of the war and the data gained in recent experiments in the Thucringen and Prins Eugen.
The arguments in favor are that the 25,300-ton quadruple-turret ships, with their 12-inch belt and the armor covering their sides and ends, their three armored decks (to be completed with armor screens against aerial projectiles), their elastic anti-submarine protective devices, compare well from a defensive standpoint with the fine German battleships so much admired in England and in the States. Secondly, the 10 metres quadruple turrets, with their 15-inch front, afford splendid protection against both projectiles and gases, and can maintain, theoretically, a rate of fire of eight rounds per turret and per minute, besides training their twelve 13.4-inch guns over a field of 3.400 degrees against only 2.700 for the Bretagne and most British ships. In the light of Jutland and Coronel a battery of twelve 13.4-inch guns is deemed superior to one of eight 15-inch weapons—although there is a strong demand for the fitting of the new 18-inch caliber which is the most powerful piece of ordnance in existence.
A series of interesting maneuvers have just taken place off the coasts of Brittany and Normandy under the supervision of Rear-Admiral Lequerre the active chief of the Escardre de la Manche, who flies his flag in the 18,000-ton Voltaire, and has under his orders the Brest and Cherbourg torpedo, submarine, and aerial flotillas at the same time as half a dozen gunboats of 800 tons of the Verdun type. For the purpose of action on the high sea and of artillery contests such a force would be, of course, ridiculously inadequate, but Admiral Lequerre is, intensely and realistically, training the few thousand seamen under his command for a totally different game: coast defense and attack, the attack of convoys and fleets mostly under the cover of night. Night conditions offer to the weak side its chance, when what matters most is not to be strong and numerous, but to offer a small and elusive target, so much so that, at the time of the craze for croiseurs corsaires, a special tactique de nuit had been elaborated by the Paris Admiralty for the case of single corsaires hurling themselves slap-dash into the very midst of an enemy squadron, with a view to provoking confusion. The significance of the strenuous night training in the French Navy is better gauged when it is remembered that the modern meaning of command of the sea is safe communications. Experience, however, has proved that efficiency for night fighting cannot be improvised, but demands constant practice, special appliances and signaling tactics, together with a perfect knowledge of coasts and sea currents. In night actions, further, the bombardment and scouting avions are the best instruments of surprise as well as of efficient defense. The night, it will be remembered, played a capital role in sea transportation in the course of the Great War; it is bound to exercise an even greater influence in future European conflicts that will be decided not by armored force shining in the sun, but by new unimposing instruments d'offensive stealthily striking in the night, for the reason that they will possess speed and range and be adapted to the novel conditions of warfare.
The discussion round the Washington Treaty is purely an academic affair: ratified or not it will change nothing in the French naval policy, since battleship construction has against it public opinion and financial difficulties. One way to retain the battleship would have been to complete the Normandie in replacement of the lost France; but that idea has been rejected by the retrograde men of the Couseil Superieur, who have learned nothing by the war and seem content to jouer an marin with the old naval recipe, in virtue of which efficiency consists of a nicely-dosed naval mixture: battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft, a few submarines, too, and a coastal organization or flotte de terre whose sole raison d’être is to find employment for our surplus of 4,000 officers de vaisseau or officers auxiliaries.
So the Raiberti program provides for the construction within twenty years of 175,000 tons of battleships, 330,000 tons of light ships, 65,000 tons of ocean-going submarines; the program, or at least the characteristic of ships to be revised every five years. At first sight it is a practical endorsement of the Washington agreement; in reality it is nothing of the sort. The Washington trick, played upon France without her consent or knowledge in defiance of common sense and fair play, has against it the unanimity of purely naval opinion. M. Briand, who acted according to his lights, had no power whatever to sign so humiliating a deed of abdication at the hands of nominal allies. It is a question of national sovereignty and pride—a point on which Frenchmen are just as sensitive as Englishmen; and M. Poincare is certain to vindicate fully France's rights as well as the claims of diplomatic honesty.
Mr. Raiberti's advisers simply want to make a start in the old way, and in a small, unostentatious way, but they have raised a storm of criticisms, coming from all quarters. Those who believe in battleships deride the proposed construction of five ships of 35,000 tons pour tout potage, and M. Raiberti's clever mixture they consider as the best up-to-date recipe to procure faihlesse sur toute la ligne, expensive powerlessness. Even among flag officers it is agreed that it would be folly to invest 1,500 million francs in a five-unit battle squadron, and that it would be better for France to give up altogether mastodons and to go in for aerial, torpedo, and speed supremacy, that would pay.—J.B. Gautreau in Naval and Military Record, October 18, 25, and November 1.
GERMANY
German Capital Ship and Light Cruiser Building Program 1914-18. It has been correctly stated that at the end of the war the Germans were only building U boats, torpedo craft and small auxiliaries. When war broke out, however, they had quite a big program on hand, including battleships, battle cruisers and light cruisers. It will be remembered that the German Navy Bills principally dealt with the big ship, and most of the warships in progress in 1914 were replacements of older ships in accordance with those Bills.
It is of interest to note the policy as the war progressed in the light of the ships laid down. When the war broke out the German High Sea Fleet consisted of three battle squadrons, the third of which contained the most modern ships, namely, the Kaiser, Kaiserin, Konig Albert and Princregent Luitpold, each of which mounted ten 12in. guns, with fourteen 5.9in. guns as a secondary armament, on a displacement of 24,300 tons. Their maximum speed was 22 knots, and these ships did not compare in offensive powers with contemporary British battleships. The cruiser squadron included only three battle cruisers, the Seydlitz and Moltke, each mounting ten 11in. guns, and the Von der Tann, with eight 11in. guns. There was another battle cruiser, the Goeben, in the Mediterranean, but she was too far away to be of value in the North Sea.
It is now proposed to describe the ships in hand when the war broke out.
From this statement it will be seen that two battleships, the Konig and the Grosser Kurfurst, were added to the High Seas Fleet in the first month of the war, whilst two more, the Markgraf and the Kronprins Wilhelm, were added before the end of 1914. These four ships were contemporary with the Emperor of India class, each of which carried ten 13.5in. guns. In each of these German ships the oil stowage only totaled 700 tons, against a bunker capacity for 3500 tons of coal.
In addition to the above, the battleship Salamis was building at the Vulcan Yard, Hamburg, for the Greek Navy, but at the outbreak of war all progress on this ship was suspended. In fact, some of her guns, which were to come from America, were used on the British monitors.
It will be noted that the Bayern was completed in April, 1916, and really she set out to meet the German fleet after Jutland. Actually at that battle the most recent battleship on the German side was the Kronprins Wilhelm.
Only two more battleships were commenced by the Germans, and they were part of the 1914-15 program. They were named the Wurtemberg and Sachsen, and were similar to the Baden and the Bayeni. The former was laid down at the Vulcan Yard, Hamburg, and the Sachsen was building by Krupps at their Germania Yard at Kiel. The designed power of these ships was 48,000 shaft horsepower, but actually the Baden obtained 55,000 shaft horsepower, and it was anticipated that that figure would be attained in these two later ships.
The Wurtemberg and Sachsen were both launched in 191 7, and after the armor belt was fitted and some of the machinery shipped, the work was stopped so that the two shipyards could devote their energies to U boat construction. The condition of the Sachsen can be judged from Fig. I, which shows this ship as she was when peace was signed. The Sachsen was unique, in that her center propeller was to be driven by a Diesel engine of 12,000 brake horsepower. Messrs. Krupps, of Kiel, designed and built the engine, but it was never installed on the ship.
These two battleships, together with other warships building when peace was declared, have had to be broken up in compliance with the Versailles Treaty. The alternative of utilizing the hulls for ordinary mercantile purposes was not a commercial proposition, and accordingly the structures were broken up and the metal sold as scrap.
The principal features of the German warships were described in papers read before the Institution of Naval Architects by Sir E.H. Tennyson D'Eyncourt and Mr. S.V. Goodall in 1921, and for details as to construction and also a comparison with contemporary British warships those contributions should be consulted. It is only proposed to touch on one or two of the salient points. In gun power, ship for ship, the German was invariably behind the British. Much has been said about subdivision, and it must be admitted that the subdivision of the German ships was more minute than in the British ships. The extent to which it was carried can be judged from the fact that the main machinery of the Baden was enclosed in fifteen different compartments—nine boiler rooms and six main machinery spaces.
As regards time taken to build, it will be seen from the details given in Table I, that the average time for a battleship was about two and a half years, which is not so good as for British ships of corresponding date.
As previously mentioned, the High Sea Fleet had only three battle cruisers available when hostilities commenced, and, in addition, three more were building and well advanced. These are set out in detail in Table II, given above, by referring to which it will be seen that the battle cruiser strength of the enemy was increased by the Derfflinger before the end of 1914, the Lutzow in the spring of 1915, and the Hindenburg in August, 1915, thus doubling its numbers in the first year of the war. All these ships had 12in. guns as their main armament, being the first German battle cruisers so armed. It is of interest to note that whilst the Lutzow could only carry 1,000 tons of oil, contemporary British ships of the same class carried about three times as much. That was due to the oil shortage in the country and was a distinct handicap.
The German Admiralty was impressed with the battle cruiser type and had provided for two ships of that class in 1914-15 and in 1915-16 also. Particulars are given in Table III.
In addition, there was certainly one more battle cruiser just started, the Ersatz Yorck, probably at Schichau, Dantzig, and possibly two more, included in the 1916-17 program, but never started owing to the concentration on U boat construction.
There were several interesting features in these large cruisers. The Graf Spee and Mackensen were to have 35 cm. (14in.) guns and would have been the first battle cruisers to mount a gun larger than 30.5 cm. (12in.), whilst the Ersatz A and Ersatz Freya were designed to carry 38 cm. (15in.) guns, and so were in line with the British battle cruisers built during the war. The horsepower and speed were also slightly increased. The Ersatz A had four propellers, each of which was independent. The 110,000 shaft horsepower was evenly distributed between the four shafts. As originally designed, a Fottinger hydraulic transmission—turbo-transformer—was to be used. The turbines themselves were to run at 1,360 revolutions per minute, and there was a reduction of 4.3 to 1 by means of the transformer, so that the propellers made 315 revolutions' per minute at full speed. It is claimed that the efficiency would have been very good. Actually, however, German engineers have for some time favored mechanical reduction gear, and it is being fitted to all classes of ships at present. The Graf Spec and Maokensen were to be fitted with mechanical reduction gear and the shaft horsepower of 90,000 was to be divided over four quite independent shafts.
In these battle cruisers the main machinery compartments were relatively small, owing to the excessive subdivision. The condenser and auxiliary machinery would be in a separate compartment from the main turbines for each shaft, and thus there would be eight engine rooms.
In light cruisers the High Sea Fleet was weak, judged from the standard set up as the war progressed. There were only six of the Town class in the cruiser squadron: viz., the Koln, Mainz, Stralsund, Kolberg, Rostock, and Strassburg. Each of these ships displaced 4,500 tons, carried twelve 10.5 cm. (4.1in.) guns, and had two revolving torpedo tubes on the upper deck. They could steam at 27 to 28 knots. There were also five others of approximately the same dimensions on the trade routes or attached to Admiral Von Spec's squadron, whilst the Breslau was attached to the Goeben in the Mediterranean.
The light cruisers built during the war and in hand when the war ended are shown in Table V given above. The losses in this class of vessel in actual service were considerable, and the new cruisers were generally first named Ersatz, or replace. It will be seen in the table that two of the cruisers building at Weser A.G. when the war ended were the Ersatz Emden and the Ersatz Koln. The light cruisers in hand at the Armistice were all of one class, and the following particulars of this class may be of interest. The length was 489ft., the beam 47ft., and the displacement 5,600 tons at 16ft. 6in. draught. The fuel carried was 1,118 tons' of coal with 682 tons of oil. There were fourteen boilers in five boiler rooms, of which eight burned coal and oil and six burned oil only. The shaft horsepower of 29,000 gave a speed of 27.5 knots. The armament consisted of eight 15 cm. (s.gin.) and three 8.8 cm. (2.5in.) high-angle guns and four single 60 cm. (23.6in.) revolving deck torpedo tubes. The side protection was about 2 5-16-inch thick and protective deck about 54in. thick. The complement was 526.
In addition, two special light cruisers were built for mine-laying, named the Brummer and the Bremse, by Blohm and Voss' and Vulcan, Stettin, respectively. These ships were designed for high speed, and some machinery on order by the Russian Admiralty, which was in hand in Germany when war broke out, was utilized to save time. The Bremse was built in twelve months. Each vessel could carry 300 mines' and the armament included four 15 cm. (5.9in.) and two 8.8 cm. (3.5in) high-angle guns and two deck torpedo tubes. The speed obtained was 30 knots, and these cruisers were intended for mine-laying at a distance, their offensive powers being sufficient to enable them to make a fight against an isolated cruiser if necessary.
Of the light cruisers left in Germany after the Armistice a number were surrendered to the Allies and incorporated in the Italian and French Navies and re-named as indicated in Table V. These ships were mainly the cruisers completed after the Battle of Jutland. Those not complete had to be broken up in accordance with the Peace Treaty.
It is interesting to note that three light cruisers were launched in 1914 and in 1915, four in 1916, three in 1917 and 1918, and two in 1919, to clear the shipways at Weser A.G. shipyard. Before closing this section we would draw attention to the short summary given in Table IV, which shows the progress in size and horsepower of the various classes of ships.
The distribution of this warship building work over the various shipyards is of interest. The submarines were built in nearly every shipyard, with the exception of Vulcan Yard at Stettin and the Schichau Yard at Dantzig, which were employed on torpedo boat construction.
The U boat program made the biggest demands on the German shipyards, and next to it came the torpedo craft ; but, as will be seen above, the capital ship and light cruiser program was quite considerable.
Adding these three programs together one can get a good idea of the capacity of the shipbuilding industry in Germany working at full pressure. All this capacity is now available for mercantile work, as the postwar building allowed for the navy by the Peace Treaty is very small indeed, and Germany may not build warships for foreign Powers.—The Engineer, 13 October, 1922.
The Danzig Yard.—The fate of the Danzig yard, which formerly was one of the most important German Imperial Dockyards, has now been decided. The yard and the plant for building railway rolling stock will be taken over by a new limited company for a term of fifty years. The share capital of this company is reckoned in British currency, thirty per cent of the capital being taken by a British group, thirty per cent by French capitalists, twenty per cent by Polish capitalists, and twenty per cent by a Danzig group of financiers. The yard embraces three building berths for ships up to 330ft. long and three floating docks with a lifting capacity of 8,000, 3,500 and 1,000 tons respectively. One of these docks may be used as a building berth, being provided with special cranes for that purpose. The vessels are completed afloat with the aid of a 100-ton floating crane. The workshops of the yard are very well equipped. Marine steam engines, hot-bulb motors, and auxiliary machinery, such as pumps and winches, may be built in the engineering department.—The Shipbuilder, November, 1922.
Operations Following the Battle of Jutland.—Admiral von Scheer, who might be called the German Beatty, a strong advocate of the offensive at sea, had succeeded the cautious Admiral von Pohl on January 18. After President Wilson's note about the Sussex, the Kaiser and his advisers decided to abandon their ruthless submarine policy, and on April 24. Scheer was instructed by his Government that thereafter his submarines were to obey prize law, visit and search their victims before destroying them. Scheer replied that he would not permit his U boats to operate under such restrictions, and sent immediate wireless instructions to the commerce-raiding submarines under his command, which included all those not in the Mediterranean area, to return to the base. The submarines came back, and Scheer worked out a plan by which he hoped to lure the British fleet from its bases into U boat traps. He decided to cross the North Sea toward England with the High Seas armada after the trap had been set. Twenty-two submarines were ordered to station themselves off British ports by May 23, and await developments. Two U boats lay off Scapa and seven off the Firth, where Beatty's hated Cat Squadron and the Fifth Battle Squadron were. One submarine was off Cromarty, one off the Tyne, two off the Humber, one south of the Dogger Bank. With the Scapa submarines was a mine layer, the U-75, and she carried a full cargo. On May 29 she discharged her mines off the Orkneys; eight days later the Hampshire struck one of these mines and Lord Kitchener perished.
Scheer depended on his Zeppelins to give him warning of the approach of the Grand Fleet when he crossed the North Sea. But on the morning of May 30 the weather was misty, so Scheer altered his plan and steered north along the coast of Norway, thinking this safer. How the Grand Fleet came out and what followed off Jutland the world knows: the new fact of interest is that Scheer's strategic plan failed. He brought out his fleet hoping to bag some British warships with waiting submarines, and not one fell a victim. It is of interest, also, to discover that Admiral Jellicoe was mistaken in thinking that submarines were operating with the High Seas Fleet or in its rear. There were none there at all; all the submarines available had been concentrated off the British ports.
But Scheer was not discouraged by Jutland. He had been very lucky, he knew, but he had inflicted more loss than he suffered. And he was greatly influenced by Admiral Jellicoe's turn away and by the evident British disinclination to face risks that could be avoided. After some controversy with Berlin, where Jutland had made the Government very nervous, he was permitted to plan a bolder repetition of Jutland for the month of August.
This Jutland that never was fought constitutes an operation of surpassing interest, and one that the public has never been told anything about. There were excellent reasons at the time on both sides for silence. Scheer revived his project, abandoned the first time because of mist, for a visit to the English coast. He thought that the lack of success of his submarines before Jutland was because they were then lying doggo in waters particularly well protected and in which danger was especially apprehended by the English. Accordingly, he planned to bring his fleet across to Sunderland, and Sunderland will be interested to learn that his battle orders included a bombardment of that city by almost the whole fighting strength of the German Navy, to be carried out if the British fleet did not arrive in time to prevent it.
The German admiral placed his submarines in lines stretched across tracks which he expected Jellicoe and Beatty to cross as they sped down the coast to intercept him. Six U boats lay off Blyth, six more were stationed off the Yorkshire coast, and two lines of submarines off Terschelling, on the theory that the British fleet would chase the Germans home.
On the evening of August 16, the High Seas Fleet shaped course for Hartlepool. Scheer left the Second Squadron to guard the Bight. He had with him the new battleship Bayern, not finished when Jutland was fought, and the Grosser Kurfurst and Markgraf in place of the Derfflinger and Seydlitz, which had been too badly hammered to reappear. These ships went ahead with the battle cruisers. The dreadnaughts followed twenty miles behind, and eight Zeppehns hovered overhead. But the Admiralty was not caught napping; indeed, Jellicoe had come out even before the Germans sailed. At 5 o'clock the same afternoon the Grand Fleet started down the east coast. Moreover, the Ess, waiting in the middle of the North Sea on the German's course, torpedoed the Westfalen twice. Scheer sent his stricken ship home, and carried on.
During the night Beatty's Cat Squadron came out and was proceeding south thirty miles ahead of the Grand Fleet when, at 5.55 in the morning, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, which led the van, ran into the first line of submarines off the Fame Islands. The Nottingham was torpedoed twice. News of this at once reached Jellicoe, who ordered the Grand Fleet to turn around and made north, away from the enemy. This maneuver might have been still more criticized than the Jutland turn away, but the Admiralty has never told about it. Meanwhile the Nottingham was torpedoed again before she could get to port and sank. Tyrwhitt's Harwich flotilla was out, and sighted the enemy at 6.30 a.m., but could not attack unsupported. Scheer kept steadily on his course all the morning, fully informed by his Zeppelins of where the British squadrons were and what they were doing.
Some four hours after the loss of the Nottingham, Admiral Jellicoe decided to cover Newcastle. At noon he was ninety-five miles east of the Fame Islands, with Beatty ahead of him, steering SSE, and the German fleet ninety miles east of Whitby and still coming on. At 12.30 Beatty's squadrons were off Newcastle, forty-two miles from the enemy, but here Scheer thought things were getting too hot, turned south, pushed off the Harwich "light stuff" that was hanging to his flank, and started home at 2.35 p.m.
Admiral Beatty was off in pursuit, but Jellicoe signaled him before 3 to turn back at 4 o'clock, because of submarine danger. At 3.20 p.m. the commander-in-chief, on receiving a report of a submarine, ordered Beatty to turn back immediately. While returning, an hour and a half later, the light cruiser Falmouth was sunk by U-66. Tyrwhitt kept after the Germans all the afternoon, and remained in touch, but could not do more unsupported. His orders from Jellicoe to make a night attack could not be carried out because of bad weather, and Scheer returned scatheless excepting for the damaged Westfalen. Nothing has ever been told the British public about this unfought Jutland, though communiques were issued announcing the loss of the two cruisers sunk.
Scheer was delighted with what he considered his successful day out, and planned another. But German policy had changed again: in October it was decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. Scheer's submarines accordingly had to be released for onslaughts upon merchant shipping. Without submarines, there seemed no purpose in risking the fleet again, since not even Scheer ever contemplated a general action unless forced into one, or unless the English attacked the Bight.—Newspaper Clipping.
UNITED STATES
Building Program.—London, October 10.—The shipbuilding program which the United States Navy Department is reported to have in contemplation is decidedly a modest one. According to a Washington dispatch printed in The Sun on July 24, the department's policy is to build only enough tonnage of various types to round out the navy and maintain it on the same relative footing with the British and Japanese fleets.
To this end it is proposed (1) to speed up the completion of the ten light cruisers now building and seek authority for starting work on a sufficient additional number to keep pace with Britain and Japan: (2) lay down "several" submarines of the scout and mine-laying type, besides finishing the three fleet submarines now under construction; (3) accelerate the expansion of the navy's air force by developing new airplane types, completing the two big dirigibles now on order, the one in Germany and the other at Lakehurst, N.J., and expediting the completion of the two battle cruisers which are being rebuilt as airplane carriers.
Judging from the dispatch referred to above, Navy Department officials believe that these measures will safeguard that status quo in auxiliary fighting ships which it is as imperative to maintain as the battleship ratio if the Limitation Treaty is to be renewed on the same lines at some future date. To foreign observers, however, it seems very doubtful if the department's program is comprehensive enough for this purpose.
In previous articles I have given full and authoritative details of Japan's post-conference construction, and shown that when all the cruisers now building and authorized are ready for service that country will have at sea no fewer than twenty-nine modern vessels of this type. The United States, on the other hand, will have only ten—unless additional ships are authorized, laid down and built with the minimum of delay. As matters stand at present, the numerical ratio in light cruisers is enormously to the disadvantage of the United States, being in fact as 1 to 3.
If, therefore, the American naval chiefs wish to bring their auxiliary tonnage ratio into line with that stipulated for capital ships, they must be prepared to legislate for the construction of about forty new cruisers during the next two or three years ! Whether such a program would be feasible is for them and the American taxpayers to decide. So far as destroyers are concerned the United States is holding her own, but the submarine position is much less favorable. On paper the American total of these boats is considerably larger than the Japanese, but more arithmetical computations of the "nose counting" order afford no true index to fighting power where modern naval material is in question.
When the respective submarine establishments are analyzed a very different position is revealed. Leaving out of count small boats, which would be only good for coast defense and practically useless for the long-range service which has become the real metier of underwater craft, an examination of the data shows Japan to have built, building or on order a total of seventy-one ocean-going submarines, as compared with fifty-six similar boats completed or building for the United States. And boat for boat the later Japanese submarines are superior to the American in tonnage, radius and armament.
Since writing my last article on this theme further information has reached me on the progress of Japanese submarine construction. In the course of last year fifteen boats were completed: viz., Nos. 38, 39, 40 and 41 at Yokosuka; 34, 35, and 36 at Kure; 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 at Kobe; 43 and 45 at Sasebo, and 42 at Maizuru. No. 44 was put afloat on November 29, 1921, and in the same month work began on No. 62. During the present year upward of twelve boats have been commenced, comprising seven of 900 tons and five of 1,500 tons. Submarine No. 72 described as a 2,000-ton vessel with a cruising range of 16,000 miles, to be armed with two guns, sixteen torpedoes, and a supply of mines, is reported to have been laid down last June. At least five other boats of this class were then contracted for, and if not already under construction will be on the stocks at an early date.
Including the series of 1,500-tonners now building, the number of "submersible cruisers"—that is, boats displacing more than 1,500 tons or more when in surface trim—which Japan has actually ordered up to the present is not less than ten, while twelve boats out of the twenty-four contained in the new program will probably be of the same formidable type, giving an aggregate of twenty-two submarines of the very largest design. Against this fleet of underwater monsters the United States has only the six fleet submarines, T 1 to T 3 and V 1 to V 3, displacing 1,106 and 2,025 tons respectively. Of the other 100-odd American submarines which remain on the active list, all displace less than 1,000 tons on the surface, and half of them are less than 600 tons.
Another fact to be noted is the remarkable rapidity with which Japanese dockyards are now turning out submarines. For example: No. 62, which was laid down in November last year, was launched April 13, 1922, in a fifty-three per cent state of completion, and is scheduled for delivery in the coming December, complete for sea in every respect, with her full equipment and armament on board. The building period for the new 1,500-ton class as specified by the contracts is fifteen months, and for the 2,000-ton boats, eighteen to twenty months. In America the construction of much smaller boats has hitherto occupied thirty to thirty-six months.
Needless to say, the difference is attributable not to any superior resources or mechanical skill on the part of Japanese shipbuilders, but to the financial arrangements which govern naval construction in the two countries. In Japan the authorization of a new war vessel of any type involves the immediate appropriation of a sum of money sufficient to cover the entire cost of the work, with a margin over to allow for extras. As for the system adopted in the United States, it is unnecessary to explain this to American readers, but the result is seen in the present long list of war craft, from battleships to submarines, on which work has had to be slackened or stopped entirely, owing to shortage of funds. Last spring, for instance, all work was suspended on the light cruiser Omaha, because the available funds had run out, the consequence being that the delivery of this ship, which is one of a type most urgently needed by the United States fleet, has been postponed indefinitely.
The Omaha, it may be recalled, was begun as far back as December, 1918, so that she will soon have been four years in the builders hands. The Marblehead and Memphis, begun in the fall of 1920, have not been reported as launched at the moment of writing, and on July 1, this year, their percentages of completion were officially returned at 33.5 and 26.5.
At the same time the completion dates of the Omaha, Milwaukee, Cincinnati and Raleigh were stated to be "indefinite."
Bearing in mind the fact that none of the ten American cruisers begun in 1918-20 has yet come into service, and that the last of them can hardly be completed for another year, it is instructive to compare this with what the Japanese have done in the corresponding period. The cruisers Tama and Kuma, started only four months before the Omaha, were both commissioned in August, 1920; the Kiso, Kitakami and Oh-i, laid down in the second half of 1919, were all in service before October, 1921; the Isudsu and Nagara, begun in August-September, 1920, were completed in nineteen to twenty months; the Yura, laid down May 21, 1921, was launched February 15, 1922, and is timed to run her trials this November.
In all, Japan has built and completed eight light cruisers since the summer of 1918 and has four others in an advanced state of completion, while about six more are in an earlier stage of building. If this rate of progress is to be maintained, it is' difficult to see how the United States can hope even to draw level with Japan in respect to auxiliary fighting ships, let alone "beat her to it" by attaining a lead in this class of tonnage equivalent to the battleship ratio. Yet if the views of the Navy Department have been rightly interpreted, nothing less than this will satisfy American naval experts.
As a matter of fact, a proportion of 5 to 3 in fast cruisers and long-range submarines would be utterly inadequate for the United States if she found herself at war with Japan. To achieve any decisive result at sea a preponderance of at least 2 to 1 would be indispensable. No reasonable doubt exists as to the purpose for which all these swift Japanese cruisers and huge underwater boats are being built. Cruisers of 7,500 and 10,000 tons and submarines of 1,500 to 2,000 tons assuredly are not intended primarily for defense. They are designed for attacking an enemy's communications and merchant shipping, for carrying out raids oversea, and generally for offensive operations at a great distance from their home ports.
There is Japanese evidence on this head, for the influential Tokio journal, Chugai Shogyo, commenting in April, 1920, on the American cruiser program, wrote as follows: "The American naval authorities lay special emphasis on the necessity of having a high speed for these ten cruisers, and it can well be imagined what is the objective of American naval policy. Is it not an undisguisable fact that since the end of the World War America has been trying to devote her efforts to the Pacific? Unlike the cruisers hitherto built, those now proposed are to be of a specially large type so that they can conveniently cruise oceans. These facts should be duly noted by all interested in the future of Pacific questions." Now, as some of the latest Japanese cruisers will be as large as the American Omaha class, and others considerably larger, it is manifest that they, too, "can conveniently cruise oceans," and ships do not cruise about the ocean in war time merely for pleasure.
Owing to its lack of properly fortified bases in the Western Pacific, the American fleet would require in war a very numerous force of cruisers to guard its communications and hunt down enemy raiders, while it would also need very many long-range submarines for scouting, blockade and patrol duties. At present it has neither the one nor the other.
Everything turns, of course, on the possibility of a war being fought in the Pacific, as to which there is notoriously a sharp cleavage of opinion—though not among naval men or students of Far Eastern politics. If we admit such a war to be a possibility of the future, there can be no question as to the glaring insufficiency of America's naval preparations. With her present resources' she would not, humanly speaking, stand the remotest chance of waging successful war against Japan, and, unless I am greatly mistaken, American naval officers will be the first to concur in this opinion.—Hector C. Bywater in The Baltimore Sun, 5 November, 1922.
Competition in Cruisers.—Washington, November 7.—The Navy Department is fully advised of the Japanese auxiliary naval program, as outlined today in cable dispatches' to The Sun, from Hector C. Bywater, and while lack of appropriations prevents this country from keeping pace in the construction of cruisers and submarines, it is said in naval circles that no concern is felt over the Japanese construction.
Admiral Baron Kato, it was explained here today, gave a general outline of the Japanese program several months ago. Officials of the Navy here are advised that since 1918 Japan has ordered or constructed twenty-five cruisers, several of them displacing 10,000 tons, while others displace 7,000, with a mounted battery of not exceeding eight guns.
This, it is said, is in accordance with the understanding at the arms conference regarding additional construction of cruisers and submarines. No limitation was placed on the number of such vessels, but the tonnage of the cruisers was limited to 10,000 tons.
The United States now has under construction ten light cruisers of the Omaha class. It also has under construction or ordered thirty submarines, as compared with the sixty-nine Japan is building. The Navy Department will ask inclusion in the next budget of authorization for at least three ocean-going submarines and three mine-laying submarines.
The Bywater cable was read today by officials of the Navy Department, who commented that while Japan undoubtedly is building more extensively than the United States, she is entirely within her rights. Construction by the United States has been curtailed by the "economy program" in Congress and arguments there that the naval strength of America is such that she need not grow concerned over the temporary spurt of the Japanese nation.
The Navy itself would like a more liberal construction policy, but the responsibility rests primarily with Congress since that body holds the purse-strings.—Baltimore Sun, 7 November, 1922.
Reorganization of Government Departments.—A number of stories have appeared in the press about the so-called reorganization of the government departments as the result of the studies made by the Brown Committee.
Well-informed newspaper men do not believe, however, that there is any prospect of any definite action being taken upon this bill during the life of the present Congress and its appeal to the next Congress is decidedly doubtful.—J.B.H.
Relief Ships Ordered to Chile.—By order of the President of the United States, the U.S.S. Cleveland and the U.S.S. Denver have been directed to proceed to the region in Chile recently devastated by an earthquake. The Cleveland will probably be able to leave the Canal Zone within twenty-four hours after receipt of her orders. The Denver, now en route to the Canal Zone, will reach her destination and probably be ready to sail within four days. It will require these ships about nine days to reach Chilean ports. The vessels will carry certain supplies and Navy stores available at Panama for emergency use should they be required. Their destination will be Huasco, a Chilean city some distance north of Valparaiso. At that point they will be guided by the necessities of the situation.
Each ship has aboard one medical officer, and one extra doctor will be taken from the Canal Zone.—J.B.H.
JAPAN
Japan Will Import Oil For Her Navy.—With all the drastic military and naval reductions that may be realized, the question of naval fuel will remain as far from solution as before, states an authority in a Tokio dispatch in the New York Herald. The Government long has been striving for the realization of self-sufficiency, but with the gradual diminishment of the annual output and the waning prospects of oil exploitation the Government will for a long time have to cling to the old policy of hoarding imported oil.
The domestic output amounted some years ago to about 450,000 tons per annum, but the amount has' dropped to less than 300,000 tons. So considerable a portion of this output is refined into lighting oil that very little fuel can be obtained out of this limited domestic product. The repeated experimental boring in the oil fields of Formosa and Saghalien have completely failed and the Government has decided to employ several additional special vessels for the importation of fuel oil, mostly from Borneo. Imports from America this year amounted already to 100,000 tons and from Borneo to 350,000 tons.—Baltimore Sun, 12 November, 1922.
Japanese Men-of-War to Patrol Siberian Coast.—11 September, 1922.—According to the Japanese press, the Japanese Government has announced that Japanese war vessels will be kept in readiness off the Siberian coast after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Siberia to protect Japanese residents there in case of necessity.
MERCHANT MARINE
School for Merchant Marine Engineers Opened by Navy.—Under the direction of Commander H.H. Norton, U.S.N., a school for merchant marine engineers is being conducted at the fuel testing plant at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The school originated through a letter the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the chairman of the Shipping Board in which he offered to give engineers of the government ships instruction in oil fuel burning. Private ship owners were advised of the plans of the Navy Department and now the prospects are that a permanent school will be developed at Philadelphia at which short courses in oil burning will be given to merchant marine engineers.—Army and Navy Journal, 28 October, 1922.
Commissioner Chamberlain On Object Of Subsidy Bill.—In an address to the City Club of Washington on the situation of our merchant marine, Commissioner George E. Chamberlain, of the Shipping Board, pointed out that American flag vessels carried less than one-third of our total competitive overseas commerce of 40,000,000 tons. Continuing he said:
"One of the primary objects of the effort to provide compensatory legislation for American shipping is to increase to approximately fifty per cent the activities of our vessels in our foreign trade overseas. This result cannot be obtained by mere weight of ship tonnage thrown into the trade.
"Suitable vessels for the specific services must be provided which will classify with the best of our competitors. These vessels would carry a lower insurance rate, provide safety and speed in deliveries and obtain the confidence of both foreign and domestic merchants and importers. This latter feature is sadly lacking from our overseas trade, owing to the fact that our present serviceable ships were designed for a particular and urgent emergency and constructed with scarcely a thought to their ultimate usage in peace time commerce.
"The cream of the import trade of the United States is carried in foreign flag vessels and the low valued imports carrying necessarily a low freight rate are the portion of the vessels under the American flag. This condition is readily seen by comparison of the six months' business of vessels under the British, French, Japanese and Dutch flags, with the American vessels; of the total tonnage of imports Great Britain brought in 15.5 per cent of volume and 35.7 per cent of value. France 1 per cent of volume and 5.3 per cent of value. Japan 9 per cent of volume and 8 per cent of value, Holland 1.3 per cent of volume and 3.7 per cent of value, while American vessels brought in 67 per cent of volume representing 34 per cent of the total value.
"The high grade imports are represented by manufacturers, silk, tea, spices, art objects, etc., and are preferably shipped on fast vessels, the sugar and fruit cargoes forming the bulk of the intermediate class, are carried on foreign flag vessels chartered by American companies, as the operating costs of these vessels are so much lower that only by this means can the cargoes be profitably handled."—The Nautical Gazette, 4 November, 1922.
American Shipping Not Losing Ground.—From time to time we have in these columns called attention to the fact that, contrary to the prevailing impression, the proportion of our foreign trade carried in American bottoms is no longer dwindling. It ceased declining about six months ago and has been slowly rising since then. The Department of Commerce has recently issued detailed figures of our foreign carrying trade and of the tonnage entered and cleared at American ports in connection therewith during August last. In that month 46.77 per cent of the total tonnage in question flew the American flag as compared with 45.65 per cent in the same month of 1921, while the percentage of our water-borne foreign commerce carried in American vessels was 35.78 per cent this year as compared with 34.95 per cent in August, 1921. Although the gain recorded is not much to boast of, it denotes progress in the right direction and a turn for the better in our shipping situation. That our merchant marine, despite the existing intense shipping depression and the unprecedentedly unremunerative freight rates at present prevailing, should have been able to more than hold its own recently is a cause for congratulation and goes to disprove the predictions of those who have been prophesying for some time past that our shipping would suffer as rapid an eclipse as in the period after the Civil War.
In the absence of detailed information it is impossible to say whether the slightly improved showing of American flag vessels in the foreign trade of the United States is due to the activities of the Shipping Board or of private shipping companies. It is beyond all question that there was a very marked gain during July and August in the tonnage of American vessels entering and clearing in the foreign trade at United States ports, whereas in the fiscal year ended June 30, an almost uniform decline occurred. Prognostications as to the future are always risky, especially in times of economic unsettlement and fluctuating exchanges like the present. But this year's poor grain crops in France and parts of Central Europe make it certain that our farmers will find a ready market for their agricultural products, which form three-fourths of our exports to the Old World. This should help to swell the volume of our foreign trade and enlarge the opportunities for the employment of our shipping. Skeptics about America's maritime future may contend that the relatively favorable showing of our tonnage during recent months has been due to the Shipping Board running its' vessels at a loss and that were its non-paying cargo carriers to be retired from operation, ships under the Stars and Stripes would not figure nearly so largely in our foreign trade. Against this must be offset the fact, however, that three-quarters of our overseas shipments transported in American bottoms are carried in privately owned vessels which would certainly fall heir to a considerable percentage of the trade now handled by Shipping Board freighters were these to be retired from service.—The Nautical Gazette, 11 November, 1922.
"Majestic" Dry Docking At Boston Navy Yard.—The mammoth White Star liner Majestic, which is 956 feet long and weighs 64,000 tons, is to be dry docked this week in the Boston Navy Yard dock number three. This is the largest graving dock in existence and has an over-all length of 1,204 feet. It is the only one capable of accommodating the giant vessel.
The floating dry dock at Hamburg, on which the Majestic was placed last April before leaving for her trials in the North Sea, has not been considered by the White Star Line because the River Elbe from Cuxhaven to Hamburg is too shallow for the huge liner to navigate safely, while the Gladstone dry dock at Liverpool has silted through the shifting sands and can now only be used as a wet dock.—The Nautical Gazette, 18 November, 1922.
ENGINEERING
Progress in Liquid Fuels.—So vast is the problem of liquid fuels that close upon one hundred communications, some of them of a particularly important character, were presented at the International Congress organized by the Societe de Chimie Industrielle, and held recently in a temporary exhibition building erected on the Esplanade des Invalides, Paris. Nearly all countries interested in the question were officially represented. The Congress was presided over by Professor Paul Sabatier, Doyen of the Faculty of Sciences at Toulouse, whose catalytic process for the dissociation of molecules in liquids has' opened up an apparently inexhaustible field for the production of light oils for motor fuels. The Congress was divided into six sections, devoted to petroleum, schist oils, lignite and peat, tars and benzol, alcohol, and vegetable oils. One of its objects was to fix upon a standard nomenclature for petroleum products and definite systems of analyses, whereby it would be possible for importers and consumers to know exactly what they were selling and using. In view of previous failures to arrive at an international standard, it was soon made clear that the difficulties at present were practically insuperable, and it was decided that the only solution was for each country to appoint a commission to draw up an exact list of the names of petroleum products, and the French commission, which is working in collaboration with a committee already existing at the Ministry of Commerce, will prepare a table in which each product will be classified under its foreign names.
The present situation of liquid fuels was admirably summarized by Professor Daniel Berthelot, who, as President of the Comite Scientifique du Carburant National, has taken an active part in the recent researches for fuels capable of replacing or of being used in conjunction with petrol. The question is not a new one, for it dates back to 1897, when the Ribot Commission published a particularly exhaustive report upon the utilization of alcohol as a fuel. The seriousness of the situation, however, only became manifest during the war, and it has been aggravated since then by the enormously increasing consumption of petroleum oils for marine engines and of petrol for motor cars and aeroplanes, to the extent that at the present rate of increase the whole of the existing supplies of petroleum will be exhausted within sixty years, while long before that time the quantities available will be so far limited that it will be impossible to rely upon them. For the moment there can be no question of diminishing the quantities of petroleum necessary for marine engines and of petrol for aviation; but it is possible to economize petrol for motors and for other uses by mixing it with other hydrocarbons, and eventually there is every prospect of petrol being superseded by synthetic spirit produced from vegetable oils by means of the catalytic process. The mixing of petrol with other hydrocarbons is regarded as a transition stage, until such time as science and industry are able to utilize the solar energy which is being stored daily in vegetable products, and will therefore provide abundant and inexhaustible supplies of fuel.
The hydrogenation process of Bergius has opened up a wide field of equipment and research in the way of producing light oils direct from petroleum by-products and other fuels of low commercial value. Gas oil, heavy oils, tars and asphalt can be transformed by this direct process into motor fuels, and good results have been obtained experimentally with solid fuels of smaller calorific value like peat. The process depends upon the reaction of hydrogen under a pressure of too to 200 atmospheres, and at a temperature of 400 degrees Cent. The operation is continuous and the losses compared with those due to cracking are small, while it appears to be applicable to almost every kind of hydrocarbon product. In Belgium the treatment of bituminous schists by hydrogenation has given excellent results. A considerable amount of experimental work is being carried out with the hydrogenation system, which seems likely to permit of the utilization of vast quantities of products that are at present regarded as of little value, and will consequently add appreciably to the supplies of light oils. Hydrogenation appears to follow the line of development opened up by the discovery of the catalytic process, which itself offers considerable promise in the economical treatment of petroleum, since the molecules are dissociated at atmospheric pressure, so that a much simpler installation than is required by cracking at high pressures can be employed. So far, experiments with catalyzers have been restricted to vegetable oils, but there are obviously great possibilities in the future in the way of obtaining a higher proportion of spirit from the distillation of petroleum oils.
The interest of the Congress, however, was centered not so much in improved methods of distilling light oils from petroleum—which can only palliate the difficulty of diminishing supplies without remedying it—as in providing new sources of liquid fuel. The production of benzol, the hydrogenation of tars and the distillation of lignites and peat are making a notable contribution to the supplies. It was hoped that the enormous reserves of peat would have helped to provide some solution of the fuel problem, but while certain claims are being made in favor of peat, it does not appear as if much is likely to be done, except, perhaps, by its utilization as a fuel for electrical generating plants in the centers of peat production. One such plant is giving satisfactory results in Belgium, and a company in France undertakes to lay down plants for the supply of electrical energy to towns and villages near peat deposits, it being claimed that the cost can be covered by the sale of by-products. It must, nevertheless, be recognized that the exploitation of peat has generally given poor results, on account mainly of the difficulty of drying it. The best method at present discovered is to stack it on shelves with a circulation of air, but as the rapidity of drying depends upon the atmosphere, and considerable areas have to be devoted to the stacking the economy of the operation is an essentially variable factor. It is argued also that peat should be washed to free it from sand, which only complicates the problem. On account of its low calorific value, it does not pay to carry peat over long distances, and, for the moment, it does not appear as if much can be done except by the employment of the fuel on the spot for electrical generating plants. Nevertheless, trials carried out at Arras with a Crossley suction gas plant specially adapted for the burning of peat have emphasized the fact that there are great possibilities in the way of economical running on this fuel.
As the object at the moment is to reduce the petrol consumption in motor cars and for other purposes, so as not to encroach upon the supplies of petroleum and spirit for marine engines and aeroplanes, there are suggestions for making a freer use of suction gas and natural gas, the discoveries of exceptionally rich marsh gas at Vaux, in the Ain, and near Arcachon having raised the question whether the gas cannot be compressed In cylinders and distributed all over the country. Apart from the cost of distribution, which must be heavy, the experience of motor car users with gas under pressure does not encourage the belief that compressed gas will be largely employed for motor vehicles so long as liquid fuels are obtainable. Suction gas is the only practical solution at the moment. The liquefaction of coal gas under a pressure of 300 atmospheres may produce considerable quantities of motor spirit, if it be found commercially advantageous: but this is still in an experimental stage, although there appears to be no doubt that a high-grade motor fuel can be obtained. The commercial success of any process of liquefying coal gas can only be investigated in relation to the interests of other industries associated with coal by-products. Still, the method opens up a new line of research which may eventually result in the complete dissociation of the constituents of coal into various liquid and gaseous fuels at the collieries.
Benzol is at present the only by-product of coal that is capable of being used as a motor fuel, and the quantities available being relatively small, it is clear that if new sources of supply are to be opened up they can only be found in alcohol and vegetable oils. The production of industrial alcohol in France is just one-tenth of the total consumption of petrol. Therefore, the aim of the Comite Scientifique du Carburant National is to encourage the use of a fuel in which there is at least ten per cent of alcohol, preferably with the addition of other home products, such as benzol, until such time as the production of industrial alcohol shall have been so far increased that it will be possible to employ the spirit in engines specially designed to run on alcohol. Legislation in France has limited the human consumption of alcohol to that distilled from grapes and other fruits, the alcohol from beets and similar produce being reserved exclusively for industrial purposes. The object now is to cheapen industrial alcohol as much as possible, as any composite fuel must necessarily be sold at a lower price than petrol. While alcohol mixes perfectly with benzol and provides a fuel in every way as satisfactory as petrol, it does not mix with petrol unless previously dehydrated or by the addition of a dissolvent. Professor Daniel Berthelot stated that the Service of Explosives had discovered a very simple process of dehydration that raised the alcohol to 99.6 degrees and 99.7 degrees. Apparently, this is done by passing alcohol vapor through a column of lime. The method is now being employed commercially, and there is no reason why pure alcohol should not be produced in considerable quantities. Various methods are employed for mixing alcohol at 95 degrees and 96 degrees with petrol, and for the time being this mixture is being used fairly extensively; but the presence of water is objectionable, and alcohol will only become entirely satisfactory as a constituent in composite fuels when the process of almost complete dehydration has been developed sufficiently to allow of its cost being reduced. In any case, it does not appear as if even an agricultural country like France will be able to produce enough alcohol to replace rectified petroleum, and Sir Frederick Nathan, in an interesting communication on the world's resources in fuels, pointed out that in the colonies the scarcity of labor and the cost of transport may stand in the way of cheap supplies to consuming countries. Therefore, we are far from reaching a period when the purely alcohol engine will be necessary, except in centers of production, like the colonies, where alcohol should be obtained at low cost. Meanwhile, the composite fuels can be used in existing engines, and the tests and experiments being carried out aim at determining the most suitable and cheapest mixtures, in which purely national products will enter the most largely. Sir Frederick Nathan mentioned calcium carbide as a source of alcohol on condition of sufficiently cheap motive power to produce it being available. In view of the vast hydraulic installations being carried out, this phase of the question may have some importance in the future.
Now that the difficulties in the way of dehydrating alcohol are being overcome, the problem of utilizing this fuel in motors is practically solved, and its future depends upon legislative measures, and upon an organization which will bring down the cost to the consumer. Nevertheless, the home production can never be sufficient to replace entirely imported mineral oils, even when alcohol is associated with all the other home products that may be available for the making of composite fuels. Therefore, the question arises whether imported oils cannot be replaced by synthetic petrol, and the most interesting feature of the Congress was the proof offered that this is well within the domain of probabilities. Vegetable oils are possible substitutes for all mineral oil fuels. They have the advantage of being entirely combustible, but, on the other hand, the temperature in the cylinders must be very high completely to burn the acids which would otherwise decompose the lubricating oils. The mere possibility of the acids not being completely neutralized, creates a certain reluctance to employ vegetable oils. Nevertheless, in the colonies these oils would offer an immediate solution of the problem of motor traction, to which Belgian engineers especially have been giving a great deal of attention, and M.R.E. Mathot dealt fully with the progress that has been made with colonial types of engines capable of running on locally produced fuels. The calorific value of vegetable oils is more than half as much again as that of alcohol, but, according to M. Charles, it must be burned at a temperature of 200 degrees to 250 degrees Cent., with a compression of 32 kilos, per square centimeter say, 455 lb. per square inch—for palm oil and the oil of ground nuts. Some of the Belgian engine builders, however, argue that such a high compression is not at all necessary. The inflammation temperature is from 300 degrees to 350 degrees Cent. The oils are suitable for Diesel and hot-bulb engines, but these do not satisfy the requirements of colonial motor traction, which will probably be entirely met by high-speed engines of the Peugeot heavy oil type that has been running on touring cars with extraordinary results from the point of view of efficiency and economy. There was a good deal of discussion on the comparative merits of compressed air and mechanical oil injection, M. Mathot being a partisan of the mechanical system on account of the power absorbed by the air compressor and of the latter being an alleged source of trouble; but the final decision was that mechanical injectors did not give such smooth running in the engine, although they are preferable for moderate powers, especially for colonial engines. Another system of injection proposed consists in a preparatory pulverizing of the oil in the volume of air which enters the cylinder in the form of gas. This is said to permit of the engines running at higher speeds.
The use of vegetable oils as fuel is limited by the cost, which is bound to be fairly high so long as the greater part of the production is absorbed for industrial and commercial purposes. There can only be an extensive use of vegetable oils as engine fuels when the African Colonies undergo a systematic development and improved methods of cultivation ensure a much greater yield of ground nuts, for example, per acre, whereby the cost will be reduced to something like the pre-war figure. The price at which vegetable oils are sold in the consuming countries is out of all proportion to the cost of production, which is something like 15 centimes per liter. A heavy surplus yield would inevitably bring down the selling price to a level that would permit of its being employed as a fuel. Even under present conditions, it appears possible commercially to transform vegetable oils into light oils having the same constituents as petrol. Professor Mailhe, who has been carrying out exhaustive experiments with the catalytic process of Professor Sabatier, showed a number of samples of oil that he had prepared from various vegetable oils.
The process consists in the dissociation of the molecules by means of two catalyzers, one dehydrating and the other dehydrogenating, the nature of the catalyzers varying with the character of the oils. Electrolytic copper is usually a good agent. The reaction is effected under temperatures of 550 degrees to 600 degrees Cent. On passing the catalyzers, the oxygen is separated in the form of water, and a dissociation of molecules leaves the resultant liquid with all the constituents of petroleum. It is then passed over nickel at a temperature of 180 degrees Centigrade when there is a dissociation of hydrogen, producing a good quality of petrol. The petroleum constituents are obtained by a separation of the acid fats which contain everything necessary for the synthetic combination of oils, identical with all kinds of mineral oils and petrol. The glycerine is removed and sold as a by-product. By the use of suitable catalyzers, benzol, toluene and other products are obtainable, as well as gases which can be added to increase the richness of poor illuminants like water gas.
The extraordinary adaptability of the catalytic process, and the facility with which the molecules of any oils can be dissociated and re-combined to form new products, appear to open up inexhaustible supplies of petrol and other liquid fuels. The only question is whether the process can become commercially successful. Professor Mailhe gave figures based upon estimations showing that there could be no doubt as to the commercial success of the catalytic method. The future, however, depends upon the supplies and cost of vegetable oils, and when the program of colonial development has been carried out sufficiently to ensure adequate quantities of cheap vegetable oils, it will be possible for companies to produce synthetic oils of exactly the same nature as oils from all parts of the world at lower prices than the natural mineral oils. His synthetic experiments led Professor Mailhe to the conclusion that the origin of petroleum oils is due to the building up process' of molecules, both animal and vegetable, under exactly the same conditions of chemical reaction and temperature, and the varied nature of the oils is explained by the differences in the chemical reactions to which they are subjected.—The Engineer, 27 October, 1922.
Chemical Society Takes up Oil-Fuel Problems.—To insure future supplies of motor fuels and oils, a special committee of the American Chemical Society has begun the investigation of a series of problems submitted by W.F. Farragher, of Mellon Institute, at the recent meeting of the society in Pittsburgh. The most important of these problems are as follows: Thorough scientific investigation of fractionating columns: rational specifications for petroleum products based on actual research work; the degree of refinement of gasoline for motor fuel; a thorough study of lubrication from a colloid chemical viewpoint; and the chemistry of petroleum hydrocarbons. The work is being directed by the American Petroleum Institute.—Power. 31 October, 1922.
New Type of Oil Pump for Semi-Diesel Engines.—For use with a solid-injection oil engine an injector or oil pump involving new principles has been designed by J.E. Guber, of Chicago. The pump was built for a small two-stroke-cycle engine and has functioned so well that its design is of general interest.
In this injector the liquid is metered in an element which is relieved from the high duty of injection, and the injection element is a second pump, arranged so that the factors ordinarily causing inaccuracy cannot affect the quantity injected. The liquid is drawn into metering chambers B by differential pistons during the entire half revolution of the crank, thus allowing maximum time for charging, and the discharge takes place during the other half of the stroke, the liquid passing from the metering chamber into the injection chamber from which its return is prevented by means of a check valve.
This chamber is always filled with oil and the incoming charge must force the injection plunger A back into contact with its cam E. The amount of this displacement is exactly that of the charge, as the position of the plunger prior to being displaced was at the point where the injector cam left it after the preceding injection. Thus it is evident that the length of the effective injection stroke cannot be varied by wear, expansion of line or residue pressure, as it is fixed by the size of the charge introduced.
Reference to the accompanying illustration will show that the operation of the metering element is based on the differential principle. Two plungers work in connected cylinders BB. When both plungers move in the same direction at the same time, the maximum quantity of oil is pumped. When they move in opposite directions at the same time, no pumping occurs. Any other relative position of the cranks causes the pumping of a quantity between full and no duty, so that by changing the angular relation of the cranks infinite variations of quantity are obtained. This change is made by sliding the double-cut spiral gear G along the drive shaft C. As one crank is driven by a right-hand spiral gear meshing with the double-cut spiral gear and the other crank by a left-hand spiral gear, also meshing with the double-cut gear, the sliding of this double-cut gear shifts one crank forward and the other backward. Their relative positions determine the amount of oil forced into the injection chamber. The position of the sliding gear is controlled by the engine governor through a forked lever.
The actual introduction of oil into the engine cylinder is made by means of the cam E and the plunger A. After the contact between cam and plunger is broken, there is no pressure on the oil in the line. This should eliminate dribbling at the nozzle even after the smallest injection.—Power, 31 October, 1922.
Diesel Engines in Liners.—London, October 30.—Shipbuilders, almost as much as marine engineers, are keenly interested in the announcement that the Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Company of Glasgow, are to build for the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand a liner six hundred feet in length and of eighteen knots' speed, for propulsion by internal combustion engines.
Hitherto it has been accepted, almost as a matter of course, that while Diesel engines of practically all the recognized types had been proved suitable for vessels of moderate sizes and moderate speeds, the time when they would be used for the propulsion of large liners at high speeds on long voyages was still a considerable way off. In this sphere of work the geared turbine was looked upon as ruling supreme, even though the experience of a good many engineers and owners with that type of machinery has not been particularly happy within the past twelve months. The Diesel engine, it was said, could not yet be manufactured in the necessary high powers, and when high propulsive efficiency had to be obtained by a multiplicity of cylinders driving several shafts the result was much less economical and less satisfactory from the mechanical point of view than the twin-screw, geared turbine.
Now, without warning, there comes the statement that a firm associated in the past with some of the most notable departures in naval architecture and marine engineering are to build and engine a motor-propelled liner that will challenge comparison with the finest, largest, and fastest vessel on the Pacific—and that one of their own construction—and with all the best vessels on the North Atlantic, with the exception of perhaps the first half dozen. There are few of the liners afloat today that can be placed in the same class with the Fairfield-built Canadian Pacific steamer Empress of Canada. There may be some larger, and perhaps faster, but there is none in which the machinery department has been carried to a higher degree of efficiency and general perfection.
Yet this is the vessel which the same firm now propose, it is understood, to repeat for other owners, with the enormously important difference that Diesel engines are to be used instead of turbines. The liner which they are to build for the Union Steamship Company of New Zealand is to be of practically the same length as the Empress of Canada, and the same speed. As is well known, the Empress steamers are the finest vessels in the large fleet of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, and if it had been announced that that company were to have built a duplicate of their latest, largest, and fastest Empress ship for propulsion by Diesel engines, much more would have been said about it than has been said about the contract which has been placed. The announcement would have been received as indicating the beginning of a revolution in marine engineering practice, and the more optimistic among the supporter of internal combustion engines would have been predicting the approaching close of the long reign of the steam engine at sea. But that is exactly what has happened, except for the quite unimportant difference that the new vessel will have other owners.
The revolutionary character of the proposal does not end with this. There are one or two types of marine internal combustion engines which have been more thoroughly tested than others, and with which more extensive experience has been gained. If the suggestion had been put forward that one of these types should be developed still further, and used for the propulsion of large high-speed liners, there would have been, comparatively speaking, less surprise, as the departure would have seemed somewhat natural. But the new vessel is to have engines of the Sulzer type, manufactured at Fairfield under license from the Sulzer firm, of Winterthur, Switzerland. It is no reflection on the type to say that this is not so much a development as a very important departure, and one which indicates very great confidence in the Swiss motor on the part of Fairfield and the Union Steamship Company.
It may be assumed, however, that owners and builders have not taken this step lightly, or without very thorough preliminary investigation. This Fairfield Company have been pioneers in marine engineering all through their long and interesting history, and have always been, in this matter, well ahead of their times. They have been experimenting and investigating with regard to Diesel engines almost ever since these were found to be suitable for the propulsion of seagoing vessels of any size: and that they are satisfied with the Sulzer type is proved by the fact that they are not starting with small vessels and low powers, but are going at once to 20,000-ton ships with a speed of eighteen knots for service on long-distance routes.
If the Union Steamship Company's vessel proves a success on the run between New Zealand and Vancouver—as she almost certainly will—there can be no reason of an engineering character for the use of steam engines on any liner routes. There may be economic reasons, associated with the cost of fuel and the convenience of fueling stations, but that is another matter. So far as naval architecture and marine engineering are concerned, the new Fairfield contract brings the first-class motor-propelled North Atlantic liner well within sight.—Boston Evening Transcript 30 October, 1922.
Biggest Floating Dock.—It is officially announced that the contract for Southampton's huge floating dock has been secured by Sir W.G. Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, Limited. This dock which is by far the largest ever projected, will be nearly 1,000 feet in length, and will be able to accommodate even the mighty Majestic, the greatest vessel afloat, which has a length of 912 feet and a gross tonnage of 56,000. The building of the dock, which will occupy about eight or nine months, will provide much needed employment for thousands of workers on Tyneside. Upwards of 20,000 tons of steel will be required for the work. The dock will be constructed at the great Armstrong Shipyard at High Walker-on-Tyne.—Industrial Management, 19 October, 1922.
Wave Transmission of Power.—From what was said in our first article it will have been gathered that the wave transmission of power consists in brief of impressing a constant mean pressure on a column of water or other fluid and, on top of it, a rapidly varying periodic pressure giving rise to a continuous train of compressions and rare-factions in the water, the point of generation of the waves being connected to the point at which they are applied by a pipe the length of which is some multiple of half the wave length of the waves generated. In any given case the wave length in feet is expressed by V/n, where V is the velocity of sound in water, approximately 480ft. per second, and n is the speed of the generator—assumed single-acting—in revolutions per second. No great precision in the exact length of the pipe is essential, for not only is there little loss of effective pressure by making it somewhat greater or less than an exact multiple of the half wave length, but, as has been found by experience, the speed of the generator automatically adjusts itself to any moderate variation in the length of the pipe provided the pipe is' not unduly short. Further, it is by no means essential that the pipe should have a straight run from the generator to the rock drill or other appliance being driven. The waves pass practically unaffected round bends in the pipe, and in this respect wave transmission permits as much freedom in the run of the pipe as does ordinary hydraulic or compressed air transmission of power.—The Engineer, 3 November, 1922.
AERONAUTICS
Pilotless Army Plane.—Washington, November 14.—The pilotless army airplane, equipped with an automatic control device said to be more accurate and dependable than any human pilot, has been developed to a point where it has made successful flights of more than ninety miles, it was announced today by the Army Air Service.
In the long series of tests just concluded the machine used was one of the small types having a span of only twenty feet, a sixty horsepower motor, capable of carrying a useful load of 250 pounds, equipped with an automatic pilot which takes it off the ground, levels off at any predetermined height and will rise to unusual heights. Except for natural deviations of flight due to unfavorable air currents, the control machinery holds fast to its course for the limit of its gas supply, which, in the equipment of the experimental aircraft makes possible a sustained flight of two and a half hours.
According to the statement, the most successful of the pilotless planes is that operated by gyroscopes.—Baltimore Sun, 15 November, 1922.
New French Plane.—An all-metal battle plane, mounting one French seventy-five field gun, was delivered to the French Government October 15.
The plane is driven by four motors of 400 horsepower each. It weighs more than ten tons. Its speed is more than 100 miles an hour. It is a night bombardment plane, capable of carrying several tons of bombs in addition to two pilots, a mechanician and a gun crew. A field gun has been specially mounted on it. The plane can carry fifty shells if necessary. It already has passed the builder's trials, but has not yet begun the Government's trials.—Aerial Age, November, 1922.
Lighthouse for Navy Pilots.—A special light for air stations has been put into operation at the Naval Air Station at Hampton Roads, Va. This is a 6,000 candle power white light, flashing every three and one-third seconds. It has an elevation of sixty-five feet above mean high water and is visible twenty miles horizontally. The rays from this light diminish in intensity toward the zenith. This feature of construction is necessary in order that an approaching aviator will not be blinded by the upper rays when close to the light.
This aerial beacon is operated by acetylene and functions automatically. It is controlled by a "sun valve," which works on the thermostatic principle. During daylight hours the valve is expanded by absorbed light rays and the main light is extinguished. After dark the valve contracts and allows the light to start functioning. A small pilot light is kept burning continuously for the purpose of lighting the main flame.
The object of this light is as a guide to aerial observation and to aid in locating the Naval Air Station.—Aerial Age, November, 1922.
The U.S. Navy Airship Mooring Mast.—There has just been completed by the Navy at Lakehurst, N.J., the tallest airship mooring mast yet built, and the first to be constructed without any wires.
It consists of (1) foundation for tower, machinery and snatch block anchorages; (2) a triangular steel tower 165 feet high, with three platforms, passenger elevator, pipe lines for gas, fuel, oil and water, electric lighting for night operation, telephone and voice tube systems; (3) the mooring gear at the top; and (4) the mooring gear at the bottom.
In appearance it is much like a great radio tower which, more than anything else, quickly distinguishes it from its foreign ancestors, standing on its three great legs at the vertices of an equilateral triangle.
At the base of the tower is a building for housing four officers and twenty men, forming the landing crew; an office elevator entrance, one main and two auxiliary winches for the lines used in bringing the ship to the mast, together with the pumps for water, fuel and oil.
The elevator runs in an interior rectangular framework to a platform 136 feet above the ground. From this a ladder extends 12 feet upward to the main operating platform; at 160 feet altitude is the third platform and the gimbal of the upper mooring device proper.
Up the tower leads a pipe line for delivering 18,000 lb. of water in an hour. Fuel is pumped at 1,500 gal. in the same time. A 12-inch pipe with fabric tube to the ship supplies 300,000 cubic feet of hydrogen or helium gas an hour under one inch pressure.
On the extreme upper platform is the gear for receiving and securing the ship, together with the connections' for the water, gasoline, oil and gas piping which couple on to the ship's lines.
Surrounding the tower is a circle of forty-eight snatch block anchorages at equal intervals. The diameter of this circle is 1,000 feet. Each anchorage has a heavy U bolt for taking a snatch block. There are also provided additional anchorages for snatch blocks or fair lead sheaves to make it possible to lead two lines from any two of the guy line snatch blocks 120 degrees apart to the two auxiliary winches in such a direction as to feed properly.
In docking, a ship is brought into the wind and approaches the mast. At a convenient distance her main hauling line is let go through the ship's cone. This line is then coupled on by the crew to a main hauling line which runs from the main winch, up the tower, and has been dropped from the cup at the top of the mast to the ground where it meets the ship's line. The slack is then taken up by the main winch and the ship is gradually pulled toward the head of the mast by electric power.
After this hauling-in has begun, and when the bow of the ship is near the circle of snatch block anchorages, two guy lines are dropped from the cone of the ship and coupled on to corresponding lines from the auxiliary winches. These lines lead from the winches in the base of the tower to the snatch blocks which are at sixty degrees on either side of the direction of the wind, through such fair lead sheaves as may be necessary to make the lines feed properly on the winches, also operated by electricity. These latter are run until a mark on each line appears at the corresponding snatch block, when the auxiliary winches are stopped, the lines then being simply held. At this point there is just sufficient line between the snatch blocks and the ship's bow so that the ship's cone can be brought into the cup on the ram of the mooring gear at the top of the mast.
The main hauling line continues to draw the ship forward and down until the ship's cone enters the revolving cup.
Hauling is then continued at reduced speed while the spring in the ram is compressed until the ram has entered the outer tube, a distance of about 5 feet, when it latches itself in the "in" position. The main hauling winch is then stopped. With the ship attached to the revolving cup and the ram in the "in" position the hand winches on the main platform are manned and the ram brought to a vertical position by the centering lines. Rod stays are then put in place and tightened up, fixing the ram and tube in this vertical position. The centering lines are then slacked off and the ship rides to the structure of the mast alone.
The two guy lines are released from their winches and the ship's portions withdrawn into the ship. The ship then overhauls the main hauling line, withdrawing it up the mast and into the body of the ship until the coupling to the winch appears on the operating platform. Hauling is stopped and the winch line is secured so that it cannot fall down the mast when the coupling is broken. A light line is then attached to the ship's half coupling and the hauling line completely withdrawn into the ship.
The passengers, baggage, armament or freight may then pass over a gangway let down from the bow of the ship to the main platform of the tower where it rests on a portable pad to prevent chafing.
In leaving the mast, the ship is trimmed sufficiently light to rise as soon as it is released from the mast, the releasing hook is opened, the ship rises and the mast is again ready to receive.—Aviation, 13 November, 1922.
Plane Takes Off and Alights on U.S.S. "Langley."—For the first time in the history of the American navy an airplane has taken off from the deck of a ship and after flying fifty miles alighted again on the same. This momentous event happened on October 26, when the United States aircraft carrier Langley was cruising off Cape Henry, on the Virginia coast. The aircraft used for this experiment, a land-type two-seater airplane, A606, was piloted by Lieutenant Commander Godfrey deC. Chevalier, U.S.N., one of the earliest American naval aviators.
The take-off was made without the use of the launching catapult, the plane hopping off the 500 feet deck of the Langley as from an airdrome. On the return from the fifty-mile flight the plane met the Langley steaming at a speed of six knots and landed on the deck in the receiving gear. A thirty-mile wind was blowing from the northwest at the time, and the plane, landing at a speed of forty-five m.p.h., was stopped by the arresting gear developed for this purpose after a run of only 25 feet.—Aviation, 6 November, 1922.
Torpedo and Bombing Maneuvers.—On Thursday, October 12, 1922, Torpedo and Bombing Plane Squadron 2, conducted bombing practice. The weather conditions were excellent and a squadron formation of six F5L's bombed from an altitude of 8,000 feet. One salvo of twelve 230-lb. bombs was dropped and a perfect straddle was obtained, with six splashes on either side of the battleship target, the mean point of impact being about 200 feet forward of the center of the target.
Observation Plane Squadron 2 completed the same practice on October 6, 1922, this squadron bombing from 6,000 feet and obtained six direct hits out of twelve bombs dropped.
The results from both practices, indicate that with increased practice it is quite possible to bomb accurately from altitudes of 6,000 feet and above.—Aviation, 6 November, 1922.
Silencing of Aircraft.—The good results of silencing are obvious. These are set forth.
As airplanes, for example, can be heard from a great distance, long before they can be seen, listening devices which show location and distance enable the enemy to be forewarned and prepared. By muffling, machines can get nearer the enemy before being perceived and carry out their work at a lower altitude and with greater surety. At night, the advantage is probably increased.
The pilot and observer can carry on conversation without the use of signals or telephones.
By the use of a cut-out, signals can be made from one machine to another in formation flying. Signals may be made to the aerodrome.
The noise of the engine is an obstacle in radio communication.
The noise of an unmuffled engine has an undesirable effect on the pilot's system.
The noise caused by an airplane arises chiefly from two sources. These are: first, the noise of the exhaust gas leaving the engine. Second, the whirr of the propeller. Since the noise of the engine is much greater than that of the propeller, if we can deaden it, or do away with it altogether, we have done, perhaps, all that is necessary.
From a military point of view, it is necessary for the machine to fly absolutely without noise, either from the engine or from the propeller. The simplest method of reducing the noise of the propeller is to reduce its speed of rotation.
It has, however, been proved that during a glide the noise is no longer audible from the ground, even when the machine is at an altitude of but 500 to 700 meters and the propeller is turning at 500 to 700 r.p.m. There is thus no doubt that the combined use of a geared propeller and a silencer adapted to the engine provides an almost perfect solution of the problem of the silent airplane.
In Switzerland there has been developed the "Ad Astra" silencer, a note on which was published in Aerial Age of January 2, 1922. An observer reported: "There was scarcely any noise from the airplane during flight. At an altitude of 1,000 m. only, the propeller was heard. Other machines were up at the same time, and the difference between them and the one fitted with the silencer was striking. According to the date given by those checking the tests, there was neither loss of engine power, nor greater heating. It was even found that there was economy of fuel. The silencer can easily be placed in a suitable housing on the plane so that there will be no increase in head resistance."
The requirements of a muffler may be summed up as follows:
There should be no objectionable loss of power. In tests of certain mufflers by the University of Michigan a loss of less than one per cent was shown.
There should be a saving of fuel.
Better cooling of cylinder walls should be obtained.
Cleanliness of spark plugs and valves.
Exhaust gas should be thoroughly cooled as it leaves to avoid the present danger of fire.
The muffler must be capable of being easily incorporated in the design of the aircraft.
The weight of the device should not be prohibitive. For 250 horsepower it should not weigh more than 20-25 pounds.
Shape must be favorable for the reduction of head resistance.
Quick detachability is desired.
Those concerned in this work will be interested in Reports nos. 10 of 1916 and 55 of 1920, of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Washington, D. C, which reports cover the only work officially done in mufflers in this country, so far as is known. In these experiments a seventy-five per cent reduction in exhaust noise was found certain of easy acquirement.—Aerial Age, November, 1922.
2,000-Mile Non-Stop Flight.—Lieutenants John A. Macready and Oakley G. Kelly, Air Service, beat all previous performances in nonstop flight on October 3-4, when they piloted the Army-Fokker monoplane T2 from Rockwell Field, San Diego, Cal., to Schoen Field, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., an airline distance of 2,060 miles which they covered in 27 hr. 56 min.
The flight was undertaken with a view of making a non-stop flight from the Pacific to the Atlantic—the terminus chosen being Mitchel Field, L.I. A leaking radiator unfortunately prevented the two pilots from carrying out their project, adding greatly to their difficulties, caused by violent storms which were encountered over the Rockies.
The longest previous non-stop flight between two points was the crossing of the Atlantic made by John Alcock and Arthur W. Brown on a Vickers Vimy bomber, on June 14, 1919, the distance being 1,930 miles.—Aviation, 13 November, 1922.
Army Bombing Tests.—Washington, November 7.—Brig.-Gen. William Mitchell, assistant chief of the Army Air Service, announced today on arrival from the bombing tests' held yesterday in Hampton Roads that protection of America's coasts now depended upon the nation's air forces, backed by a good army. Air bombers, he said, had supplanted coast artillerymen as a protective military weapon, adding that the demonstration yesterday totally eclipsed anything ever before attempted by aviators from a standpoint of accuracy in bombing and potential defense strength of aircraft.
"Five Martin bombers, loaded with full equipment, including four 300-pound dummy bombs' to the ship, bombed two targets under towage from a height of between 3,200 feet to 3,700 feet," General Mitchell said, "and every bomb dropped was effective, possibly with one exception. The accuracy of this fire is without parallel, especially since the targets were only twenty feet by twenty feet in size, and the aviators themselves had been under instruction only for a short time."
General Mitchell declared it was possible now to protect the Atlantic coast from Chesapeake Bay to Boston with "a couple of pursuit groups of aircraft."—Baltimore Sun, 8 November, 1922.
ORDNANCE
Air Target Practice by Army.—Big guns at Fort Story will open up tomorrow on moving targets fifteen miles at sea, in the joint army and air service maneuvers which have been in progress in Hampton Roads for a week. Airplanes will observe the fire from the big guns.
The guns in service at the Fort Story practice will be the railroad howitzers, among the largest of this kind which have ever been in practice in this territory.
The Fortress Monroe air batteries were scheduled to fire today at targets trailed in the air from airplanes, the most dangerous target practice undertaken by the service. Rain interfered, however. It will be carried on tomorrow if the weather clears.
In the firing at trailing targets airplanes will drag them at a distance of about half a mile a certain type of kite balloon. The targets can be released after being hit and the effect of the fire ascertained.—Baltimore Sun, 8 November, 1922.
RADIO AND NAVIGATION
Large Vacuum Tube.—The General Electric Company has Just announced the production of a 1,000 kilowatt or 1,000,000-watt vacuum tube. Such an output is the equivalent of approximately 1,300 horsepower. For several years research work on vacuum tubes has been done in both the Western Electric Company laboratories and in the General Electric Company laboratories at Schenectady. Last year the General Electric Company startled the world with the announcement of the production of a twenty-kilowatt tube. Then came the announcement from the Western Electric Company's engineers that they had developed a tube capable of handling 1,000 kilowatts of electric energy. Now comes the announcement from the General Electric Company of the realization of a 1,000-kilowatt "supertube," from which we can glean the fact that it is now not so much a problem of manufacturing the tube as it is devising a means of furnishing the necessary power to operate it.
The General Electric Company's latest accomplishment is not the same type of vacuum as the one popularly known in use with radio sets. It is not a three-element tube consisting of a plate, grid and filament, but a tube in which there is only a plate and filament on the inside. In detail, the plate is not sealed in a glass tube, as is done in the smaller sizes of vacuum tubes in present use, but this plate actually makes up the tube. It is cylindrical in form, thirty inches long and one and three-quarters at a rather high frequency of ten thousand cycles a second, and under these conditions the exciting current is one thousand eight hundred amperes. The actual power input of the filament is twenty kilowatts. In other words, twenty per cent of the output is the amount of energy thrown away in the filament. This energy is required solely for the purpose of producing electrons. The current heats the tungsten filament and boils out these little carriers.
This new tube promises to bear out the prediction of Mr. A.W. Hull, In that it will ultimately enable the power engineer to control vast amounts of power with comparatively little effort. In the near future, power transmission will very probably be accomplished by the use of direct currents instead of alternating currents. Large vacuum tubes will be used to change the alternating current of a generating station to direct current, after transformers have raised the generated voltage to a high value, let us say, for example, to two hundred fifty thousand volts. This energy will be transmitted over long lines with comparatively little loss compared to that which would occur on the same line were it used to transmit alternating current. At the distant end, this voltage will be impressed on other large vacuum tubes so connected as to transform the high voltage direct current to an oscillating or alternating current. This alternating current will then be run through transformers, where its voltage will be reduced to that ordinarily used for city transmission for lighting and local power purposes.—Boston Transcript, 14 November, 1922.
Summary of Activities of Radio Compass Stations.—There has been instituted a standard report form covering the activities of all radio compass stations, which indicates the amount of service rendered by the stations and other important points.
It is interesting to note the service rendered by the stations in the fifth naval district during the month of January.
Cape Hatteras handled 1,403 bearings. There was an average of 1,038 bearings furnished by each station in the fifth naval district. This is the largest number of bearings ever furnished by any district organization since the inception of the radio compass service.
It is also interesting to note that a total of 11,650 bearings was furnished in an average time of 3.6 minutes.
The February report shows a slight decrease in the amount of service rendered, which is probably due to better weather conditions.—Engineering Bulletin, No. 3, 1 August, 1922.
New Electric Submerged Log.—The disadvantages of mechanical and hydraulic logs have been eliminated in the electric submerged log invented by Captain B. Chernikeeff, formerly hydrographer of the Russian Navy. This log registers accurately at all speeds, sets up no detrimental or variable friction, and can be readily drawn inboard for inspection. It consists of an electro-mechanical device fitted to the hull of a ship at a pre-determined depth and at a point where wave and propeller disturbances do not occur. Detrimental friction being eliminated, the log is supersensitive.
There is no packing about the rotator shaft, and the remaining resistance to the rotation of the shaft is constant and practically infinitesimal at all speeds. A single ball-thrust bearing, submerged in oil, is employed, and brush friction at the electrical contacts is cut down to a negligible quantity by the use of a worm gear reduction in the ratio of 225 to 1.
In connection with the log a recording apparatus and table of speeds are provided which can be installed in any part of the ship. A buzzer is also used for determining the speed of the vessel. This buzzer gives an audible signal every twentieth of a mile traversed, and with the aid of a stopwatch the actual speed can be ascertained. The energy consumption of the complete installation is quite low, a six-volt battery being used which is sufficient for a 50,000 mile run. The battery is of the dry cell type and requires no attention.
The accuracy of this log has been brought down to a fraction of a foot per mile regardless of the speed of the ship. This has been accomplished even when the speed was as low as three miles per hour. Navigators have been accustomed to charge all errors of the log to currents, and have endeavored to check the log by the revolutions of the propeller, but rough weather will upset all these calculations, and this is the time when it is most important that the log be accurate. With the electric submerged log no correction for errors is necessary no matter what the speed of the ship may be. Other advantages of this log are as follows: the distance actually traveled by the vessel in maneuvering as well as when traveling on a straight course is recorded; when the vessel is at anchor the speed of tidal or other currents is accurately measured; the log operates satisfactorily when the ship is going astern; the apparatus can be installed without placing the vessel into dry-dock.
The Chernikeeflf device is being put on the market by the Electric Submerged Log Company of 33-35 Eastcheap, London.—The Nautical Gazette, 11 November 1922.
Navigation by Gyro-compasses—The Admiralty, in directing attention to the growing importance of the gyro-compass in the navigation of the modern ship, emphasizes the necessity of a thorough working knowledge by those responsible for the efficiency of gyro installations. It has been ascertained that a certain number of senior navigating officers have not yet been through a course of gyro-compasses. Every officer who has qualified in navigation for first class ships and has not been through a course should take an early opportunity of applying for one, and officers who have already received gyro instruction should apply for refresher courses at intervals of every three years in order to keep abreast with the latest developments. Courses consist of ten working days, and officers serving afloat should arrange the date of their applications to fit in with the period of refit of their ships.—Army, Navy, and Air Force Gazette, 21 October, 1922.
The Marimeter.—The marimeter is undoubtedly an instrument of tremendous possibilities. A button is' pressed, a small hammer strikes a plate in the bottom of the ship and at that instant, by means of the sound waves, the machine records the precise time from the origin of the sound to the return of the echo, starting and stopping automatically. The dial, guaged to fathoms, shows the depth under the keel almost instantly. Of course the speed of sound in water is known, a mean value of 4,800 feet per second being used.
With the marimeter four soundings may be taken per minute. This too, from a station in the chart room, or wheel house. An anxious navigator, bending over his chart at night, may press the button on his sounding apparatus, and know the depth as soon as the sound waves have time to descend and bump back again in the form of an echo.
The speed of the vessel from which soundings are taken introduces no appreciable error because its speed, in all cases, is small in comparison with the speed of sound in sea water.
The writer can imagine no safer ship than one fitted with radio, with competent wide awake operators, a radio direction finder, a gyro-compass, and a "Metal Mike" steerer. Then, to top off, a beautiful brass marimeter in the chartroom. Clear view screens on the bridge, spinning away the salt drift before the eyes of the officer on watch. Below, of course, there would be a submarine signal apparatus. Add all of these things together and balance them against the value of the lives on a modern liner, not to mention the ship and cargo, and then wonder why all ships are not being equipped with these things as fast as they come out.
One other thing, which would cost nothing, and might save a lot of money both in construction and in upkeep—have the bridge designed by a sailor and not a naval architect.—The Nautical Gazette, 18 November, 1922.
MISCELLANEOUS
France and the Naval Treaty.—The Washington Conference demonstrated that Americans at large are prone to consider France's requirements respecting sea power as of comparatively minor importance. No justification from any broad viewpoint can be found for such opinion.
France is the greatest political entity on the continent of Europe. Among the colonial empires of the world the French is second in relative size and population. The perpetuation of our civilization depends upon the survival of no nation more than upon France. Both her economic life and her political life have such a fundamental basis in sea power that an acceptance of the Washington treaties, which relegate France to a third rate naval power, would seriously impair the probability of her survival as a great nation.
It is true that France is burdened with the obvious vital necessity of maintaining herself as a great military power. Her armies today are the greatest stabilizing influence that exists against chaos all over Europe. Moreover, her old problem of the land defense of France itself against numerically stronger hostile armies gives every promise of frequent recurrence in the future. But these land conditions of military necessity do not lessen the importance of sea power to France. Quite the contrary, they enhance it.
During the late war 1,000,000 soldiers were added to the French army from French colonies. The early transport of large numbers of troops from northern Africa across the Mediterranean to France was an important element in the initial grand strategy of the main armies in 1914. Notwithstanding the great naval preponderance of the joint Anglo-French naval forces in the Mediterranean, a raid by the German battle cruiser Goeben seriously interfered with and delayed the troop movements from Africa and hampered the Allies correspondingly in the Marne campaign. Could the Germans have established sea control of the Mediterranean, Joffre would have been denied many thousands of troops at a time when the balance of victory could be decided by a few battalions.
A broad survey of the earlier years of the World War disclosed France holding her own very precariously, even with the assistance of the British and Russian armies and of 1,000,000 French colonial troops.
It took 2,000,000 Americans landed in France to turn the tide after Russia dropped out of the war. What, then, of future prospects? Russia must be eliminated for many decades. Hostility between England and France has grown into the outstanding feature of current European politics. Italy follows the British lead. America is far away and requires a long time to be aroused to warlike action. Except for those million or more colonial troops which must come from overseas France has no reasonable hope of reinforcements against the day when German hordes may return. In such circumstances France will surely collapse unless the French Navy can assure the passage of the colonial troops across salt water. Sea power means this to France, and more also.
France's Great Colonies
French colonial possessions are of a magnitude exceeded only by British. Their total area is nearly twenty per cent greater than that of the United States proper, while they are populated by about 50,000,000 persons. They furnish splendid opportunity for France to regain slowly some of the thirty per cent of her capital wealth lost in the late war. The building up of a large trade with her colonies under present conditions is a vital economic necessity, which cannot be met with sufficient certainty except under the protection of an adequate navy.
Considering France's fundamental need for adequate sea power to safeguard both her economic life and land power it is hardly surprising that the French resented bitterly the low place accorded by the Washington Conference to their navy relative to other great powers, especially Britain.
The capital ship ratio between Britain and France of 5 to 1.75 prescribed by the Washington treaty will prevent France from utilizing colonial troops should the present strong and increasing tendency of quantities of munitions required in modern war that France must import from overseas.
Why France Needs Sea Power
A hostile England means the death-knell of France, unless the latter can exert some substantial maritime restraint upon the former. Even in the event of England's being her only opponent, France would be at a tremendous disadvantage in the absence of substantial sea power, since she would have to bear a smothering economic blockade and would face the certain loss of her immense colonial empire.
The principal reason advanced for holding France to such a low ratio in capital ship tonnage was that the status quo basis for limitation was the most equitable, and the only one upon which the general agreement could be reached. In the main, these reasons are logical, but there is another side of the question which in French eyes warrants special consideration being given her.
The naval status quo in 1922 was markedly abnormal in France's case. Until the advent of Germany as a great naval power the inherent need for some substantial balance to British sea preponderance had made it necessary for France to maintain a fleet approaching the British in strength. This had been the normal condition for several hundred years. The sudden elimination of the German fleet recreated the old underlying conditions before the French Navy could be built up to normalcy. The basis of limitation for sea power should take into account not only the existing but also the normal status quo if the greater danger incident to unbalanced power in Europe is to be avoided.
Loss May be Permanent
With still less justice, the fact that France cannot now afford extensive building of capital ships has been given as a reason for assigning her a low ratio, which bids fair to become permanent. In any future conference the principle of the status quo almost certainly will be the basis for limitation. Hence the relative strengths fixed by the Washington Conference, if accepted now, will have a strong tendency to become permanent. Under these circumstances France may never be able to recover her appropriate position on the sea, even if improved finances or other opportunities, such as a sudden radical change in the conventional characteristics of the capital ship, should present itself. France is poor now, she may he rich ten years hence. One of the most important requisites for the recovery of her wealth is sea power. How illogical to cite her present poverty as a reason for denying her the opportunity to recoup her fortunes!
But the French have an even greater objection to the Washington treaties than the low capital ship ratio assigned France. The so-called Root code respecting the employment of submarines would draw the fangs even of such very limited naval power as remains to France. Moreover, French distaste for this code is heightened by the fact of its adoption having been apparently accomplished largely through what they believe to be a diplomatic trick.
The code intends to deny to submarines the rights universally conceded to other types of naval vessels in conducting war against commerce. Even though the submarine should scrupulously adhere to every requirement of international law and custom, still she would be forbidden to molest enemy commerce. This under the assumption that it is practically impossible to use submarines against commerce without ruthlessness as practiced by the Germans. Such an assumption entirely ignores the numerous cases in the late war of the capture of merchant vessels by German and Allied submarines in a manner strictly in accord with methods employed by surface vessels and sanctioned for many centuries. It ignores the inevitable development now in progress to submarines of large type which will have even less difficulty in adhering to methods recognized as entirely legitimate. To deny France the right to use submarines in a regular way against British commerce is to remove wholly any substantial restraint in Europe against the abuse of sea power by the British for the next ten years at least.
The use of French submarines against British commerce would amount to little else than a restraining influence upon Britain. The experience gained by the British Navy during the late war, combined with the great strides that have been and are being made in anti-submarine devices and methods, would prevent a French submarine campaign from starving the population or industries of Great Britain. Such campaign would not operate to free France from an economic blockade. British cruisers would continue to starve France much more effectively than Britain could be starved. Under these conditions the justice of denying France her only means of defense against British aggression at sea is difficult to admit. France could hardly be blamed for refusing to give up the right thus to defend herself.
In addition to the inherent justice which seems to support the French view, their disinclination to accept the new submarine code is influenced by what they consider the objectionable British tactics at the conference. Through a considerable period of the conference discussions the British repeatedly implied that the French subscribed to the principle of ruthless submarining. The French delegation was led into frequent emphatic denial of such implication. Finally the British misquoted a published article by an officer of the French naval staff, ascribing to the writer sentiments quoted by him as being German. Apparently the French delegates failed to detect the discrepancy until after the delay incident to mailing the article all the way from Paris, and thereafter British parliamentary tactics prevented the French from announcing the error until too late to derive any psychological benefit therefrom.
Meantime the negotiations' in framing the submarine code had progressed too far for the French to withdraw their acquiescence. Throughout this incident the French were subjected to a propaganda in the American press so hostile as to cause an official protest from their delegation, which knew that the whole matter of giving information to the American press during the conference had been placed in the hands of the British publicity agent. All of this remains in the French mind as an influence against adoption of the Washington treaties.
Other important aspects of these treaties operate to the disadvantage of France as compared with England. The proposed abolition of gas warfare would largely nullify the advantage conferred on France by the advent of air power. Paris is almost twice as far from the English coast as London is from French coastal territory. The threat of a gas attack from the air upon London and other great English centers of population might bring Britain to terms in spite of preponderant naval power.
Other Disadvantages Cited
The proposal to refrain from further fortification and development of Pacific naval bases will prevent a proper defense by France of her extensive possessions in that region. The British have a system of admirably placed and well equipped naval bases which insure a safe and speedy passage of their fleet from Europe to Singapore and Australia, thus greatly reducing the handicap of limited base facilities in the Pacific itself.
France has nothing comparable to this. The existing grip of British upon Chinese commerce and resources will be perpetuated from the fact of the Nine-Power Treaty not being retroactive. Hence France will not enjoy opportunity with Britain in the rich Chinese markets if this treaty is ratified.
Finally, an acceptance of the Washington treaties will prevent France from finding a balance in Europe to British naval preponderance, even by the time-honored custom of alliances. Italy is the only other European power possessing any considerable navy, and she also is limited to a 1.75 ratio. France and Italy combined could muster a ratio of only 3.5 compared with Britain's 5. European naval power is thus hopelessly unbalanced, a condition never paralleled except at short intervals for many centuries.
It is only human that France, whose greatness is so dependent upon sea power, should want to keep the right to match England in capital ships, should future events render it desirable: and that France should hesitate about abolishing submarine and gas warfare, which will constitute her only possible restraint against British naval aggression until she can afford to compete in capital ships. These are the principal influences at work toward an adverse decision by France respecting the "Great Experiment" embodied in the Washington treaties.—Captain Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N. Retired, in The Army and Navy Journal, 11 November. 1922.
Is the Washington Agreement in Danger?—Is the non-ratification of the Naval Limitation Treaty by one or more of the five signatory Powers a contingency sufficiently probable to justify an examination of the consequences which might ensue therefrom? A survey of French comment on the treaty and of recent statements by prominent French naval officers suggests an affirmative answer. The fruits of the Washington Conference in respect to naval disarmament have never aroused enthusiasm in France. It is felt that her just claims were brutally disregarded, that, in the words of Admiral Favereau, "the Conference marked a triumph of selfish interest on the part of the three dominant naval Powers," and above all that those responsible for drawing up the Limitation Treaty completely failed, either from ignorance or set purpose, to show France that consideration to which she was entitled by virtue of her traditional rank as a maritime state and her far-reaching requirements of sea defense.
It is asserted that the French naval delegates were unanimously against the leading clauses of the treaty and only withdrew their opposition in deference to the wishes of their diplomatic chiefs. Since then the treaty has been scrutinized with painful care by every Frenchman who is concerned for the maritime future of his country, and without exception they reject it as incompatible with her minimum needs in the naval sphere. Nor is the treaty any more popular with French statesmen, who find in it a formal renunciation of more than one fundamental principle of national policy. Both in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate there is said to be a strong movement against ratification, though when the actual decision has to be made these bodies are expected to take their cue from the Government, and there is no reason to suppose that M. Poincare and his colleagues are blind to the gravity of the issue which would be raised were the treaty to be repudiated by them.
It is evident from inquiries made in competent American circles that failure to ratify the document by any one of the parties involved would render it a dead letter so far as the United States was concerned. One American authority whom I recently consulted was explicit on this point. "If the treaty is turned down either by France or Italy, it will at once go into the waste-paper basket," he said. "An instrument of this kind must be binding on all or none. For two or three Powers to restrict themselves to a certain standard of relative naval strength while one or two other Powers remained at liberty to expand their fleets as much as they desired would be contrary to reason. If, therefore, the treaty is not ratified all round, you may take it that the whole of our original program will be revived and carried into execution."
This means that the United States would resume work on the seven battleships and the six battle cruisers which were to have been cancelled under the treaty. In that event Japan, of course, would resuscitate her own program, which comprised fourteen capital ships. She would complete the Kaga and Tosa, on which no work has been done since they were launched nearly a year ago; she would abandon the scheme of converting the Aviagi and Akagi into aircraft-carriers and proceed to build them to the original design as 43,000-ton battle cruisers, besides relaying the keels of the Afago and Takao, of similar type, on which all work was suspended last December; and she would make preparations for laying down in due season the other four battleships and four battle cruisers which had been authorized by the 1920 program. Moreover, these enormous reinforcements to the American and Japanese battle fleets would involve a proportionate increase in the auxiliary establishments of both, so that many additional cruisers, torpedo craft etc., would have to be legislated for.
To estimate the effect of this renewed shipbuilding on British policy we need only hark back to the position as it stood before the Washington Conference was convened. At that time we were committed to the building of four 47,000-ton battle cruisers, which were obviously but the first installment of the huge program that would eventually have had to be undertaken in order to maintain the one-Power standard. If the Limitation Treaty went by the board these four ships would have to be restored immediately, and arrangements made for building at least ten additional vessels of the largest type in the course of the next five years, together with many more cruisers, destroyers, and other ancillary craft. We should also have to restore the personnel to the figure at which it stood before the "axe" got to work, set aside millions for the construction of docks to accommodate our new leviathans, and generally resign ourselves to years of naval expenditure on a lavish scale. All of this would be absolutely unavoidable if the limitation agreement broke down and we were still resolved to maintain bare equality with the United States Navy.
It is therefore devoutly to be hoped that French dissatisfaction with the treaty will not be carried to the length of repudiating it. The French point of view, which has been explained to me on high authority, is by no means unreasonable. "It is not that we object to the restriction of battleship construction for a short term of years," said my informant, "since France in any case is not yet able to afford new capital ships. Our protest is against the cool assumption expressed in the treaty that France must forever remain a third-rate naval Power, that she is entitled to no greater measure of sea power than Italy, and that her maritime interests are so much inferior to those of Japan—conclusions which are flatly at variance with present-day facts and the teachings of history. With our long but divided coastline fronting two seas, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, in both of which the freedom of our communications in war time would be for us a question of life and death; with our great colonial Empire and our far from insignificant merchant marine, a powerful navy is more of a necessity to us than to Italy.
"The fundamental error committed by the authors of the treaty lay in taking the world's fleets of 1921 as the standard of relative strength to be observed in the future. The position in 1921 was, in fact, quite artificial. The French Navy had been unable to make good any of its war losses because the dockyards were too busily engaged in fabricating military material. Thus for seven years the navy had been in a state of arrested development, every war casualty representing an irreplaceable loss, whilst in the same period America and Japan, and Britain to a lesser degree, had been steadily adding to their naval resources. Consequently the post-war year of 1921 found our fleet abnormally weak, and now we are invited to keep it in that feeble condition for an indefinite term of years, whilst other fleets, which were inferior to ours before the war, are to be guaranteed a perpetual ascendancy. For France the only acceptable ratio of sea power would be a ratio based on the relative standing of the world's navies in 1914, and it is in that sense that we are anxious to secure a revision of the treaty which was hastily concluded at Washington. France yields to none in her desire for peace and disarmament, but she is not prepared to conclude offhandedly an arrangement which is so demonstrably unfair and so prejudicial to her future."
It remains, however, for Frenchmen to ask themselves whether their country would really benefit in the end if the naval limitation scheme were shipwrecked. Since in the building competition that would inevitably follow the French Navy must be left further behind than ever, it would eventually occupy a position much lower than the treaty assigns to it, and France herself, by her action in starting afresh the old and ruinous rivalry in naval armaments, would not enlarge her circle of friends abroad.—Hector C. Bywater in the Naval and Military Record, 18 October, 1922.
Torpedo Craft Strength.—A distinguished American journalist said recently, in summing up the results of the Washington Conference, that in subscribing to the Naval Treaty, Great Britain surrendered actual dominance of sea power, and the United States surrendered potential dominance. There is one aspect of naval strength, however, which was not touched by the Treaty, and in which it would seem Great Britain has surrendered her actual dominance to America, without a corresponding action on the part of the latter, and that is in regard to torpedo craft. The British proposal for the total abolition of submarines, as is well known, did not find favor with the Powers at the Conference. Had it gone through, there is no doubt that a considerable reduction would have been possible in the strength of surface torpedo craft, for it was the menace of the U boats which obliged such a considerable expansion of these flotillas during the war. The relative strength of the leading Powers in destroyers and similar vessels, therefore, becomes of more consequence, and the figures on this subject contained in the recent official Return of Fleets deserve attention.
Dealing first with destroyers, it will be found that numerically America is fifty per cent stronger than this country, having 315 vessels, as compared with 200 flotilla leaders and destroyers in our own Service. If the age and tonnage of the boats be compared, it will be found that this preponderance in numbers very fairly reflects the increased power of the American flotillas. All but thirty-three of their boats have been launched since 1914, and all but twenty-one are of 1,000 tons displacement or over and carry four 4-in. guns. It is true that a note in the Return states that all destroyers before the Wickes, launched in 1918, may be considered as obsolete in estimating fleet strength; this would eliminate fifty-two vessels, but since thirty-one of this number are of the tonnage and armament mentioned, they can scarcely be called obsolete, and are certainly as good as, or better than, the majority of vessels in other fleets. Except in the Australian Flotilla, there are no British destroyers on the effective list launched or completed before 1916, but such a drastic reduction has not yet been effected, according to the Return, in the American Service. Japan has fifty-eight destroyers; France, fifty-three; and Italy, fifty-eight; so that these Powers are about equal, but in each case there is a high proportion of pre-war boats, so that, judged by English or American standards, their flotillas are not so efficient as the numbers would suggest.
As to submarines, it is well known that the lead in these craft is also held by America. In December last, at Washington, Lord Lee gave the following estimates of submarine tonnage of the Powers: United States, 83,540; Great Britain, 80,500; Japan, 32,000; France, 28,360; and Italy, 18,250. The new Return supplements these figures by the following numbers of boats: United States, 102; Great Britain, ninety-three; Japan, twenty-four; France, fifty; and Italy, forty-three. In the building list there are thirty-eight for America, eight for Britain, thirty-one for Japan, twelve (projected) for France, and four for Italy. The American flotilla is, moreover, composed almost entirely of modern boats; only seventeen were launched before 1915, in which year the oldest of the British boats were put afloat. The largest submarines under construction of which details are given are the three Fleet boats of the P type for the United States, which have a displacement of 2,114 tons on the surface and 2,520 submerged, and carry one 5-in. gun, one 3-in. anti-aircraft gun, and six 21-in. torpedo tubes. A great change has, therefore, come over the situation as regards relative submarine strength, for ten years ago Great Britain was superior to all other Powers, with France as her nearest rival, and her flotilla was more than twice as strong numerically as that of America. It is, of course, unwise to dogmatize merely upon the figures of the recent Return, since many changes are sure to be made in the next few j-ears in weeding out vessels suitable for coast defense only or otherwise not fitted to play their part in modern fleet operations. But enough has been said to show that the submarine, which we sought to abolish, has, if anything, taken on a new lease of life.—By "a Sea Officer" in Army, Navy, and Air Force Gazette, 4 November, 1922.
An Oil Blockade Would Cripple France in a Week.—(By crowding France out of the Black Sea Oil Fields (Treaty of San Remo), did England alienate French interest and co-operation in the Near East?)—Modern economic life rests upon fuel. Today power and influence go hand in hand with control of oil. Henceforth the nation without oil will have no navy, no army, no credit, and will find itself classed with the minor countries like Portugal. Without oil there can be no such thing as real national independence.
The French public does not realize that the German offensive on the western front was temporarily eased up in 1915 so that Germany might carry a stronger offensive into Galicia and Rumania in the search for oil; before all else the peace of Bucharest and the peace of Brest-Litowsk were The Peace of Oil.
The French public does not realize that the moment the eastern front was broken Germany had to lay down her arms for lack of oil for her many aircraft and army trucks.
It does not realize that at the most critical moment of the war, March, 1918, the shortage of oil on the part of the Allies almost resulted in the Germans breaking through the western front; and the greatest service rendered the allied cause by the United States, even greater than the United States Army, was their making available to that cause the 100,000 tons of tankers which were drawn from the Pacific.
The French public does not realize that for this inestimable service England has shown the United States ingratitude, and that this ingratitude has been in large measure responsible for America's policy of withdrawing from European affairs; that it has prompted the dissolution of inter-allied committees in which had been accomplished an economic and financial solidarity; that the curve of American sympathy for France follows closely the curve of French purchases of oil in America.
The French public does not realize that the treaty of Sevres was conceived with an eye solely to giving England control of oil fields in Turkey, pushing America to one side, while tricking France out of rights that should have been hers as succeeding to German rights.
The French public does not realize that by the strange and mysterious agreement of San Remo, August 24, 1920, the French Government practically signed away our political independence, not only in abandoning to England the fields in Mesopotamia, but also all of our oil interests in the colonies and abroad.
It does not realize that England's disdain of the German peril, so disconcerting to us, is based on this very mastery of the oil situation which she has acquired. You cannot carry on a war without oil; and without England's permission you cannot replenish with oil. Thus in England's eyes there is no more fear of Germany.
The French public does not know that France has become a scene of conflict between the two great Anglo-Saxon oil trusts and that from this fact in particular we are letting ourselves be driven to making a choice as between America and England, with a good chance of losing the friendship of both.
The world moves and the oil kings lead. They both instigate and suppress revolutions in Asia, Mexico, and Central America, to suit their own interests. Speakers appeal to ideals and excite passions. They are but tools of the oil magnates. In their dealings with Governments these latter meet power with power. They know how to control public opinion. During the war the flag of Henry Deterding, president of the Royal Dutch, was held in great respect by both sides until the Napoleon of oil definitely placed himself on the side of the English alliance.
We should look upon this cosmopolitan personage, almost denationalized as he is, as the head of a sort of super State of oil, as the personified control of an immense international force which has finally entered into combination with British imperialism.
From the point of view of oil, France was non-existent in 1914. France did not foresee the future of oil. She had made no real provision for oil. Under the protection of a tax law of 1871 France's oil needs were supplied by a league of ten importing companies, who were neither producers nor carriers and were hardly even refiners. Our oil fleet included fourteen small ships, of which but three were under the French flag.
These ten companies held a veritable monopoly of oil in France. They divided the territory among themselves and refrained from competition among themselves. Since the time when this league gained exclusive control of the French market, in 1893, it has been all but impossible for a competing company to get a foothold. Capital in the league is not more than 100 millions, while the profits on this investment amount to fifty millions annually. Thus oil costs more in France than in any other country in the world. Under a regime offering such large profits, and so perfectly assured, the beneficiaries of the system have no inducement to independent efforts or enterprise. Since 1904 the league of the ten companies holding the oil monopoly in France has been no more than a branch of the Standard Oil. No doubt some oil fields exist in France and in the colonies, but legislation as old as 1810 has settled all effort at prospecting. The rule of idleness, lack of interest, depression, absorption in internal quarrels, results in easy acceptance of things as they are.
Both America and England have faith in oil. They have but one thought—to push forward the time when oil will be the universal motor fuel.
By herself the United States consumes as much oil as does the rest of the world. At the rate they are going they will exhaust their own resources within a generation.
It is but natural that the two countries, strive with all energy, speed, and capital to gain the premier place in oil. Imperialism passes from theory to fact.
Nothing can relieve the bitterness of the struggle between the two Anglo-Saxon competitors.
The form that the struggle will take is determined in advance by the differences in characteristics of the two peoples. And these differences have been shown up during the Great War.
Americans do not possess to the same degree as do the English the faculty of sticking to a line of action.
They lack a class of trained public servants brought up in a school of tradition. They are not so quick to discover the point of convergence between a matter of national interest and one of imperialistic power. From this difference their cause suffers.
In both countries there are powerful personages who come to the front without official authority or position and whom their Governments can disavow as necessary. Trusts are formed, group themselves about bankers and industrials, and combine in one big trust. This trust becomes the ally and associate of the public power (the Government). But it is never to be confused with it. The trust and the Government lend one another mutual help, but each reserves to itself sufficient autonomy, according to a formula which habit and ideas make it difficult for Frenchmen to understand.
Thus at the opening of hostilities the struggle was less between the United States and Great Britain than it was between the Standard Oil, under Mr. Bedford, and the Royal Dutch, which has a Bonaparte in Mr. Henry Deterding and a Talleyrand in Mr. Gulbenkian.
A few words are necessary as to these two trusts.
The alliance between Great Britain and the Royal Dutch Shell, including Mr. Deterding of the latter, was not an accomplished fact until 1918. Even though Mr. Deterding was favorable to the Allies and had foreseen their triumph, this Napoleon of oil did not fail to take all precautions. This is borne out when recording that alongside the Royal Dutch Shell and its associates in England we find two other oil trusts:
(A) The Anglo-Persian, which, directed by English and managed by trained specialists closely associated with the Admiralty, has taken for its special mission since 1909 the acquisition of the Persian fields. As we said in the previous article, "In 1922 the Anglo-Persian will be able to supply eighty per cent of the needs of England." Reaching beyond its original mission, it has established depots in all the large ports of Europe, including Spain and Hungary, and particularly in France. The imposing flotilla of monitors which England keeps on the Danube is for the protection of the Anglo-Persian.
(B) The British-controlled field, which, established under a Canadian law, takes for its special mission the evasion of the Monroe doctrine and completes the work of the Dutch Shell in Venezuela and around Panama, encircling two-thirds of the Caribbean Sea and operating with success in Ecuador and even in Brazil.
The coming of the war precipitated events.
The United States and the Standard Oil generously provided eighty per cent of the needs of the Allies during the war.
And England finds herself incontestably in the lead in 1922. Ten years ago she had no oil within her own domain. Today she holds half of the world's oil. In Mexico, where the immense resources would seem naturally to belong to the American system, England has, thanks to Pearson, now Lord Cowdray, thanks to a policy of handling the Mexicans, beaten out the Americans notwithstanding the small English capital invested. By similar audacity she is installed on American soil.
She has built a fleet of 252 tankers of 1,300,000 tons' capacity, compared with America's fleet of 191 tankers of 1,000,000 tons' capacity.
From this battle of giants England comes out the empire of oil. But the fight is not finished. The Standard Oil does not accept defeat. It has gained a foothold in France and more recently in northern Persia.
Whatever is to be the outcome, whatever the consequences at present impossible to predict, we cannot refrain from expressing admiration for a policy where Great Britain shows herself to be once more an imperial race. The vigorous initiative of men like Lord Fisher, Lord Curzon, Sir Marcus Samuel, Sir John Cadman, Lord Strathconan, etc., has made up somewhat for the weakness of the British democracy. Perhaps the most striking feature of the fight for oil is this revelation of an extra constitutional imperialism which governments by political parties had all but neglected. The man of affairs, the business man, is having his day. These uncrowned kings will not make a bad figure in history.
Why should France be denied the pride of possessing a similar class of men? Why has our League of Ten (oil companies) never had even the shadow of a thought of imperialism for France? It does not suffice to say that selfishness is the reason. Selfishness, self-interest, are human, not French alone; they are to be found among American, English, and Dutch business men. But while our compatriots are busy building up enormous private fortunes, men of affairs in other countries, especially in England, utilize the power of those fortunes in the interests of their Governments. Why? It is not that Frenchmen have less capacity for affairs, nor that our institutions are to blame any more than are those of other democracies. We come to the conclusion, then, that our failure is due to an idea of weakness transmitted to all classes of Frenchmen by those who should be our leaders. The kernel of that idea is that France should efface herself in the interest of universal democracy. And while this Utopian thought is current, weakening the nation, those who accumulate large fortunes are concerned less with the nation's affairs.
Before the war France used annually 400,000 tons of oil furnished by the Standard through the League of Ten. Today she needs 1,000,000 tons. It costs us 2,000,000,000 francs per year for this precious oil for our aviation and for our ever-increasing number of automobiles and trucks for civil and military purposes.
So absorbed were our leaders in pacifist ideas and in false principles of nationalities that they had no room in their heads for even a thought as to a national policy as to oil.
We gave up everything, abandoning all to England. Our weakness and our generosity passes understanding.
By the agreements of 1916, Mossoul was in our sphere of influence in Arabia. But we gave up to England our territorial rights. And when we later made claim to fifty per cent of the oil there turned up at once a phantom of a "Company of Straw Men," created in 1914 and known as the Turkish Petroleum, whose rights it seemed easy to prove as antedating ours. It may even be said that by the inexplicable convention of San Reno we were evicted from our own colonies. English prospectors are operating in Algeria and are installed in Madagascar.
If we accept the theory that political freedom depends upon freedom of oil supplies, we may then look upon the San Reno agreement as a sort of treaty of Methuen. By this latter treaty Lord Methuen in 1703 made Portugal a practical dependency of England since that date.
Being dependent upon the will of others in future as to oil supply, all the armies, aircraft, automobiles, tanks, trucks in the world will be to no purpose. A simple oil blockade, set up with the least noise or ostentation, would cripple us in a week. Our national resources are limited to 60,000 tons in Alsace.
It is astonishing that the debate in the Chamber should have lasted through endless sessions on the subject of the new military law and without a thought being expressed as to the bearing of oil on the matter of national defense. No one of the debaters presented the not untenable hypothesis: Suppose Germany and France, or any two countries, confronting one another within the enclosure of an oil blockade sustained by the Anglo-Saxons. The belligerents would be at once thrown back to methods of 1885. They have had to give thought to this in Germany; but we have not given it a thought. We organize our defense as though we had at hand oil for all time. Where would we be if, lacking oil ourselves, Germany were to find a substitute, as she is' no doubt bending every effort to do?
It remains for France to make a study of the possibility of developing a fuel from agricultural products that shall loose her from this bondage to the Anglo-Saxon oil trusts. We have a promising substitute already in use in the country, which is known as national fuel.
Up to the present it has been little more than an item for campaign speeches. Much has been said of the use made by Paris omnibus companies of a mixture of French industrial alcohol with benzol in 50-50 proportions; and the result has been modest.
At present industrial alcohol is under a State monopoly, and has been since a decree of August 13, 1919. This Control buys of 167 distilleries, of which 144 are from beet root. The sale price is fixed by the Minister of Finances.
A differential price accomplishes the profit of the system. The Control sells at a loss, alcohol for heat and light and for carburization. But it sells at great profit for exportation and what is used for perfumery, for druggists, vinegar industry Under present conditions the business should continue to realize important profits. However, with warehouses filled with alcohol in stock, the Control is not putting it to best advantage in seeking markets or in seeking to develop the more general use of it. This French monopoly, even when it seeks to disguise itself as an industrial concern and to assume the airs of a trust, such as they are known among Anglo-Saxons; is doomed to failure in advance. What it needs is vigorous development as a producer of national fuel. If it can be rescued from the realm of politics we may find freedom from the domination of foreign trusts.
Against the general use of alcohol as a fuel in place of petroleum there are great objections which must be taken into consideration.
The heat units of alcohol are considerably less than of gasoline (4,600 calories of alcohol as against 7,500 of gasoline), a difference which is reflected in the price.
Alcohol used alone requires the motor a high compression and retarded admission. Thus it is not interchangeable with gasoline and cannot be used in motors of ordinary type excepting by the admixture of benzol, ether, etc. Further, alcohol must be denaturized.
This difficulty would seem to be discouraging if we did not consider the agricultural advantages to be derived from the distillation of alcohol and the by-products of that distillation.
The secret of the agricultural success in Germany arises from her 10,000 small distilleries, all returning valuable by-products to the soil, enriching it to a point where its productiveness has been increased threefold during the last thirty years, and even enabling a military resistance much longer sustained than would otherwise have been believed.
No more is necessary to show that the national fuel is at a point where patriotic interest (freedom from oil trusts) is coincident with rural interests (fields enriched), and social interests (lower cost of living.)
Notwithstanding the inferiority of alcohol as compared with gasoline, then, there remains a large margin in favor of the former, so large that we should no longer hesitate. At the moment France produces 800,000 rectoliters of industrial alcohol. Let this be increased by ten times, which is not at all impossible, and we shall be largely freed from the evil consequences of San Remo.
It would be Utopian to hope for the total substitution for gasoline. There is some point to be determined by circumstances where the importation of oil and the production of alcohol would balance.
The question of a national fuel thus links closely with a national policy as to oil, to be closely followed, else France, after her supreme effort in the Great War, will fall into the estate of a second-rate nation.—Condensed translation of article by Count de Fels in La Revue de Paris.
The Ship Subsidy and Its Need.—Some time ago the Shipping Board appointed a commission to study the history of ship subsidy in this and other countries and to make a report, on the basis of which a bill could be prepared to provide for practical aid for American shipping. Early this year the bill was before Congress with the endorsement of the Shipping Board and the Administration, and was referred to a joint committee of the Senate and House. From that time not much has been heard about the fate of the bill until the President called the special session of Congress and made known his intention of having the act come up in this Congress.
At the hearings before the joint committee, it developed that there were many who indorsed the bill with various reservations and proposed amendments, but there was little organized opposition. Those who favor the proposed legislation are solidly behind the bill and present convincing arguments on every phase. Opponents argue just as convincingly on each and every angle and come out strongly against any Government aid or supervision of our merchant shipping.
Ship Men Favor Plan
Steamship owners, ship builders and others interested in maritime matters favor a subsidy and indorse this bill with some few amendments, which, it is expected, will be offered for consideration. These amendments, it is said, do not affect the purpose of the act, but tend to define and limit some of the powers given the Shipping Board.
The act is intended to "aid the development and maintenance of the American Merchant Marine, to promote the growth of the foreign commerce of the United States and to contribute to the national defense." In order to accomplish this result the bill proposes both direct and indirect aids to shipping.
The direct aid consist of payments to ships on a speed and mileage basis. The Shipping Board is authorized to pay to the owner of every sail or steam vessel of 1,500 gross tons or over, documented under the laws of the United States and operated in the foreign trade, an amount calculated on the basic rate for each vessel of one-half cent ($.005) for each gross ton of such vessel, for each 100 nautical miles traveled by such vessel.
From this rate of one-half cent, a sliding rate up to two and six-tenths cents per gross ton is provided according to the speed of the vessel. It is estimated that the direct payments would amount to about $35,000,000 each year on a well-balanced fleet of about 7,000,000 tons—in other words an average yearly payment of $5 for each gross ton of shipping under the American flag operating in the foreign trade.
Naval Reserve Proposed
Other methods of direct aid are the establishment of a naval reserve to be paid from the merchant marine fund and the payment of about $5,000,000 by the Post office Department for the carrying of mails. The whole fund, approximately $40,000,000 is to be raised by the allotment of ten per cent of the customs duties, by the appropriation of all light and port dues, which are to be doubled in order to make a yearly return of $4,000,000 and by the payment of the $5,000,000 by the Post office Department mentioned above.
The naval reserve is to consist of officers and men of the merchant fleet; is to be controlled by the navy and paid by the Shipping Board through the navy. The Post office Department is to be allowed to ship mail on any ship accepting subsidy, the payment for which service is to be covered by the $5,000,000 yearly payment to the fund.
Many indirect aids are also planned. Among these are tax exemptions estimated between eight and ten million dollars a year. Shippers who patronize American ships are to be allowed a deduction from their income tax of five per cent of the amount of freight money they have paid for the transportation of goods on American ships during the year. Ship owners are to be allowed to charge off an exception rate of yearly depreciation.
The Government is to remit all income taxes ordinarily payable by individuals or companies owning American ships engaged in foreign trade if a sum equal to the amount of the tax exemption is placed in a reserve fund to be used for the payment of half the building costs of new ships.
To Create Construction Fund
The Shipping Board is authorized to establish a construction loan fund of $125,000,000, from which money is to be loaned to ship owners for the purpose of building new ships. The interest rates chargeable are to be not less than two per cent. This fund may be loaned to citizens of the United States for the construction of vessels in American ship yards to be used in foreign trade and documented under the laws of the United States.
Loans can also be made for reconditioning of vessels now built. No loan is to exceed two-thirds of the cost of the vessel to be built, or two-thirds of the value of the vessel which is re-equipped. The Shipping Board is to acquire a first lien on the entire interest in the vessel to which the loan is made.
The sale of the Shipping Board fleet is another provision of the act. The Board is directed to sell, as soon as possible, all merchant vessels now owned by the Government. The sales may be public or private, and the purchaser is allowed liberal terms of payment. The purchaser is given fifteen years to complete payment, and the interest charges are not to be less than two per cent. All funds accruing from the sale of vessels is to be applied to the Merchant Marine Fund.
Immigrants to be Carried
Other indirect aids include the provision requiring fifty per cent of all aliens admissible under the immigration laws to be carried in American vessels. The method of carrying out his section of the act is also provided through the Consular Service. American Consuls' in ports of departure are to specify, when application is made by the prospective immigrant, whether the applicant is to travel on a foreign or an American vessel. Provisions are also made for the inspection of all immigrants at the ports of embarkation who are to travel on American vessels.
Under the proposed legislation American ships will carry all officials and other employees of the United States and all goods or supplies owned by or intended for the United States Government. The army and navy transport services are to be discontinued and the vessels transferred to the Shipping Board. Private operators are to get all army and navy business, if the act is passed.
This then is a brief sketch of the Subsidy bill as it is presented for passage. The outstanding features are the direct cash payments, the naval reserve, the mail contracts, the income tax deductions allowed to shippers and ship owners, the construction loan fund of $125,000,000, the immigration provisions and the discontinuance of the army and the navy transport services.
Direct Payments Estimated
The direct cash payments are estimated as amounting to about $40,000,000 yearly, and the income tax exemptions allowed shippers to about $10,000,000. This total of $50,000,000 is the estimated yearly expenditure, but does not include the loss in income tax caused by the deductions allowed ship owners who set aside the whole amount of income tax on a ship's earnings toward new vessels, the loss in interest on $125,000,000 which will probably be loaned at two per cent and the loss in income tax occasioned by allowing ship-owners to charge off a greater yearly depreciation on their vessels. It is impossible to estimate this cost to the Government.
Proponents of the bill believe this huge expenditure will be justified by the establishment of an efficient American Merchant Marine capable of carrying at least one-half our foreign commerce. Those who oppose the measure are of the opinion that the subsidy will not aid in building up the merchant marine of the country and contend that American ships can operate with more efficient management and with more modern and up-to-date vessels as cheaply as can those of any other country.
Crews' wages, feeding costs and other operating costs are more nearly on a par with those of foreign countries than ever before, it is claimed, and there are a few private owners doing business now who operate as closely as any foreign company in existence. It will be interesting to compare the arguments for and against the subsidy in an effort to present the facts.
One of the principal reasons advanced in its favor by backers of the Ship Subsidy bill is the much-talked-of differential in operating costs between American and foreign-owned vessels. It has been stated that it costs twenty-five per cent more to operate American vessels, chiefly due to higher wages, greater feeding costs, more expensive repair charges, carrying charges, etc. It seems difficult to tie down actual figures of vessels operating under private ownership for the purposes of comparison.
Opponents of subsidy legislation claim that one reason foreign-owned ships can operate more cheaply than American is rather on account of inefficient or inexperienced management and handling than on account of higher wages and other operating costs.
This is probably less true today than it was a year ago. It has been shown recently that American ships can operate even at the present low freight rates and do more than break even, not allowing, however, for interest on capital investment or depreciation.
Figures of Tramp Ship Cited
The figures on an 8,000-ton American ship, classified as a tramp ship, show that crew wages for a three-month voyage amount to less than seventeen per cent of the total operating costs of the voyage. This vessel carried a cargo from a United States port to a European port and picked up another cargo for the return voyage to the United States. The figures are averaged on the entire number of days in port and at sea. The total cost of operation was $430 a day, and was divided as follows:
? | P.C. |
Wage | 16.3 |
Deck, engine and steward’s supplies | 7.2 |
Provisions | 5.6 |
Bunkers | 20.3 |
Repairs and renewals | 1.4 |
Insurance | 14.2 |
Port charges, including stevedore costs | 28.8 |
Office overhead | 6.2 |
Total ($430) | 100 |
?
The vessel for this voyage cleared a slight margin of profit over the above figures. There is no account taken of carrying charges other than overhead, but the Shipping Board operating costs do not carry such items as insurance and overhead as' a rule. The ship was handled as closely as is possible, it is believed, and it would be impractical to cut further any of the above figures. Fifty per cent of the cost of running a ship is disbursed for insurance, overhead and loading and discharging cargo. The amount spent on the ship itself, such as wages, constitute the other fifty per cent.
Vessel Privately Operated
It is not considered possible that foreign ships operate any more cheaply than the one mentioned above, but it must be remembered that this vessel was privately owned and operated, and had nothing to do with any sort of Government control. Foreign ships must buy provisions in whatever port they make, as do American ships; crew wages are not very much lower except possibly in German vessels; bunker coal was purchased at market prices, in various ports, as were supplies and provisions.
The cost of feeding a man a day was less than fifty cents, not an extremely low figure when it is considered that the Shipping Board has set a maximum for their vessels of sixty-five cents. If it were possible to get the operating costs of a British or Swedish vessel of the same type, it is quite certain that they would not be much less than those quoted above. There is no doubt that this operation can be continued for the time being at least, as it is now being done by every steamship company operating its own ships. To do this, however, it has been necessary to cut out waste in all departments, employ well-trained men on the ship, place more confidence in the masters of the vessels and also more authority and to make big cuts in office forces ashore.
Steamship companies are now using their masters in foreign ports as their agents, more so than ever before, and the net result has been to cut down large agency charges abroad. It is probably quite true that there is less grafting being done by American masters today than by those of any other nationality. Repair work that formerly went to the shop is being done by ship's crews. Every leak in the disbursement of a vessel must be carefully checked today, in order to keep operating costs at rock bottom, but it can and is being done.
Seeks Private Ownership
The Shipping Board has made the statement that private ownership is the only hope of the American merchant marine. With this in view, the subsidy bill has provisions for the sale of the fleet of Government vessels and for removing the Shipping Board or other Government control of shipping. It has been pointed out, however, that the act as it now stands tends to increase the powers of the Shipping Board and will keep the Government in the shipping business indefinitely.
It is claimed that it will not increase trade, nor will it make the Government ships a more attractive proposition to the shipping man. Our foreign trade is one-sided, exports greatly exceeding imports, probably due somewhat to high protective tariff policies, and this prevents to a great extent the procuring of return cargoes by American ships from foreign ports.
Regardless of the subsidy, our merchant fleet to be a success must have sufficient trade to keep vessels loaded on all legs of their voyages. This building up of a permanent foreign trade can only be done, opponents of the subsidy believe, by long and patient work in an effort to give better services on American ships than on foreign vessels. It is further stated that Government control of shipping will hinder rather than tend toward hastening this end.
Owner Must Make Pact
A ship-owner accepting subsidy must agree, under contract with the Shipping Board, to do certain things. To begin with, his ship must engage in foreign trade. His vessel must be built in the United States, regardless of costs. He must also make all repairs in an American yard, excepting those repairs which are necessary in foreign ports to allow the vessel to continue a voyage. Three-quarters of the tonnage owned by an American owner must be registered under the American flag or none of his vessels will receive any Government aid.
If he makes over ten per cent profit on his vessel he must return one-half of what is earned over the ten per cent to the Government. His subsidy payments may be increased or decreased by the Shipping Board, according to their estimate of what his vessels are doing. If he takes advantage of the remittance in income tax allowed him, he must put it in a fund to be used toward building a new ship—the ship to be built as approved by the Shipping Board. He is allowed to borrow money from the board at a very low rate of interest, for the purpose of building ships, but the board is to hold mortgage on the entire interest in the vessel and to control the type to be built.
Those who do not believe in Government aid contend that the powers assigned to the board give to it virtual control over all vessels whose owners accept the subsidy. They claim that the legislation is regulatory and restricts business enterprise. Ship building costs will not decrease as long as American ships must be built here, and the owner must therefore carry a much higher capital charge than his foreign competitor. He cannot take advantage of lower prices in foreign markets, nor can he send his vessel to a cheap port for major repairs. It is pointed out that British ships today are repairing in Hamburg, Germany, taking the cheapest offer for the work, regardless of the fact that British shipyards are partly closed down arid need business.
Feeder Lines Prevented
The fact that three quarters of his tonnage must be registered in the United States prevents the ship-owner from operating cheap feeder lines between foreign ports and under foreign flags, to aid in securing cargo for his ocean trading vessels. This method of procuring cargoes is considered one of the greatest aids to foreign trade.
Furthermore, there is nothing to provide for the disposal of the Shipping Board fleet. Some of the vessels may be purchased, but, in the opinion of the opposition, the bulk of the fleet will never be sold to private owners. That some of the vessels are already out of date or too expensive or unsuitable for operation in any sort of competition is well known. It is considered by many that it is cheaper to build a more modern ship than to recondition one of the expensive types of Shipping Board ships, at the prices paid, and they point to the fact that our shipyards now have a few new ships on the ways.
Lastly, the Shipping Board is going to stay in operation, with probably more departments than at present, subsidy opponents believe. Checking trade routes, voyage accounts, establishing the required amount to be paid each ship on each trade route, establishment and care of the merchant marine fund, the establishment of the $125,000,000 ship construction loan fund and the arrangement of the loans to ship-owners who wish to build ships and the control of the building and type of the ships will all require supervision.
Even more so will the income tax provisions and excess profit returns need expert attention, and once established and empowered to virtually control the country's shipping, it is believed that the Shipping Board would be a very difficult department to dispose of. All opponents of subsidy legislation are solidly behind the movement to take the Government out of the shipping business, but they are convinced that this proposed bill will not gain the desired end.—H.H. Burns in the Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 and 21 November, 1922.