A PERSONNEL SURVEY
By Commander J.S. McCain, U.S. Navy
Herewith is attempted an analysis of the future working of the Personnel Law of 1916, as applied to the line of the navy. Under that law the authorized strength of the line consists of 5,499 officers with numbers in ranks as indicated:
Rear Admirals 55
Captains 220
Commanders 385
Lieutenant Commanders 770
Lieutenants 1,787
Lieutenants (jg), and Ensigns 2,282
The distribution of June 3, 1922, fixed the following numbers in grades:
Rear Admirals 44
Captains 176
Commanders 308, exclusive of extra numbers.
A board was convened which selected not only for the vacancies created by the Naval Academy class of 1922 as per distribution above, but also for estimated vacancies in selection grades due to known retirements and probable casualties which may occur up to July 1, 1923, excepting, however, the Naval Academy class of 1923. This will be taken as the policy of the future. That is, selection boards will be convened in June of each year, and will select for vacancies created by the Naval Academy class graduating that same June, and for vacancies which may ensue during the succeeding fiscal year.
The figures given in the tables below are based throughout, first, on what is known, after that on what past performances suggest may be future probability.
Rear Admiral Vacancy Sheet—Basis 5,499 Officers, Fifty-five Rear Admirals
Vacancies occurring in fiscal year | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
Naval Academy classes of ’23, ’24, ’25, ’26, ‘27 | 125 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Vacancies due to increase of the navy | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Due to retirements for age at sixty-four years | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 5 |
Casualties, retirements other than for age, deaths, etc | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 |
Total estimated vacancies to be selected for by June Board of preceding year | 4 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
Captains Age in Grade Retirement Sheet—Basis 5,499 Officers
? | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
From Sheet 1, total estimated R.A. vacancies occurring in fiscal year prior to date shown at head of column | 4 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
Total number of Captains who will retire at age of fifty-six in fiscal year prior to date at head of column if not selected | 4 | 7 | 11 | 16 | 8 | 10 | 20 | 12 | 24 | 29 | 16 |
Minimum age in grade retirements of Captains, in fiscal year as indicated, assuming all selections to be made from those who would otherwise be retired | ? | ? | 4 | 10 | ? | 5 | 15 | 3 | 18 | 21 | 9 |
Captains Vacancy Sheet—Basis 5,499 Officers, 220 Captains
Vacancies occurring in fiscal year | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
Naval Academy classes of ’23, ’24, ’25, ’26, ‘27 | 125 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Vacancies due to increase of the navy | 5 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Vacancies due to minimum retirements age in grade sheet 2 | ? | ? | 4 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 15 | 3 | 18 | 21 | ? |
Vacancies due to casualties, retirements other than age in grade, deaths, etc | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 |
Vacancies vice Captains promoted | 4 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
Total estimated vacancies to be selected for by June Board of preceding year | 14 | 23 | 26 | 32 | 25 | 15 | 26 | 19 | 30 | 36 | 22 |
Commanders Age in Grade Retirement Sheet
? | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
From sheet 3—total estimated vacancies in Captains list occurring in fiscal year prior to date at head of column | 14 | 23 | 26 | 32 | 25 | 15 | 26 | 19 | 30 | 36 | 22 |
Retirements of Commanders if not selected at age of fifty occurring in fiscal year prior to date at head of column | 1 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 31 | 42 | 59 | 69 |
Minimum retirements for age in grade assuming all selections to be made from those who would otherwise retire | None |
Commanders Vacancy Sheet—Basis 5,499 Officers, 385 Commanders Allowed
Vacancies occurring in fiscal year | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
Naval Academy classes of ’23, ’24, ’25, ’26, ‘27 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Vacancies due to increase of the navy | 9 | 18 | 17 | 18 | 15 | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? |
Casualties, resignations other than age in grade, deaths, etc | 6 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 7 |
Vacancies due to minimum retirements for age in grade | None | ||||||||||
Vacancies vice Commanders promoted | 14 | 23 | 26 | 32 | 25 | 15 | 26 | 19 | 30 | 36 | 22 |
Total estimated vacancies in Commanders list to be selected for by June Board of preceding year | 29 | 48 | 50 | 56 | 47 | 21 | 33 | 27 | 37 | 44 | 29 |
Lieutenant Commanders Age in Grade Retirement Sheet
? | Prior to July 1, ‘24 | Prior to July 1, ‘25 | Prior to July 1, ‘26 | Prior to July 1, ‘27 | Prior to July 1, ‘28 | Prior to July 1, ‘29 | Prior to July 1, ‘30 | Prior to July 1, ‘31 | Prior to July 1, ‘32 | Prior to July 1, ‘33 | Prior to July 1, ‘34 |
From sheet 5, total estimated vacancies in commanders list occurring in fiscal year prior to date at head of column | 29 | 48 | 50 | 56 | 47 | 21 | 33 | 27 | 37 | 44 | 29 |
Retirements of Lieutenant Commanders if not selected at age of forty-five occurring in fiscal year prior to date at head of column | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 20 | 70 | 77 | 86 | 87 | 62 | 47 |
Minimum age in grade retirements of Lieutenant Commanders assuming all selections to be made from those who would otherwise retire | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | 5 | 18 | 18 |
Under increase of the navy it was considered that the class of 1923 would perhaps graduate 375 men. There is reason to believe that there will be a large number of separations from the service the coming year, so increase of the line from that class is placed at only 125.
Increase of the line for each of the classes of 1924, 1925, 1926 and 1927 is estimated at 250 men. Note that the class of 1927 will fill the navy to its allowed total of 5,499 officers.
The figures given for casualties, retirements other than age, deaths, etc., are not far from the twenty-year average on a percentage basis. They are conservative for the period covered because officers of long service, after a war, are apt to hold that their great professional opportunity has come and gone and therefore are not so strongly averse to separation from active service.
No account is taken of casualties to those officers who appear in the age in grade retirement column. The difference will be made up for by the widely scattered position of these officers on the lineal list, with the possibility that more will be passed over, and hence immediately retired than are shown in the minimum age in grade retirement column. Also there are officers older than the average of their lineal position yet to be selected, who will swell the column age retirement for the last four years. It is believed that altogether the only weak point in the estimate is the guess at the Naval Academy graduates, and the resultant increase to the line.
Some day, however, without change in law, the Naval Academy will fill up the line of the navy. Deferment of such filling up beyond 1927 will unfavorably affect some of the older Captains but will help some of the younger and will not harm the Commanders or Lieutenant Commanders.
Age humps appear, identified by the larger numbers of retirements for age. Such retirements cause vacancies in the grade with promotions from the grade next below, tending to bequeath the hump just eliminated by retirement of the oldest officers of a rank to the junior officers of the rank. This would probably be the case if the navy were now filled up and the Law operating normally, a condition not to be reached for several years yet, so that the varying ages of the officers in the rank next below who will be selected to fill the vacancies caused by retirements, will cause a gradual flattening out of age humps, eventually all being eliminated.
The operation of the Law with full-up navy, and when the average age of the several grades has risen to normal, is estimated to be as follows:
Rear Admiral vacancies each year average 9.
Captains promoted each year average 9.
Captains retired each year average 26.
Captains vacancies each year average 41.
Commanders retired each year average 32.
Commanders promoted each year average 41.
Commanders vacancies each year average 81.
Lieutenant Commanders promoted each year average 81.
Lieutenant Commanders retired each year average 89.
Lieutenant Commanders vacancies each year average 185.
"Retired" refers to age in grade retirements.
The vacancies in the Lieutenant Commanders grade are carried along into the junior grades with increases for casualties in such grades.
The average age of attaining Lieutenant Commander will be forty and one-half years. The average age of attaining rank of Lieutenant will be thirty-two years. The yearly graduating class from the Naval Academy necessary to maintain the line at full strength is 270.
The following outstanding facts appear from a survey of the tables:
- Age in grade retirement of Captains because of lack of vacancies cannot be delayed longer than the fiscal year ending July, 1926. Complicated as age in grade is by lineal seniority the attention of the Selection Board will be most forcibly drawn to the problem a year or two earlier.
- In the eleven-year period covered there will be only seventy-two vacancies for the 157 Captains who will retire if not selected.
- Commanders have a comparatively easy thing of it. During the period covered there will be 268 vacancies for the 267 Commanders who will retire if not selected, also seniority will not be seriously injected into the situation until the fiscal year ending July 1, 1933. Their age average rises every minute, of course, and there is a good deal of marking time in the grade. By 1934, practically all Commanders will be compressed into their five-year age period, forty-five to fifty years.
- Lieutenant Commanders to all purposes are in the same box as Commanders. The very few minimum retirements for age in grade in the years ending July, 1932, 1933 and 1934 will certainly be unnecessary due to casualties within the grade itself and to the normal functioning of the Selection Board in passing over the comparatively less efficient. All Lieutenant Commanders by July 1, 1934, will be compressed into thirty-seven to forty-five years of age period, the lower limit gradually approaching forty and one-half years.
- Only those Commanders and Lieutenant Commanders whose ages are considerably above the average age of their lineal positions need fear age in grade retirement because of lack of vacancies.
The predicament of the Captains has already caused remark and some activity. That rank having a good deal to do with policy and operation of this navy, many schemes will be considered to furnish relief.
The working of a few plans are guessed at herewith.
Plan 1. Increase of percentage of Rear Admirals to two per cent, the resulting percentage decrease being taken out of Lieutenants (jg) and Ensigns.
This will result in the promotion of all Captains considered qualified until the fiscal year ending July 1, 1936. In the next year the shoe will begin to pinch again though the average retirements of Captains will be decreased to seventeen yearly. If Rear Admirals are increased to one and one-half per cent, retirements of Captains for lack of vacancies will not begin until 1930 when the average of twenty-one per year will be approached.
Increase of the number of Rear Admirals will have no effect whatever on Commanders and Lieutenant Commanders, the Captains taking up the slack, if such a term may be used.
Plan II. Deferring the retirement of Captains to the age of fifty-eight for instance.
This will compress the fifty-five Rear Admirals into a six instead of eight-year period and will result in an average of eleven Rear Admirals vacancies instead of nine each year. It will spread out the number of Captains over an eight instead of six-year period and forcible retirement through lack of vacancies will not begin until 1930, the average number being eleven. This will be more than paid for out of the Commanders grade, a somewhat larger than the corresponding number being retired for lack of Captain vacancies. (Raising the age limit for retirement is a method of approximating seniority.)
Plan III. Lowering the age of admission to the Captains rank, or what is the same thing and the way to accomplish it, lowering the age of retirement of Commanders.
This spreads out the Captains over a greater number of years and compresses Commanders into a smaller number of years causing fewer average early retirements of Captains and greater yearly retirement of Commanders. This will not help any of those Captains who appear on the minimum age in grade retirement columns, but will benefit the rank as a whole in the distant future.
The sole source of anxiety to Commanders and Lieutenant Commanders is that the lower halves of each grade must wait for ten or twelve years for promotion, but if they must mark time these are good grades in which to do it.
However, an increase in the Captains will both immediately and permanently benefit Commanders, though it will also increase the retirement of Captains; such an increase will neither help nor harm Lieutenant Commanders. The same is true of an increase of Commanders with respect to Lieutenant Commanders and Lieutenants.
Carrying the tables on down to include Lieutenant Commanders vacancies the following is guessed at as a minimum for each fiscal year of the eleven year period:
1924 | 1925 | 1926 | 1927 | 1928 | 1929 | 1930 | 1931 | 1932 | 1933 | 1934 |
62 | 90 | 91 | 98 | 86 | 28 | 41 | 34 | 50 | 67 | 53 |
These vacancies hold good for the lower grades after appropriate increases are made for casualties. Promotion for Lieutenants and Lieutenant (jg) is thus shown to be only fair until the navy is filled up when there is a decided slump. This slump continues for four years until age in grade retirement commences to get in its work on the upper grades. A steady increase each year thereafter will be experienced until a yearly average of 185 promotions of Lieutenants to Lieutenant Commanders is reached. This number is of course handed down with increases to the Lieutenants (jg).
It is exceedingly interesting to compare the number of vacancies created by the Selection law in and above the rank of Lieutenant Commander with number created by the "Plucking Board" Act. That act required the forcing of forty vacancies per annum in and above the rank of Lieutenant. By custom and practices created by the Selection Law in and above the rank of Lieutenant Commander, The number of officers of the Line during the years of the "Plucking Board" regime averaged about 1,000. The number of officers of the Line for the next eleven years will average about 5,000, and the average number of vacancies of and above the Lieutenant Commander rank will average about fifty-five. The normal for a full-up navy of 5,499 officers is 185 per year. Proportionately, creation of vacancies alone considered, the "Plucking Board" Law is much to be preferred all the way through.
Age in grade retirements for Lieutenant Commanders is a dam which backs up the entire lineal lists of the junior grades. Any change of its age position or any increase or decrease in the promotions over it or retirements because of it, are transmitted without delay to the entire list back of it. Also any different percentage of Lieutenant Commanders affects at once all grades below Lieutenant Commander, not merely the grade next below. An increase in the number of Lieutenant Commanders will favorably affect all of the junior grades, except insofar as its favorable effects may be modified by the service in grade restrictions on Ensigns and Lieutenants (jg). It will increase the average time spent in the grade, lower the average age of attaining the grade and decrease the time spent in the Lieutenants grade particularly if the increase in Lieutenant Commanders is deducted from the Lieutenants.
If the Law, insofar as it is specific, with reference to age, or length of service in the various grades is taken as a statement of desirable fact, then the proper and desirable ages for an officer to attain the rank of Commander, Captain and Rear Admiral are respectively forty-five, fifty and fifty-six and the proper and desirable lengths of time in each grade are respectively five, six and eight years. Just how the age of thirty-two for Lieutenants, and forty and one-half for Lieutenant Commanders, with eight and one-half years in the grade of Lieutenant, to but four and one-half in the grade of Lieutenant Commander, will harmonize with these desirable facts is a matter of opinion.
If it is considered desirable to positively insure a number of years of service as a Lieutenant Commander then it is necessary to extend selection a grade lower and institute age in grade retirement for Lieutenants if not promoted. Making the age three or even two years lower than forty and one-half years, the average age under present Law of attaining Lieutenant Commander, will cause a large number of retirements of Lieutenants, and will accordingly increase the number to be graduated from the Naval Academy to supply vacancies.
It may be of interest to forecast the date of promotion of several Captains and Commanders and Lieutenant Commanders.
The top of the navy list of Captains excluding extra numbers and assuming all previous selections to have been made from those who would otherwise retire will, on July 1, 1930, consist of the Captains whose numbers in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, are as follows:
- No. 126
- No. 135
- No. 138
- No. 142
- No. 144
- No. 145
- No. 147
- No. 148
- No. 154
- No. 155
- No. 156
Number of selections to be made this year nine. Number to be retired, if not selected, twelve.
The top of the Captains list under same assumption as above, will on July 1, 1932, consist of Captains whose numbers in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, are as follows:
- No. 161
- No. 165
- No. 166
- No. 171
- No. 173
- No. 174
- No. 180
- No. 184
- No. 186
In that year there will be eight promotions, with twenty-nine retirements for age in grade if not promoted.
The officer whose number is 340 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately thirty-four on the list of Commanders, provided no officers ahead of him on the list are passed over, then he should make his Captains number in the spring of 1925.
The officer whose number is 389 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately eighty-two on the list of Commanders and should make his number for Captain on July 1, 1926.
The officer whose number is 451 on the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 146 on the list of Commanders and should make his Captains number on July 1, 1929.
The officer whose number is 511 in the Navy Register of January, 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 206 on the list of Commanders and will make his number for Captain in the spring of 1932.
The officer whose number is 726 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 320 on the list of Commanders and will make this number for Captain in the fiscal year of 1935 after some competition in the selection.
The officer whose number is 835 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately eighty-one on the list of Lieutenant Commanders and will make his number for Commander on July 1, 1925.
The officer whose number is 952 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 200 on the list of Lieutenant Commanders and will make his number for Commander on July 1, 1927.
The officer whose number is 1061 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 305 on the list of Lieutenant Commanders and will make his number for Commander in the spring of 1931.
The officer whose number is 1147 in the Navy Register of January 1, 1922, will on July 1, 1923, be approximately 392 on the list of Lieutenant Commanders and will make his number for Commander in the spring of 1933, after some competition for selection.
This is not encouraging to the Junior Commanders and Lieutenant Commanders.
It may be remarked that for any given basis of officers, so long as the percentages remain unchanged, there is no change in the average opportunity for promotion nor in the average age of attaining the various grades. This does not apply until an excess or a deficiency in the total numbers of officers allowed has been consumed or made up nor until the average age of the various grades has risen to normal.
Complicating the foregoing estimates and guesses is the extremely uncertain conjecture of possible changes in the essentials of the Act of August 29, 1916. The factors for and against change are diverse within and without the service. The most important within the service hinge upon the action of selection boards in the cases of officers who face retirement for age in grade.
There are two things, and two things only, vitally affecting an officer's fortunes and misfortunes on the lineal lists which are accepted by him with calmness and equanimity. These are the date of his birth and his class standing at the Naval Academy. In whatever this accident and near accident respectively may do for or to him, he cheerfully acquiesces. A threat to his lineal position from any other source arouses his immediate and active hostility. The "Plucking Board" assaulted and weakened the principle of seniority, formerly held impregnable. That board met with fierce resistance and was finally overthrown.
The Selection Law renews in deadly fashion the attack on seniority, makes date of birth a probable source of danger, and arrays one officer's age against another's seniority.
Boards of Selection must soon, perforce, set a precedent and establish a policy. Shall this officer who is senior and well fitted for promotion, but who will not retire for a year or two, be passed over by that officer who is junior and equally well fitted for promotion, but who if not selected will be retired at once?
The question may be rendered more intricate by making the junior officer unusually able professionally.
Seniority has still great strength and behind it lies tradition. It is and has been a foundation stone of discipline, and may not be handled carelessly without injury to discipline.
Those on the eve of retirement will not be without an argument or two, and besides they will be better advertised, the catch word of the advertisement being the insistent "If we are not promoted now at once, we will be lost to active service."
Their strongest plea will be for selection at once on the ground that the younger, though lineally senior officers, will have another opportunity the following year or years. The easiest way out is to let seniority decide. The naval public is schooled to the privilege or right of seniority and to the misadventures of undue age. Still it does not require any great amount of foresight to predict some remarkably close decisions. Intense interest is also predicted.
A policy having been determined by the Boards of Selection, will the service be in agreement, and will it be so patently equitable that even those who suffer thereby will submit with good grace? For therein lies the fate of the law. It is history that personnel laws not favored by the service are sooner or later repealed. A very few embittered and determined officers have greatly modified legislation, under conditions, however, very much more favorable to such action than they are now. The present system to endure must prove that it is founded on right, its execution must be just, and lastly, it must produce an efficient navy at reasonable expense. And this time the demand for an efficient navy is going to come, not only from within the navy itself but from additional sources, perhaps with sufficient strength to override all other considerations. From the foregoing it is clear that the real test of the Selection Law has not come. But it has been operating for six years, a sufficient experience to fulfill or confound much of prophecy and criticism rife since 1916.
One generality of the scintillating kind, which, by its cleverness and seeming aptness, was given wide circulation and gained many followers, was to the effect that the element of competition could not be introduced into a co-operative institution. There seems to be more of truth in this one, "Willing co-operation is necessary to effective competition." Obstructionists are readily known, and neither before 1916 nor since, do they stand well with inferiors, equals, or superiors. They always harm themselves more than anyone else, which is simple justice, if they act with deliberate intent. They seldom or never act so; it is a matter of temperament.
There was or is another prophecy more seriously meant; that initiative and forceful independence of thought and action would be killed, and that a marked tendency toward subserviency and even boot-licking would result. Inferiors seem to be as difficult as ever. Their mannerisms of mentality and of performance of duty are not the less pronounced. They are still truly loyal in that they are persistent and skilful in endeavoring to maneuver superiors into doing things according to their ideas. Those so disposed get sulky sometimes, if not successful, just as they did in 1915. Subserviency and pride were never bedfellows, and pride is trained into all naval officers. There is the thorough execution of an unwelcome duty or of an ill-considered order, which is due to conscious pride in discipline, and is in no way akin to subserviency. Those who lick boots were born that way.
The admitted truism that it is detrimental to the service to retain therein officers who have been "passed over" becomes of less and less importance every year now. In a very few years the great majority of officers failing of selection will be retired within the same year.
Criticism of the fallibility of the Boards on Selection has so far been destructive only. Nothing is offered as a substitute which is not open to error in the same degree, except lineal promotion.
Written records are imperfect, service reputation is not always accurate; both may be so constructed that comparisons of relative efficiency are impractical. Admit these things, yet exact justice cannot be done by any human agency, and if it were done by the gods, never-the-less it would be harshly questioned by man. All of these arguments with others not yet to the surface will be brought up by those in the service who attack selection whether they speak of the officers, a minority group, or for themselves alone.
Granting that errors are made, it makes no great difference any way who, within large limits, remain on the active list of the navy; sad individually, but of no serious import to an institution composed of indoctrinated units. It is of great importance, however, that for the active list of the navy, there be healthy promotion in rank, in pay, and in successive details to duty.
If Naval Academy classes would only die off after graduation in the precise ratio of the percentages in the several grades within the proper age limits, then the problem of officer personnel would totally disappear. Naval Academy graduates are not so obliging. Some must be cleared out artificially, so that those who remain do so under conditions favorable to most efficient development. That is the situation in a nutshell. Selection is a misnomer. It is elimination that has been practiced in the navy, and it is difficult to see how any process other than elimination may be employed in the future. This with due regard to the troubles certain to center about Selection Boards.
The navy has been expanding since "99." That expansion, the "Plucking Board," public and Congressional interest in the navy aroused by our entry into the arena of nations in 1898, all served to produce and to increase efficiency. Everybody remembers the distressingly dead period between the abolition of the "Plucking Board" and the passage of the 1916 Bill. This at a time, in the shadow of impending war, when the navy, the American people, and Congress were nervous and acutely aware of the need of urgency in naval preparation. The navy felt these things first and most strongly, and though so stimulated, the stoppage of promotion in 1913 caused a distinct lowering in morale.
Now the armaments of the great powers have been limited, and while the personnel of our navy should be increased to place us on an officer parity with England and on a 5-3 ratio with Japan, it is clear that with such increase, the halting of naval personnel expansion will have come, not to be begun again until another world catastrophe.
The limit in personnel having been reached, its character and quality will become of primary consequence to the navy and more than ever before to our country.
That interest in character and quality takes widely different forms among naval officers. Some honestly think that it is necessary for the efficiency of the navy that they themselves re main in the service, even if their particular cases are marked exceptions to law or custom.
Others think that the righting of their wrongs, real or imagined, is of paramount importance to the navy, and so perhaps it would be if such wrongs were inflicted by a tyrannical and iniquitous system. It has been stated that laws may bear upon public servants with hardship, but never with injustice. No institution great or small, public or privates, is free of both injustice and hardship. The injustice is seldom studied and hardship is the common lot. As a matter of cold fact the navy would not miss any of us more than a day, and would gladly rid itself of those of us who will take our wrongs and injustices and ourselves and bury the lot outside of the service. The provocation should be extreme, the wrong basic and apparent, before any officer is justified in making a monkey wrench of himself in the navy personnel machinery.
The opinion of the service has been the controlling force eventually in personnel changes, therefore much of menace to the law of 1916 will come from within the service. Congressmen will be badgered and hectored and pulled this way and that. Under such circumstances, in matters in which public knowledge is small and interest little. Congressmen naturally take the line of least resistance. The line of least resistance in this case is lineal promotion. It is cheaper in money and is a sedative or an opiate to naval officers, most of whom quiet down to wait patiently for death or for retirement with flag rank. Fights in Congress for radical changes in the law, for a little improvement here, a slight departure there, may lead not to the purposes announced but to promotion by seniority.
On the other hand there are signs which tend to prove that the navy is no longer a subject in which "public knowledge is small and interest little." And Congress will stiffen against disruption of personnel to the extent that this is true and no further.
Those familiar with conditions know of course that the Personnel Act of 1916 was not that originally proposed by naval officers and by the Navy Department. Naval officers gave their best to it. Congress had the wisdom to accept good advice but changed in various ways the Department's ideas. The people of the United States, however, facing war with anxiety over the state of the navy, passed the bill. On the whole it is a good bill.
Right now, circumstances are most favorable for widespread and increasing concern over the navy.
With or without the pretense of isolation our country stands forth the greatest in all history. Courted, swamped with adulation, cursed and reviled, besought and bedeviled, respected, honored, and loved, despised, feared and even hated, by a restless an unhappy world, ours is the pomp and the glory and the certitude of power. That state and its maintenance are the pride and the duty of every American citizen. Even the Christians who pray for Armenia, and Prohibitionists who pray for a twelve-mile limit, know that when ministers of state have anything to say they say it with battleships, not with flowers, no matter how soft the tone, or honeyed the words.
Never before has the navy been so widely known as now. Every country and every hamlet has its quota that crossed the Atlantic under naval convoy and on naval transports. In general, knowledge of the navy is not unmixed with gratitude. Public understanding of naval matters was well exemplified in the fight over last year's appropriation bill. It is almost time to say that they who touch the navy, touch the people. Aware of keen popular scrutiny, Congressmen may not listen so complacently to malcontents within the service. Their natural bent if absolutely uninfluenced is like all other civilians, toward selection. Every one would like to see selection applied to other organizations or to the other fellow, and the more Spartan-like the severity and rectitude of its application, the better. It is only when the personal element is introduced that modifications and qualifications appear worthy of consideration. Civilians in both a social and business way live theoretically at least under selective conditions, and understand the principle thereof. Those who come in contact with the military services learn that seniority is sacred; they sometimes become impatient with its tenets, but hesitate to condemn it. Greatly impressed as they may be by the respect accorded to, and the evident importance of, seniority, still to outsiders it remains rather vague and mysterious and they fail to grasp its true inwardness.
The very term "selection" has great and favorable publicity value, and the average Congressman will be for it if other factors, including cost, neutralize each other.
He may not, however, be unalterably for selection by nine flag officers. He may for instance be for selection, present law unchanged otherwise, by the Secretary of the Navy, or by political agency.
In making his decision on the question he would probably be confronted by this set of facts:
- Dissatisfied naval officers are persistently lobbying for a setting aside of the Selection Law in their particular cases, or for a repeal of the Law as a whole, they being individual beneficiaries in the terms of repeal.
- His fellow members of Congress, the newspapers, and the man in the street are keenly attentive, and are insistent upon a highly efficient officer personnel.
- A return to lineal promotion would result in a very inefficient officer personnel and would therefore conflict with (2) above, unless the numbers in the higher grades are vastly increased, the cost of which is prohibitive.
It would be entirely reasonable for that Congressman to conclude, and vote accordingly, that the navy was incapable of self-government in the matter of promotion, and that therefore selections for promotion should be made by a duly designated body not composed of naval officers. Any selecting agency operating under present law, will result in an efficient navy, but the most efficient navy will undoubtedly be produced by the best qualified selecting body. That is the Board of Nine Rear Admirals.
Efficiency due to intelligent upkeep, timely repairs, and disposal of cluttering waste, costs money, naturally. But that cost is very small compared to the final loss when operating without upkeep or repairs and choked with refuse.
For the next eleven years, as a glance at the retirement columns of the tables will show, the cost of forced age in grade retirement is negligible, in fact, it is not nearly so much as if the navy were promoting by lineal seniority, during the same period; because all officers who do retire for forced age in grade are Captains, who but for that retirement would become Rear Admirals retiring during service as Rear Admirals, or at the age of sixty-four with flag rank, at greatly increased retired pay. These officers will all have from thirty-five to forty years of service on retirement at fifty-six.
Under promotion by seniority at least three times as many officers will retire with flag rank as will retire with that rank under selection. Now the retired pay of eighteen Rear Admirals yearly will offset the pay of quite a number of retired Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders. Able-bodied Rear Admirals on retirement are of little further use to the navy and the country. On the contrary younger officers, retired in, health, are a reserve of great potential value which does not depreciate until age takes its toll of them likewise.
They become instantly available in time of war, and if the last war may be used as a measure, they are worth many times the money invested in them.
Really no argument can be built up to prove loss in men or money as a result of age in grade retirement. The navy will still have the men and may use them when necessary. It pays them for that prospective use; and it also pays them for the greatly increased efficiency of the active establishment as a result of their departure. Its recompense to them is an inducement for farseeing young graduates of the Naval Academy to make the navy a life work. No such youngster is going to waste time on a profession which has no counterpart in civil life, with the possibility of being thrown out in the cold world at the age of forty-five, unless certain of some compensation for time lost. Assured of a reasonable income while learning new work, then, if the fortunes of selection go against him, he will stick, do his best, and take his chance.
If promotion stops in the navy, the navy stagnates. A method which provides a reasonable flow of promotion at very small cost, which is elastic and adaptable, and which has proven the soundness of its organization in the stress and strain of a great war, should by all means be retained.